abstract

Husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by Husserl in the framework of his genetic phenomenology. Referring to some of Husserl’s genetic pronouncements, the article investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from one’s own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other’s experiences or insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form.

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keywords

Intentionality, habituality, horizon, knowledge, testimony
Proceeding from the descriptive analysis of acts (i.e., of intentional lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware) and oriented toward act-intentionality as the prototype of any intentionality whatever, Husserl described, within the framework of static phenomenology, certain act-moments that are indeed intentional, but are not act-moments of which we are prereflectively aware; under the headings of “empty intention” and “meaning (or intending) more” he assimilates the intentionality of these act-moments to the intentionality of acts and describes them as pertaining to the phenomena of consciousness. I would like to show that assimilating these moments under those headings is inadequate and that broadening the notions of “meaning” and “intention” to include something that is not itself a phenomenon of consciousness, that is not an act-like meaning or intending, is misleading and superfluous: it is misleading because it leads the reflective glance in the wrong direction, and it is superfluous because with familiar habitualities of knowledge and belief we have forms of intentionality that cannot be addressed as forms of act-intentionality, yet play the very same role in the constitution of things and of the world that Husserl ascribed to empty intention and meaning-more. What Husserl was trying to describe “statically,” using the resources of a broadened vocabulary of “consciousness,” as something that is act-like and is thus a type of conscious performance turns out “genetically” to be a performance of non-conscious habitualities whose intentionality is to be characterized as non-episodic intentionality, in contrast to the episodic intentionality of acts.1 Using the example of thing-constitution, I will show in the first part of the present essay that a distinction must be made between episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that something like thing-perception is only possible through their functioning

1 What I am calling “episodic intentionality” in this essay corresponds quite precisely to the form of intentionality that Uwe Meixner called “classical intentionality” or “Brentano-Husserlian intentionality” and highlighted as “the core form of intentionality” in contrast to functionalistic and representationalist conceptions of intentionality—see Uwe Meixner (2006), as well as Meixner (2014), especially Chapter III, “On Intending,” pp. 247–360. This form of intentionality determines the thematic and methodic framework of Brentano’s descriptive psychology of “psychic phenomena” and of Husserl’s earlier phenomenology of intentional lived experiences.
together. In the second, considerably shorter part of this essay, I will show that what holds good for the constitution of things in perception holds good all the more and to an even greater extent for the intentional constitution of the world. Like the intentional constitution of things, the intentional constitution of the world remains incomprehensible without taking into account the constitutive function of the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief: it is essentially due to the intentional horizon-forming performance of these habitualities that we have existing things and an existing world given through empty inner and outer horizons.

1.1 The Original Visual Concept of Horizon and the Phenomenological Concept of Horizon

When we visually perceive such things as houses or tables, we always perceive the whole thing, even though we always only “genuinely” see sides of things. We don’t merely perceive the front side that is intuitively presented to us; instead, we perceive the whole thing: what we refer to perceptually is the thing as a whole, appearing from the front side. It is just this reference to the whole thing that is expressed in everyday language when, for example, we are looking at the house in front of us and say, “This house has been empty for years.” The thing intended in in the perception is the entire physical thing as such standing there before us in person, even if it is always seen from a particular angle and thus always appears only “one-sidedly.” This is precisely what is peculiar to thing-perception, and is what distinguishes it from both pictorial presentations and descriptions in which a thing existing contemporaneously elsewhere is presentified—namely, in thing-perception, the thing itself is not only given as present now, but also as being there in person. Yet all that is “genuinely” perceived at any given time—perceived in the narrow sense of what is immediately present purely visually—is the side of the visually appearing thing that is currently facing us, the side we

2 What will be shown in what follows about acts of thing-perception holds good mutatis mutandis for any act whatever. All analyses of specific types of acts remain incomplete if habitualities and their constitutive function are not taken into consideration.

3 The latter is the case when, e.g., I am standing in front of the Eiffel Tower in Paris and am looking at this landmark itself; if I am looking at a photograph of it or reading a description of it in a travel guide, it is not given in person, but is merely pictorially or symbolically presentified.
could reproduce with the aid of photography or film. In order to make the fact that the perceived thing is given in person as a whole comprehensible in light of the fact that the seen thing necessarily appears from one side, Husserl introduces the phenomenological concept of horizon, or more precisely, of inner horizon. Husserl’s phenomenological concept of horizon can be explained as follows by taking an analysis of the original visual concept of the horizon as a point of departure. A horizon in the original visual sense is a limited sphere of view, relative to the standpoint of the beholder, within which things appear; it moves along with the beholder, and because it shifts in this way it has a movable boundary line that points (in more or less determinate fashion) toward what is potentially visible beyond the boundary line of the sphere of view. (For instance, at sea the horizon line is a movable boundary line of the sphere of view that points toward further, unlimited stretches of open ocean, or else toward sea bounded by shore, and our expectations of the one or the other can be more or less determinate, depending on how much we currently know about our nautical position.) Since a horizon or sphere of view is always only a sphere of view relative to a current standpoint, any talk of horizons is subjective from the start, always also implicitly including the subject in any given case, along with this subject’s movable standpoint. And it is this relativity to the subject that makes the concept of horizon a concept suitable for phenomenological descriptions, since in such descriptions the appearing (more generally: what one is conscious of) is always thematized in its relation to the subjectivity for whom something appears (more generally: for whom something is consciously given). Husserl’s specifically phenomenological concept of horizon does include the components of subject-relativity, delimitedness, and movability (components drawn from the original visual concept of the horizon), but these components receive another, non-visual sense: the components of the visual horizon become components of a horizon of acceptance [Geltungshorizont]. The subject-relative, delimited, and movable field of view of the visible becomes a movable sphere (a sphere that is therefore open, even though delimited) of what currently holds good [gilt] for the subject, and in a double way. On the one hand, it includes acceptances [Geltendes] that are currently actually holding good within the current lived experiences of intentional consciousness; on the
other hand, it includes acceptances that habitually hold good (or better, are in co-acceptance [Mit-Geltung]), especially with regard to fixed convictions in which what holds good for us with the sense “existing” or “real” remains in abiding acceptance, comprising, in its totality, what is suggested in the expression “background knowledge.” This specifically phenomenological concept of horizon—which is indispensable for what follows—can be seen in a manuscript that Husserl wrote around 1933 or 1934. Here what he has in view is the horizon-phenomenon, “world holding good for me [mir geltende Welt],” and he uses the perceptual field and the visual concept of the horizon as the point of departure from which to determine the genuinely phenomenological concept of horizon:

The world holding good for me extends beyond the perceptual field; it has its non-perceptual horizon; [what I have] apart from the latter [is] the perceptual field in its oriented mode of givenness within which all the objects simultaneously perceived in it (the perceptually coexisting objects) have their modes of adumbration as near and far and <within which> a sphere of the outermost still-perceivable distance can be distinguished. This [concept of horizon] [...] in the stratum of visual perception [...] is even the original concept of “horizon.” Of course, the latter word is used ambiguously. It also refers to the entire visual field—to the totality of that which lies within the sphere of the horizon. In phenomenology, [however,] we use the word to designate that which holds good beyond the perceptual field, and then further for all similar cases (fields of memory, etc.). (Hua XXXIX, p. 333f.)

This characterization of the horizon as what holds good beyond the perceptual field (and similar fields of what is intentionally meant) makes it clear that horizon in the specifically phenomenological sense is not something like a background that we are unthetically aware of co-appearing along with the object that we are currently thematically aware of, i.e., the perceptually appearing object standing in the foreground. To equate the “horizon” of consciousness with its “background”

4 Below I will show how the horizon-concept in this passage compares with another horizon-concept Husserl uses elsewhere (horizon as the “induction that essentially belongs to each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself”—see the second passage from Experience and Judgment cited in section 1.2 below).
is to confuse the much more impoverished static concept of the background (which has its original place in the distinction between a salient visual form in the foreground and a visually co-appearing background) with Husserl’s richer, dynamic horizon-concept, whose main characteristic is that what \textit{horizontally holds good}—or better, what is \textit{co-accepted}—does not and must not appear: it can neither co-appear on the perceptually appearing object as a determination of it, nor can it appear within the perceptually co-appearing background. What is decisive is that what lies in the horizon and belongs to it as a component is merely \textit{co-accepted} \textit{[gilt mit]} in what appears, and as \textit{co-accepted}, determines the \textit{sense} with which the appearing appears. And within this total sphere of what holds good for me at any given moment, what currently thematically holds good for me—e.g., the thing holding good for me as currently actually perceived and as determined in such and such a way—is merely a small (albeit central) sector of a whole consisting of everything I have in acceptance in a given living present, including everything that “exists” (in the broadest sense) “for me” at all, part of which I am thematically aware of and part of which is unthematic or entirely out of awareness.

Husserl gives the following answer to the question of how a real thing is constituted for us in perception as there in person \textit{as a whole}, how the sense “real thing” is built up in perception: it is by way of an \textit{inner horizon}, i.e., through the intentions that form this horizon and that \textit{intend beyond what is “genuinely” perceived}. In \textit{Experience and Judgment} (a work edited by Ludwig Landgrebe and published posthumously in 1939), Husserl characterizes the concept of inner horizon with reference to a concept of horizon that is essentially different from the one discussed above:

Each real item arising in experience as something new stands within the world-horizon and thus has its inner horizon. It is known in thematic perception by continually being presented as itself there, while at the same time being explicated in its individual features, its “what”-moments, during the stretch of experiencing [...]. For their part, these features too are known as presenting themselves, but precisely with the sense of features through which the real item is displayed as what it is. [...] Everything that shows itself in this way, and is already implicitly
there even before the explication of what is perceived, essentially holds good as that which is genuinely perceived of the real item in this perception. [The real item] itself is more than what currently comes to actual cognizance or has already come to cognizance: it has the sense that its “inner horizon” constantly imparts to it; the seen side is only a side to the extent that it [reading “es,” not “sie”] has unseen sides that are anticipated in a way that determines the sense. (Husserl 1976, §8, pp. 30f./35; emphasis altered)

Husserl explains the general guiding concept of horizon as follows:

“Horizon” thereby means the induction that essentially belongs to each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself. [...] This originary “induction” or anticipation turns out to be [...] a mode of “intentionality”—precisely the mode that anticipatorily intends beyond a core of givenness [...]. (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 28/32f.; cf. Hua XXXIX, p. 137)

Both the characterization given here of the inner horizon as concerning the possibility of explicating the thing’s being-thus and the general characterization of the horizon-concept that this...
entails have weaknesses.

One weakness lies in falsely equating the horizontal “intending beyond” with an “anticipating,” i.e., with the anticipation of something temporally subsequent. That to equate these is false follows from a fact that can be brought to light in reflection, namely, that determinations (qualities or parts) that are ascribed to the thing, through the “intending-beyond” perception, as belonging to the thing right now are not anticipated, i.e., anticipated as something future, but are appresented, i.e., posited as something co-present. As co-present thing-determinations, the horizontally intended determinations are present, just as the entire thing intended is (as well as what is currently “genuinely” perceived of it). At best, what could be anticipated is its future givenness in future acts of “genuine” perception. The horizon-intentionality characteristic of inner horizons, an intentionality that posits co-present thing-determinations as co-present “implicitly,” is accordingly not anticipating, but appresenting.

A second weakness of the above characterizations of the concepts of horizon and inner horizon arises because what is appresented or posited as co-present are not sides or views of the thing relative to the subject, but objective thing-determinations such as, for instance, the shape and color of the facade of a house I am seeing from the back side, or of its inside, which is hidden from me at the moment. These objective thing-determinations, which would become visible if I were to enter the house or go around to the front side, are the thing-determinations that are co-intended, and co-posited as present, in horizontal intending-beyond. The formula for the constitution of things by means of inner horizons accordingly reads: presentation through appresentation.

This solution of the problem of the in-person givenness of perceptual things as a whole can also be found in Husserl. In a text from the 1930s with the title “Apparition and presentation with respect to individual things and with respect to the whole world,”

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8 Cf. the following related formulation found in Hua XXXIX, Text Nr. 15: “Now perception as perception of the thing, of this thing, is perception through apperception, through horizontal co-acceptance [horizontmitgeltung] as determining the ontic sense. This co-acceptance is ‘indeterminately general.’ Itself-appearing is appearing as determined. What is anticipated in an ‘indeterminate’ manner, in a vague, equivocal, ‘general’ way, is what would appear in a possible [vermögl] continuation of the perception, in a synthetic itself-appearing and as something that itself appears” (p. 141, emphasis added). [The last two sentences of the German original: “Sich selbst zeigen ist sich bestimmt zeigen. Antizipiert ist in ‘unbestimmter’ Weise, in vager, vielseitiger, ‘allgemeiner’ Weise: sich in vermöglich der Fortführung der Wahrnehmung selbst Zeigendes in einem synthetischen Sich-selbst-Zeigen und <sich> selbst Zeigenden.”]
he writes: “Each perception of something transcendent can only present its transcendent object by means of appresentation” (Hua XXXIX, p. 142). And since Husserl also characterizes the appresenting inner horizon that is functioning constitutively here as a so-called empty horizon, he can say in the same text: “Insofar as [...] [empty horizons] are essential for thing-perception, and insofar as a thing can only be present in person at all through their help, they make present [sind sie gegenwärtigend] rather than merely presentifying [vergegenwärtigend]” (Hua XXXIX, p. 142).

What exactly are these empty horizons? And how is the horizon-intentionality that forms them and functions in them to be characterized? Husserl speaks of empty intentions as having the function of appresenting. But what are these appresenting empty intentions? Are they merely acts of a particular type? Are they latent acts co-performed alongside other acts? Or are they moments of acts, non-selfsufficient parts of acts that themselves have nothing act-like about them? In what does the peculiar constitutive performance of empty horizons consist, and how can we make this performance comprehensible?

Within the empty intentions forming the horizons of thing-perceptions, something would be emptily intended insofar as what is “horizonally” intended, and is thereby co-accepted in the objective sense (e.g., the inside of a house I’m familiar with and am perceiving from the outside), is not presentified intuitively. As a rule, no matter what side I am seeing the house from, no phantasy or memory images of its interior hover before me. Husserl emphasizes the non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended when he writes of thing-experience as follows:

Its experiencing intending has an open horizon of possible experiences of the same thing in which whatever is not yet genuinely given would come to genuine givenness. They are not experiences that actually hover before me in advance as intuitively presentified, or even as particular individual experiences of any sort. It is nevertheless a horizon of consciousness, a mode of implicitly intending beyond what is genuinely experienced. This is a “vague,” “non-intuitive” mode such that the sense intended in this intending-beyond is brought to demonstrative display in specific actual or possible [vermöglich] experiences, whether they are able to be freely <generated> or occur on their own; this [demonstrative display] is accompanied by
the evidence that [these experiences] were encompassed in the indeterminate generality [of that horizon of consciousness] in a peculiar way, i.e., vaguely, non-intuitively, indistinctly, yet co-intended. (Hua XXXIX, p. 112)

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl characterizes what is implicitly horizonally co-intended beyond what is genuinely experienced as “what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum” (Hua I, §20, p. 85). The non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended and included in the sense of the cogitatum—a non-intuitiveness that Husserl emphasized—is also not offset by a *symbolic* reference, a symbolic intending-beyond, through linguistic or non-linguistic signs establishing a symbolic relation to what is not “genuinely” perceived of the thing (e.g., the inside of a house seen from the outside), since both of these types of signs are usually lacking in my perceptual consciousness. And in any case, no sort of symbolic consciousness of what is not genuinely perceived of the thing can be descriptively brought to light in reflection on normal prelinguistic thing-perception. But if the appresenting empty intentions consist neither in intuitive nor in symbolic presentifications of what is co-present, how is their performance to be understood, namely, the performance of appresenting something as determinate as, e.g., the familiar interior of a familiar house and not appresenting something completely indeterminate instead? For if all that was appresented was something completely indeterminate, with only the “genuinely” seen side of the house determined, then there would be no perception of a house as a concrete physical thing, and certainly no perception of it as a familiar individual material thing with a familiar interior.

The difficulties in understanding Husserl’s talk of the doubly empty horizon-intentions (i.e., empty both with regard to the intuitive and with regard to the symbolic) can be resolved if one recognizes that Husserl’s conception of inner horizons as formed by *empty intentions* remains trapped in the vocabulary of “consciousness” and accordingly replaces this construction with the Husserlian conception of *acceptance-horizon* [Geltungshorizont]

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9 Passages from Hua I quoted in the present essay generally follow the published English translation, which includes the Hua I page numbers in the margin.
introduced above—and indeed, with a conception of an acceptance-horizon that is the correlate of knowledge and belief, hence the correlate of habitualities, and not of a particular sort of act or act-like act-moments called “empty intentions.” By habitualities Husserl understands “abiding Ego-properties” or “habitual determining properties” (Hua I, §32, 101) that have been passively or actively acquired; to a certain extent, these have an intentional character, since they have intentional “contents” (such as convictions and willed decisions in particular), and to a certain extent they have a non-intentional character (e.g., a person’s typical way of walking or of behaving in conflicts). What is important in our context are habitualities that have an intentional character, and above all those one could call epistemic habitualities.10

As Husserl recognized by the beginning of the 1920s at the latest but probably already realized during the preceding decade,11 only part of the sphere of intentionality consists of acts or intentional lived experiences; another part consists of intentional habitualities of various kinds whose intentionality differs from that of so-called acts. As will be shown below, acts too always

10 The epistemic habitualities (including knowledge and belief) comprise only one part of the multifarious sphere of habitual intentionality; habitualities of willing and valuing in particular also belong to this sphere and co-contribute in their own way to the constitution of the concretely experienced lifeworld. In a text from 1926 on decision as a habituality of willing, Husserl says (Hua XXXIV, pp. 105f.): “A decision I make to go on a journey in eight days is not solely a momentary lived experience, [...] but my decision to go on this journey at that date. The decision to take a course of treatment every day for a year is a general decision, and in its generality it is ‘valid’ ["gültig"] for a year through all the individual activities I carry out, always recurring in being re-awakened as the same decision for me, the same person who is now acting in accordance with what I willed. For a year. Likewise, however, there are also infinite decisions in a true and literal sense. These include any decision for a vocation, a willed resolve that signifies an abiding general attitude of willing for the rest of one’s life [...]”

11 That Husserl already had habitualities in view under the title of “psychic dispositions” in the years following 1910 can be seen from the following remark from Ideas I (Hua III/1, §85, p. 195/206): “Belonging together with [the tendency toward a ‘psychology without a psyche’] is the fact that under the heading of the psychic—especially of the currently actual psychic in contrast to the corresponding ‘psychic dispositions’—one preferably thinks of lived experiences in the unity of the empirically posited stream of lived experiences.” For the sake of consistency of terminology, passages from Hua III/1 quoted in the present essay will depart in some respects from the published English translation, whose page numbers will also be provided. That Husserl paid attention to habitualities (and especially to intentional habitualities) could be due to the influence of Adolf Reinach; according to Wolfgang Künne (1986, p. 175), Reinach was “the first phenomenologist to draw a clear line between a lived experience such as judging and a state such as being convinced,” doing so in an essay that appeared in 1911 (Reinach 1911). Whether or not this historical claim is true may be able to be clarified on the basis of Husserl’s Nachlass. But it seems less probable when one considers that Brentano (1874) already speaks of “unconscious habitus and dispositions” or “habitual dispositions”, even though he excludes them from the sphere of the eo ipso conscious “psychic phenomena” (Book 1, Ch. III, §6; Book 2, Ch. II, §2). This would have to have been Husserl’s initial literary source for his distinction between intentional lived experiences and habitualities.
have components of habitual intentionality, and would hardly be possible without them. If we limit talk of intentions to acts of consciousness, i.e., to intentional lived experiences, while taking appresenting empty horizons as horizons of acceptance, and indeed, as horizons of what is habitually known and believed, then there is no difficulty in understanding the emptiness or non-intuitiveness of what is habitually co-accepted as the non-intuitiveness of what is merely co-known and co-believed. Nor is it difficult to understand how what is known and believed contributes to the unitary objective sense of any perceived thing characterized by in-person givenness, standing there for consciousness as a physical thing as a whole and not merely one side of it. Thus when we look, for example, at the door of an individual closet familiar to us—e.g., our own clothes closet—we know how what is inside it looks, or if we see an individual yet typical clothes closet we are not familiar with, we apprehend it as “a” clothes closet and know in general what such a thing typically looks like inside.12

Both types of knowledge—knowledge of an individual, which concerns a specific clothes closet familiar to us, and the general (and usually rather rough) typical knowledge of any clothes closet whatever—have their sense-determining “efficacy” when we are perceiving clothes closets. But both types of knowledge play their role as knowledge, and knowledge is not an act: it is not an ephemeral episode within the stream of consciousness, but something habitual. Thus knowledge is something abiding in contrast to the flowing lived experiences, and as something belonging to the I, it is transcendent to the stream of consciousness, just as the stream’s I is transcendent to the stream and is the same I at various temporal locations within the stream.13

12 What holds good here for the example of a perceived clothes closet also holds good for any perceived thing whatsoever: “Each thing as a currently perceived thing in ontic acceptance [Daseinsgehalt] is ‘apperceived typically’ in terms of its species and genus, and for their part the species and genus enter into the ont<ic> horizon as types that only now receive their ‘determined’ particularization as what is proper to an ‘individual’” (Hua XXXIX, pp. 140f.). When an unknown individual is apprehended according to its type, it receives a certain concomitant character of familiarity: “Even when the object is initially seized upon and is at first purely and simply contemplated, it does already have its horizons, which are co-awakened right away—first of all, an inner horizon [...]. The object stands there with a character of familiarity from the very beginning; it is apprehended as an object of a certain type that is already known in some way, even if in vague generality. Seeing the object awakens protentional expectations regarding its being-thus, its as yet unseen back side, etc.—regarding whatever individual properties that examining it in more detail would yield” (Husserl 1976, §22, p. 114/104f.).

13 John Locke already had the distinction between episodic and non-episodic forms of knowledge in view with his distinction between actual knowledge and habitual knowledge—see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 4, Ch. 1, §§8 and 9.
known by a subject, which is sometimes termed “background
knowledge,”14 is not a matter of conscious awareness, and is not a
part of the actual or manifest content of consciousness in the
pregnant sense. Yet it determines this content in a peculiar fashion
insofar as it essentially co-determines its core—the objective
sense of the currently appearing object. The actual content of
consciousness (e.g., “my clothes closet, appearing to me right
now in such and such a way”) is indeed essentially co-determined
by knowledge, but this co-determining knowledge is something
habitual belonging to the I, and as such is not an actual, fleeting
content of consciousness. Thus in the case of actual, episodic thing-
perception, the content of consciousness is empty with respect
to the components of knowledge that are implicitly functioning
constitutively without our being consciously aware of them either
intuitively or symbolically. However, this emptiness is really no
surprise; instead, it is a natural and a necessary consequence of
the habitual and non-episodic nature of knowledge. As a content co-
determined by knowledge and therefore by something habitual, the
intentional content of consciousness is accordingly characterized
by an “emptiness” that Husserl conceived in terms of a specific sort
of intentions proper to it—namely, empty intentions functioning in
the inner horizon. If in explaining the emptiness of inner horizons
we resort not to empty intentions but instead to the habituality of
knowledge and its contribution to the constitution of perceptual
things, we can dispense with the descriptively inadequate
construction of “empty intentions” in the sense of acts performed
alongside other acts.

What has been said here about Husserl’s concept of empty
intention also holds good for Husserl’s terms “co-intending”
[Mitmeinung] and “meaning-more” [Mehrmeinung]; when these
terms refer to acts of co-intending and meaning-more, they

14 Smith (2007) speaks of a “background of tacit understanding,” or for short, of the “relevant
background” of a situation (p. 208). However, he neither brings out the habitual knowledge and belief
that this background consists of, nor sees that what is most essentially constituted in these epistemic
habitualities is what Husserl calls “horizon,” and more specifically “acceptance-horizon”; for Smith (p.
287), what the “horizon of an act of consciousness” means is “the range of possibilities for the intended object
that are left open by the act’s noematic sense together with relevant background ideas that are implicit
or presupposed in the core sense.” Smith already defended this position in the important work he co-
authored with Ronald McIntyre, (Smith and McIntyre 1982). In John R. Searle’s conception of intentionality,
the background of habitual intentionality plays an important role under the title of a “network.” This
is a holistic network of non-conscious “intentional states” such as convictions, wishes, hopes, etc., and
according to Searle, it is these, along with a non-conscious background of abilities or “know-how” as well
as general pre-intentional assumptions—all of which he terms “background” for short—that first make
individual conscious states (and acts) possible as such. See Searle (1983), pp. 19–21, 65–71, and Ch. V.
are just other expressions for the concept of empty horizon-intention, and are used in the *Cartesian Meditations* to characterize the constitutive function of horizon-intentionality. All they basically do is to broaden concepts like “meaning” and “intention”—concepts belonging to the vocabulary concerned with consciousness (a vocabulary that arose from the analysis of acts)—without truly grasping and adequately characterizing the phenomena of habitual intentionality that such terms address, phenomena that are indeed already in view in a certain way when such terms as co-intending and meaning-more are used. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl is still talking about a particular type of meaning and intending when he speaks in §20 of “meaning more” and “intending-beyond-itself” in articulating the “fundamental [insight]” that “as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [Meinung seines Gemeinten], but that, at any moment, this something meant [dieses Vermeinte] is more—something meant with something more—than what is meant at that moment ‘explicitly’” (Hua I, p. 84). Husserl explicitly characterizes this general state of affairs as a state of affairs in accordance with an eidetic law: “This intending-beyond-itself, which is implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of it” (Hua I, p. 84).

The hidden “noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone [...] we have one intentional object, and [in each case] this definite one, continuously meant—have it, so to speak, before us as [determined] thus and so” (Hua I, p. 84), which Husserl calls “hidden constitutive performances” here (Hua I, p. 84) and are what he has in view under the title of “meaning more” [Mehrmeinung], are not, however, phenomena of episodic act-intentionality, as the reference to “noetic multiplicities of consciousness” suggests. Instead, they are actually phenomena of non-episodic horizon-intentionality: they are neither acts nor act-like co-meanings or co-intendings, but intentional habitualities. These habitualities are beliefs [Meinungen] that one has; as such, they function appresentationally in intentional acts of thing-perception and make an essential contribution to the perceptual constitution of things as wholes, since what is going on in thing-perception is a global positing of the thing as a whole.
without secretly “co-intending” any qualities, pieces, or moments that are not directly visible. In any case, such “co-intending” in the sense of hidden acts or act-like intentions cannot be descriptively brought to light. It is otherwise with the habitual co-intendings that count as knowledge [Wissen]; in any given case they are in implicit co-acceptance [Mitgeltung] within the global thing-acceptance [Dinggeltung], and thus determine the objective sense of the currently intended thing. The sense-constitutive co-accepting of the knowledge both of general types and of individuals does indeed depend upon an actual performance of an act of thing-perception in order to enter into a constitutive function co-determining the sense at all. But this co-accepting is not itself an act-like co-intending implied in the act of perception: on closer inspection, the alleged horizonal co-intending of what does not “genuinely” appear is a horizonal having in co-acceptance [In-Mitgeltung-Haben], and as I have attempted to show, a having in co-acceptance in the mode of habitual knowledge, which is a form of non-episodic intentionality. Despite the fact that Husserl’s talk of empty intentions, meaning more, and co-intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary of a static phenomenology of consciousness, he did have the habitual, constitutively functioning horizon-intentionality of acquired knowledge in view throughout, and thereby the sphere of non-episodic intentionality per se (to be sure, without making it fruitful for the “official” theory of horizon in the Cartesian Meditations, for which horizons are “predelineated possibilities”15). This can be seen in numerous Nachlass manuscripts from the

15 See Hua I, §19, p. 82: “The horizons are ‘predelineated’ possibilities. We say also: We can ask any horizon what ‘lies in it,’ we can explicate or unfold it, and ‘uncover’ the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. [...] The predelineation [of the potentialities of conscious life] itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure.” It is this completely insufficient and even misleading characterization of the horizon that Smith and McIntyre appeal to when—contrary to the position I defend, and contrary to numerous statements in Husserl—they do not take up the currently co-accepted “background beliefs” into the horizon itself, and merely allow the horizon to “predelineate”: “These beliefs play an essential role in the predelineation of an act’s horizon; they (or their Sinne) ‘motivate’ the possibilities making up the horizon by prescribing what would and would not count, for the subject, as further ‘determination’ of the object as it is given in the present act” (Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. 249f.). That for Husserl the horizon constitutive for the objective sense is not only a horizon of predelineated potentialities but essentially consists of the intentional contents of background beliefs is shown in, for instance, the following statement from Experience and Judgment: “The object [...] is given for consciousness [ist bewusst] along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of acquired knowledge” (Husserl 1976, B25, p. 138/122f.).
1920s and 1930s. But even in published works of this period such as *Cartesian Meditations* and *Experience and Judgment*, there are clear indications of the constitutive role of epistemic habitualities, and in particular of the constitutive role of the habituality of knowledge. In *Experience and Judgment* he writes, for instance, as follows with regard to the knowledge of types that functions constitutively in the experience of things:

A cognitive performance concerned with individual objects of experience is never carried out as if the latter were initially pregiven as substrates that were still entirely indeterminate. For us the world is always already a world in which cognition has already done its work in the most various ways: it is undoubtedly the case that there is no experience (in the sense of a first, unmodified thing-experience) that seizes upon this thing for the first time, taking cognizance of it, without already “knowing” more of it than what is thereby cognitively grasped. Whatever any experience may experience in the genuine sense whereby something comes into view as “it, itself,” each experience necessarily has eo ipso a knowledge and co-knowledge with respect to this very thing—namely, of something proper to it that has not yet come into view. This foreknowledge is contentually indeterminate or incompletely determined, but never completely empty, and if it were not co-accepted [wenn es nicht mitgelten würde], the experience would not be an experience of this one thing at all. (Husserl 1976, §8, pp. 26f./31f.; see also Hua XXXIX, p. 126)

And with reference to the “habitual possession” (Husserl 1976, §67, p. 331/275; §68, p. 340/282; §79, p. 380/313) of object-determinations acquired through explication and constitutive for the objective sense, he writes:

[The object] has taken on forms of sense that were originally constituted in acts of explication, forms of sense [that are now taken on as] habitual knowledge. [...] The object [...] is [henceforth] given for consciousness along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of acquired knowledge: the sediment of the active sense-bestowing in which [the object] previously received a determination is now a component part of the apprehension-sense of the perception [...]. (Husserl 1976, §25, pp. 137f./122f.)
In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl relates the object-constitutive habitualities of the I both to constituted objects and to the constituted surrounding world:

This, my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions make up my surrounding world, so far as I am acquainted with it at the time, with its horizons of objects with which I am unacquainted—that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this formal object-structure. (Hua I, §33, p. 102)

Although Husserl did not take the intentional phenomenon of habitual knowledge (and its contribution to the constitution of things and of the world) sufficiently into account at the level of static phenomenology, and although this phenomenon is more concealed than revealed in his theory of empty intentions, at the level of genetic phenomenology he did clearly establish the constitutive contribution of the habitual and incorporate it into his theory of empty horizons. As I would like to show in what follows, what holds good for the habituality of knowledge in the constitution of objective sense similarly holds good for the habituality of belief: as a mode of habitually taking-for-true, belief essentially contributes to the constitution of things and of the world, and must accordingly receive appropriate consideration in a transcendental-phenomenological description of intersubjective thing- and world-constitution. In phenomenology, as far as I know, hardly any attempts have been made so far to approach this issue.

Before I discuss the constitutive function of belief, I would like to offer some overdue explication of the concepts of “knowledge” and “belief”—concepts I have used up until now in their vague, everyday language signification, trusting that they would be generally understood.

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16 One has the impression that in the *Cartesian Meditations*, constitutive analyses from static phenomenology are presented immediately alongside constitutive analyses from genetic phenomenology.

17 Taking Husserl’s later work as a point of departure, Alfred Schutz investigated the role of knowledge (and especially our knowledge of types) in our lifeworldly experiencing, acting, and knowing; penetrating analyses are to be found in a work written between 1947 and 1951 (Schutz 1970).
I am not using the expression “knowledge” in the sense of the standard analysis of propositional knowledge (“knowledge is justified true belief”), a sense that Edmund Gettier has placed in question.\textsuperscript{18} The standard analysis can serve as an explication of one of the everyday language concepts of knowledge; however, I am using the expression “knowledge” in another sense of the word, likewise occurring in everyday language and arising from a contrast between knowledge and belief (in a non-religious sense to be discussed shortly). In what follows, “knowledge” will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, on the basis of one’s own evidence, i.e., on the basis of one’s own experiences or one’s own insights, be these insights empirical or a priori. (This concept of knowledge corresponds, by the way, with the etymology of the German “wissen,” to know, as “having seen”; the same holds true for the Greek “eidenai.”) In contrast, “belief” will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, on the basis of trusting the knowledge of someone else one trusts.\textsuperscript{19} I take my guiding concepts of belief and knowledge from Josef Pieper’s philosophical treatise On Belief.\textsuperscript{20} There Pieper, following Thomas of Aquinas, explicates “belief” as a three-placed predicate: “Believing always means: believing someone about something. The one who believes in the strict sense of the word accepts a state of affairs as actually obtaining on the basis of the testimony of someone else [...]” (Pieper 1962, p. 31).\textsuperscript{21} In this characterization of the concept Pieper emphasizes the following two interconnected elements: “on the one hand, agreeing with a [judgment about a] state of affairs, taking it for true; on the other hand, agreeing with a person, trusting [this person]” (p. 31), since “the basis [...] upon which one believes ‘something’ is that one believes ‘someone’” (p. 32). The following remarks by Pieper are also illuminating and fruitful for the problem of thing- and

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\textsuperscript{18} Gettier (1963). See also, e.g., Grundmann (2008), pp. 86–109.

\textsuperscript{19} A further concept of knowledge in everyday language encompasses both of the concepts of knowledge and belief just explicated: “knowing that p” means “being informed that p.” This more general (and more contentually impoverished) concept of knowledge leaves open what source the “information” comes from and cannot be used for my purposes, since what I am concerned with is precisely what the source of being informed is.

\textsuperscript{20} Pieper (1962) was reprinted in Pieper (1997). Page references in the present essay are to the German edition (Pieper 1962).

\textsuperscript{21} For the purposes of the present essay, the other current determination of belief as “taking [something] as true on a basis that is indeed objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient” (Kant 1968, p. 67) is also unusable as an explication of the word “belief.”
world-constitution in the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief: “To believe means: to participate in the knowledge of someone who knows” (p. 49). Since such participation is a type of grasping reality, then someone who believes someone else who knows “is able to grasp more reality” (p. 52) than is possible when one relies only upon what one has experienced oneself or knows only on the basis of one’s own insights—and apart from cases of pathological mistrust, we do not normally rely solely upon our own experiences and insights in everyday life. Instead, ever since early childhood we participate to an ever larger extent and in many different ways in a knowledge that we have not acquired for ourselves and that we ourselves do not genuinely possess.22

It is further essential for belief in the sense thematized here that the one who believes is subjectively certain of what he or she believes (cf. Pieper 1962, p. 60). This too is relevant for our problem of constitution, since whoever believes someone about something is relying upon the truth of what has been said, taking it “at face value.” For such a person, things are the way the believed, trusted other says they are. Thus for the one who believes, a state of affairs the other presents as obtaining does indeed obtain. In this respect belief has the same epistemic effect as knowledge: it makes reality accessible, and for the believing subject, it constitutes what exists in the pregnant sense, i.e., objects and states of affairs that are intersubjectively demonstrable as existing.23 It should therefore now be clear that belief in the sense of “taking objects as existing and states of affairs as obtaining” on the basis of the testimony of others has a crucial object- and world-constituting function, since apart from the relatively small compass of taking-for-true in the mode of knowledge (in the sense explicated above, i.e., taking-for-true on the basis of one’s own experience and insight), it is above all taking-for-true in the mode of belief that has objects that

22 Here we may point to the epistemological problem of knowledge on the basis of the testimony of others, a problem that has been intensively discussed among analytically oriented epistemologists ever since Coady (1992); cf. Laskey and Sosa (2006).

23 In the case of knowledge and belief as specific forms of having-in-acceptance, it must be noted that with Husserl, “holding good” or “acceptance” (Geltung) is not the same as “validity” (Gültigkeit). Everything valid is indeed accepted as holding good, but not everything accepted as holding good has the status of validity. In this sense, as Husserl says in an as yet unpublished manuscript, “To hold good is not yet to be valid in the pregnant sense. [...] Validity, truth [...] is a child of critique” (“Geltend ist aber noch nicht im prägnanten Sinn gültig. [...] Die Gültigkeit, die Wahrheit [...] ist ein Kind der Kritik”—Ms. B I 10/56). In the present translation, “gültig” is translated as “valid”; the terms ‘gelten’ and “Geltung” are always rendered using some version of the locutions “holding good” and “acceptance.”
exist and states of affairs that obtain as intentionally correlated with it, and that has a world holding good as existing as its total intentional correlate. That belief has a thing- and world-constitutive function is familiar to everyone from everyday life. If we learn from people we believe that our neighbor is incurably ill with cancer, then on our next encounter we will see this neighbor with different eyes; the sense in which this person immediately appears to us in perception has become different. Hence what we have here is belief, in the sense just explicated, in its constitutive function of determining the objective sense. It is similar in more primitive cases of “enrichment of meaning” and “continuing development of meaning” (Hua VI, p. 161/158). What Husserl describes in the following quotation, although without using the word “belief” (he speaks instead of “co-judging, as it were”), is a simple case of constitution through belief, a case in which the appresentation of a thing-quality is accomplished through taking over and believing something communicated and through the subsequent involuntary habitualization of what is thus taken over:

If someone says to me that the back side of the thing is red, then I apply the predicate “red” to it, co-judging, as it were; [...] then what the thing attains for me is both the closer determination of the back side as red and the conceptual content of this determination, although not on the basis of my own experience determining the thing. (Hua XXXIX, p. 425)

The thing holds good for me henceforth—up until a possible correction of my conviction compels me to new knowledge—as a thing whose back side is red. My belief, my habitual taking what is said by another as true, thus determines the inner horizon of the thing, and thereby implicitly determines the total sense of the thing in the mode of a habitual intentionality. Using the vocabulary of Ideas I, Husserl could characterize the habitual intentionalities of knowledge and belief as noeses, and indeed, as habitual noeses. As habitual noeses, the noeses of knowledge and belief are non-episodic noeses. But in contrast

24 Husserl introduced the concept of noesis as the concept correlative to that of noema in Ideas I (1913), but it seems that all he thematized there were noeses that as performances of intentional sense-bestowing had the character of currently lived (or livable) intendings, intendings we are explicitly conscious of (Hua III/1, cf. §885, pp. 87f.).
to episodic noeses (e.g., judgments performed in speech acts of assertion or perceptual observations of processes), I have no consciousness of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. It is even a criterion of habitual noeses that we can legitimately ascribe them to someone asleep or unconscious, whereas we cannot ascribe episodic noeses to a sleeping or unconscious person. Thus, for example, I can legitimately claim that a sleeping person knows that Paris is the capital of France or that $2 \times 2 = 4$, just as I can legitimately claim that this person knows how to swim or to play the piano. When someone knows or believes this or that, this person is not prereflectively aware of this knowledge or belief (along with the known or believed-in state of affairs); the person has no lived experience of this knowledge or belief: to use the language of Brentano, it is not the content of an accompanying “inner consciousness.” What characterizes acts (intentional lived experiences)—namely, that they are lived, that we are prereflectively aware of them as such—does not apply to the habitualities of knowledge and belief. When I know that Paris is the capital of France or that $2 \times 2 = 4$, I do not have a lived experience of knowing these states of affairs. In contrast, when I am watching a bird sitting in a tree, I am immediately conscious of perceiving something; when I add 143 and 922 “in my head,” I am immediately aware that I am doing so. When I carry out such episodic noeses, someone can ask me, “What are you doing right now?” or “What were you doing a moment ago?” (using the word “doing” in the broadest sense), and I can provide the answer on the basis of my prereflective awareness of the acts carried out, saying, for instance, “Right now I am watching the bird in that tree over there” or “I just added 143 and 922 ‘in my head.’” It is similar for the episodic psychic states that I am aware of (feelings, moods), states about which someone can ask me, “How are you feeling right now?” But this kind of question cannot be posed in principle about habitual noeses.

25 Cf. Brentano’s exposition in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano 1874), Book 2, Ch. II, III. Given the sharp distinction Brentano draws between inner perception and inner observation (Book 1, §2), the only thing Brentano can mean by “inner perception” or “inner consciousness” is what has more recently been termed prereflective self-awareness. Gallagher and Zahavi allege that when Brentano speaks of inner consciousness, he means something other than “prereflectively, my experience is not itself an object for me” or “I do not occupy the position of an observer, spectator, or intraspector who attends to this experience”—see Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), p. 53; however, this interpretation has no foundation in the text of the abovementioned two chapters on inner consciousness in Brentano’s main work.
That it belongs to the essence of habitual noeses of knowledge and belief that they are not present for lived experience or prereflective awareness does not alter their status as intentional, for they are both characterized by the same feature that acts or intentional lived experiences also exhibit: namely, by mineness \([jemeinigkeit]\) and by having an intentional objectivity (an object in the narrower sense or a state of affairs), a theme, something that they are “about” (in discussions of intentionality in English-speaking philosophy of mind, this latter specific quality of intentionality has tentatively been termed “aboutness”). The habitualities of knowledge and belief are distinguished by mineness insofar as they have an intentional subject, i.e., the subject who knows or believes something.

They are distinguished by so-called “aboutness” or “directedness”\(^{26}\) toward an intentional objectivity insofar as they are related to an objectivity (an object in the narrower sense or a state of affairs)—one that as an intentional objectivity has the distinguishing feature that nothing real has to correspond to it: the object purely and simply as intended need not exist, the state of affairs purely and simply as intended need not obtain.\(^{27}\) We can nevertheless thematize the intended objectivity as such (i.e., the currently intended objectivity as intended), analyzing and describing the manner in which it is intended without paying the slightest attention to the question of the reality of what has been purely and simply intended. If we use the term “noema” to designate not only what is intended as such in the case of episodic noeses but also what is intentionally meant as such in a non-episodic manner in knowledge and belief (i.e., the habitually

\(^{26}\) The metaphorical talk of “being directed” toward something (an objectivity in the broadest sense) is only good for a first, rough characterization of intentionality, and proves inadequate for numerous types of episodic intentionality. However, we cannot use the metaphor for the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief either, as if a subject were “directed” toward known or believed-in objectivities (states of affairs); here the metaphor of “aboutness” is more appropriate. In these and in all other cases of intentional relatedness toward something, both locutions (“directedness” and “aboutness”) point to the formal quality whereby intentional relations are asymmetrical relations: something (and indeed, always a “subject”) is related to something (an “object”) in a certain way, not the other way around.

\(^{27}\) As Husserl says in §90 of Ideas I, “every intentional lived experience [...] has its ‘intentional Object,’ i.e., its objective sense. [...] The situation defining [this sense for us is] the circumstance [...] that the non-existence (or the conviction of non-existence) of the objectivated or thought of object pure and simple pertaining to the objectivation in question (and therefore to any particular intentional lived experience whatever) cannot rob any objectivation of its ‘being objectivated’ as such” (Hua III/1, pp. 206f./217f.).
accepted as such), then with knowledge and belief we have noeses that do indeed have an intended objectivity (a habitually intended state of affairs as such), but as *habitual* noeses do not have the character of being carried out in prereflective awareness.

In light of such *non-conscious* noeses, Husserl’s concept of noesis becomes problematic; the question arises whether we need the concept of noesis at all—indeed, whether it has any descriptive contents at all. Either the habitualities of knowledge and belief are noeses, or they are not. In the first case, if they are noeses, then it is not essential for noeses to be lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware, so “noesis” becomes equivalent to “having a noema”—e.g., the noesis of being convinced is nothing other than having a conviction, and visual perceiving is nothing but having a visual perceptual appearance. But in the second case, if they are not noeses, then there is no universal “correlation” of noesis and noema characterizing the entire field of intentionality in general, and the correlation must accordingly be limited to the sphere of intentional lived experiences. With the former case, we are close to dispensing with the concept of noesis entirely and characterizing the multiform field of intentionality purely noematically, i.e., limiting all descriptive analyses of acts and habitualities to analyses of noemata.28 In the latter case, we have the by no means trivial task of descriptively exhibiting the actuality of noeses in the sphere of intentional lived experiences and giving the concept of noesis a precise signification. If one wants to retain both the concept of noesis and the so-called noetic-noematic correlation as a universal correlation—which is what I would like to advocate—then one must allow non-conscious habitual noeses on the one hand while showing on the other hand how episodic and non-episodic (habitual) noeses can be descriptively brought to light. This would call for attaining greater determinateness and a definitive content not only for the concept of the noesis, but also for the notoriously controversial notion of the noema.

I am conscious of a judgment or a perception I actually carry out, and such consciousness is “inner perception” in Brentano’s sense, i.e., I am prereflectively aware of performing such an act, and in

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28 Hans-Ulrich Hoche has been advocating dispensing with the noema ever since publishing his *Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib* (Hoche 1973). He is particularly convincing in his latest book (Hoche 2007), especially in his extensive essay on “Consciousness” (pp. 129–95), which from a methodological point of view provides a successful synthesis of the methods of phenomenology and of linguistic analysis.
each case I can in principle provide descriptions of it through subsequent reflection founded on retention or recollection. As shown above, however, it is completely different in the case of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. Among these (and certainly not the least of these) we find knowledge of our own current “circumstances” (in the broadest sense), especially the knowledge of where I am in space and time right now. At the moment, for instance, I know that while I am composing this text I am in my office at the philosophical institute in Aachen. But I am not explicitly conscious of this knowledge, in contrast, for example, to the numerous acts of thinking and writing I am performing while I’m working on this section of the essay—I am prereflectively aware of the latter acts as I carry them out, and thus I can recall them and thematize them in acts of reflection. To this (non-conscious) knowledge of one’s own current circumstances there also belongs the knowledge of social circumstances and relationships. Thus I know, e.g., that I am at a party when I am discussing a philosophical problem with another guest at the party, or that I am talking to my superior when I am making a request to the head of the institute, and this sort of knowledge of my circumstances is also characterized by non-episodic intentionality.

I am indeed not conscious of my habitual noeses (along with their noemata), but they are nevertheless undoubtedly “there” and determine the sense of the currently appearing objectivity (more generally: the objectivity I am currently conscious of). But there is more to it than that. These non-conscious noeses also effectively determine my action: they are at work (and their efficacy can be descriptively brought to light) in all cases of action in which the actor automatically takes habitually accepted contents (of knowledge or belief) into account. And apart from the “actions” of newborns, this is true for all actions. Even when the actor is giving no thought whatever to these contents (and thus is not “conscious” of them in the narrower sense of being explicitly aware of them), they are mentally, as it were, “in view” [“in Sicht”] insofar as the actor is taking them into consideration in “circumspective” [“umsichtig”] action. Thus, for example, we are habitually keeping

29 What Heidegger describes in §§22 and 23 of Sein und Zeit (Heidegger 1927) as the familiar spatial surrounding world “circumspectively” [umsichtig] articulated into “places” and “regions” is a phenomenon that cannot be made comprehensible without turning to the habitual intentionality of knowledge and belief. In a genetic perspective, all forms of familiarity and acquaintance turn out to be manifestations of habitual intentionality.
in mind that we are at a museum when we speak in muted tones and refrain from munching on the sandwiches we’ve brought along or lighting up a cigarette. We know, or as we can also loosely say, we are “aware” that we are in a museum, and we act accordingly without bringing the fact that we are in the museum to explicit awareness (whether continually or discretely).

What holds good both for praxis in the usual sense and for the situated knowledge relevant to the action concerned also holds good for perception, which Husserl called a “primal praxis” \([\text{Urpraxis}]\) underlying all other practice. 30 When we are perceiving a house, for example, whatever we know about an individual house familiar to us or about houses in general is also habitually mentally “in view,” and this knowledge has its effect in the primal praxis of perception, co-determining the individually and typically determined sense that the perceived objectivity has for us as well as co-determining the way we behave toward it. This is what lends an individually or merely typically familiar thing (we know this specific house or this type of house\(^{31}\)) its character of “familiarity” \(\text{[“Bekantheitscharakter”]}\). But what is known \((\text{gewusst})\) about a house in this manner (and thereby functions in determining the sense of what we are perceiving) has nothing to do with anything explicitly conscious \((\text{bewusst})\). It is not a manifest content of consciousness—all we are explicitly conscious of here is the perceptually intended house as a whole, even though it does have a certain implicit character of individual or typical familiarity. And the moment that determines the perceived house as “familiar” is the moment in which the habitual noesis of the relevant knowledge “exerts its efficacy.”

Insofar as knowledge and belief are horizon-intentionalities that essentially co-participate in the constitution of any (individually or typically) familiar perceptual thing we encounter, they are a phenomenon of habitual intentionality for which we could coin the German term \(\text{“Gewusstsein”}\) (literally, being-known), following the model of the German word \(\text{“Bewusstsein”}\) (consciousness—

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30  See Hua XXXIX, Beilage XXVI, pp. 382–84.
31  Here and elsewhere in the present essay I am disregarding the everyday language distinction between two German verbs meaning “to know,” “kennen” and “wissen.” We say that we know objects (especially persons and places) in the sense that we “recognize” them (kennen), but not that we know them in the sense of possessing knowledge about them (wissen). However, I am taking the concept of knowledge (Wissen) in a broad sense that also includes recognizing and being familiar with objects. (Note that the English version of this essay also makes no distinction between being explicitly “conscious” of something and being explicitly “aware” of it.)
literally, being-conscious). How could this be expressed in English? We might turn to the neologism “knownness,” but not as a predicate that merely expresses the status of something known irrespective of the way in which it is known. Instead, what “knownness” points to here is first of all a specific manner of being-known that is not a matter of our being explicitly conscious of something. In addition, however, our concept of “knownness” refers to something that is not only already known, but comes into play by implicitly “informing” our lived experience in a currently given case, exerting its efficacy by contributing to the constitution of the sense of the situation or object itself. Thus in the present essay, the term “knownness”—a term that can play a useful role in the theory of constitution and that will be understood in a broad sense including implicitly being-believed-in—designates the habituality of taking states of affairs as obtaining, and doing so in the modes of knowledge and belief in such a way that what is known or believed in is relevant to the situation of the action and/or sense-determining, here and now, for what one is currently explicitly and thematically aware of through an intentional lived experience.

Hence it is this actual, living, sense- and action-determining reference to what we are currently thematically conscious of in any given case that distinguishes the contents of “knownness” from sheer contents of knowledge. Knowledge can also be “dead,” completely irrelevant for the current situation and the objectivities given for consciousness (and most of our individual stock of knowledge is irrelevant for the currently actual situation!); in contrast, the contents of knownness are, in accordance with our concept of knownness, distinguished by being situationally relevant and by their immediate sense-reference to what is currently thematic for consciousness. But if, along with Husserl, we understand the expression “consciousness” in the narrowest sense, contents of knownness are not contents of consciousness, even if they contribute to (and in this sense co-comprise) the sense of the objectivity or action that we are explicitly aware of. When I am admiring the closet door I am looking at, I already “know” that it leads to something “inside”—I don’t have any sense that what I am looking at is a dummy door—yet I am not “conscious of” this interior: it is not the object of an intentional lived experience (and although I “know” that I
could explore what is inside the closet in new acts, I only “know” this because, and to the extent to which, I “know” that it has an “inside” in the first place). In the narrowest sense of the words “conscious” and “consciousness,” contents of knownness are “non-conscious.” Thus with regard to these contents we find ourselves in the epistemic state that Husserl terms “non-consciousness,” since “what is ‘conscious’ in the narrowest sense means [...] what I am occupied with, what pertains to the unity of the being-occupied-with—and this itself once again has a central mode, <that> of having consciousness of, being conscious of, in the narrowest sense of all, [referring to] what lies in the center, the original point of [our] being-occupied-with-[something]” (Hua XLII, p. 38). Thus contents of knownness are non-conscious in both the narrow and the narrowest sense of the word “conscious.” However, they are also non-conscious in the broader sense of “conscious” in which this term is applied to the perceptual field that I always have as an awake I, a field that includes everything that is merely affectively present and “ready” to be perceived.\textsuperscript{32} Compared with these three significations of “conscious,” then, habitual contents of knownness are non-conscious, whether they arise from one’s own experiences and insights or rest on the testimony of others. As indicated above, however, in a certain manner they are nevertheless “there” as contents co-accepted in the contents of consciousness pertaining to the current thing-perception—they “too” are “there” [“mit da”] as contents co-determining the currently actual objective sense. The intentional consciousness currently intending its thematic object is “saturated” and “permeated,” as it were, with knownness, and would hardly be thinkable in its current concrete intentionality without this knownness. Suppose, for instance, that we attempted to remove all contents of knownness—everything having to do with what is individually or typically known or believed—from the perceptual consciousness we have when looking at our wristwatch, stripping away the individual and typical character of familiarity pertaining to “my watch,” “any watch whatever,” “any cultural thing whatever,” “any thing whatever”; such a denuded perception would not even deserve the name “thing-perception.” Husserl therefore says the following about the contentually more or less determinate (but never empty) constitutively co-
functioning individual and typical “knowledge and co-knowledge” of a thing: “if it were not co-accepted, then the experience would not be an experience of this one thing at all” (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 27/32; emphasis added).

Such thought experiments attempting to omit something known or believed can help to determine whether or not something is currently co-accepted—whether something belongs to a specific actual content of consciousness as a relevant “knownness,” or whether it is situationally irrelevant knowledge that remains “dead” at the moment. Lived experiences of disappointment have a similar function. If, for example, I am putting on the shirt I had laid out to wear on my trip and discover, to my annoyance, that there is a button missing, this demonstrates after the fact that when I was getting my travel clothes ready, I had “presumed” that all of the buttons were there—thus that a state of affairs did indeed “obtain”—without ever having explicitly intended this state of affairs or having become thematically aware of it. However, the habitual presumption that has been situationally “activated” as relevant here in the form of “taking this state of affairs as obtaining” is nothing other than “knownness” in the sense discussed, and the state of affairs held to obtain is nothing other than its knownness-content.

Up to this point, I have attempted to show that the perceptual consciousness of things mingles episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that such habitualities as knowledge and belief play an important—and indeed necessary—constitutive role in such consciousness. In what follows, I would like to provide a sketch of the role these epistemic habitualities play in the constitution of the world of realities as a whole, suggesting how they are co-effective in “bringing the world’s being and being-thus to constant acceptance for me” (“für mich Sein und Sosein der Welt zu beständiger Geltung zu bringen”—Ms. B I 14/37b). This broader problem of constitution can be put into words in the following question: what makes it possible for us to be “conscious” of a world as a whole in every moment of our waking life while we are intentionally occupied with this and that, so that we are therefore “conscious” of our waking life as a living-in-the-world? Here too, Husserl’s answer makes good use of the concept of horizon in the form of the outer horizon and of the world-horizon as the outermost outer horizon.
A text from 1933 offers the following illuminating characterizations of the concept of horizon in general and of the concepts of both inner horizon and outer horizon, with the latter lying halfway, as it were, to the concept of world-horizon:

The *horizontality*—the non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently specifically aware of, or the horizon of latent, non-conscious, and yet co-accepted sense pertaining to the patent, intuitively fulfilled sense, and indeed, as co-determining <the> sense of the patent objectivity—is, however, a double horizontality. On the one hand, it concerns the substrate-structure of the intuitively presented real item insofar as the latter [...] has its [inner] horizon of explication; [...] <on the other hand>, the concrete objects stand within outer horizons, within their intuitive fields, which in their ontic sense themselves have [...] sense-determinations “from the outside.” (Hu a XXXIX, pp. 102–104)

What Husserl here calls “horizon” is the sense-determining, co-accepted “non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently specifically aware of,” and this corresponds to what has previously been said about the habitual horizon-intentionalities of knowledge and belief, whose knowledge- and belief-contents are non-conscious, but—as co-accepted contents—are nevertheless sense-determining for the conscious or patent objective sense. In the passage just quoted, Husserl characterizes the outer horizon as the field of intuitive but unthematic objects surrounding the object that is currently thematically intuitive. Whenever we are related to an object of this field through an act of perception, we are automatically and “passively” (non-actionally) co-related to this co-appearing field. Beyond this passively co-appearing perceptual field given in horizonal awareness we find an enveloping field of which we are not conscious, yet toward which we are always “intending beyond” (as Husserl terms it in his vocabulary of consciousness). But such intending-beyond toward what is no longer perceived is a habitual intending-beyond in the form of knowledge and belief. And as a habitual, universal horizon-intention, it ultimately reaches beyond all currently intuitive fields to the *world* constantly co-accepted as the total unity of realities. As the quotation above puts it, each intuitive individual thing receives “sense-determinations ‘from the outside,’” i.e., from the habitually known and believed-in world. In addition, however, the currently co-conscious,
indeterminately delimited perceptual field as a whole receives the sense of being something from the world or a sector of the world. Speaking of being “conscious” or “aware” of something in a loose sense of these expressions, Husserl writes as follows about this sense—a sense that all appearing things (as well as qualities of and relations between things) have, as appearing, in common: “[we are] conscious of all of [...] the real items we are currently aware of as real objects (qualities, relations, etc.) from the world, as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon” (Husserl 1976, §8, p. 29/33). Husserl characterizes this peculiar sense-determination quite similarly in another text in which (once again using his extended vocabulary of consciousness) he says of the “total world-field” (“totale[n] Weltfeld”) that it “is in acceptance for consciousness by virtue of an indeterminately general co-intending that constantly gives the sector as such the sense of [being a] sector” (“bewusstseinsmäßig in Geltung ist, vermöge einer unbestimmt allgemeinen Mitmeinung, die ständig dem Ausschnitt als solchem den Sinn eines Ausschnittes gibt”—Ms. E III 11/2a). This sense of being a sector, of “being something from the world”—this sense with which everything real appears to us, a sense that lends anything and everything, even the most fleeting and private stirrings of our souls, the sense of worldliness—is, however, not a phenomenon of consciousness. Instead, as an effect of horizon-intentionality, and as a phenomenon of habitual knowledge and belief, it is a phenomenon of knownness in the sense explicated above. At every moment of our waking lives we know of the world as the totality of spatiotemporal realities constantly encompassing us, and we know this in the form of a habitual “indeterminately general co-intending.” But this means that in all experience of real items, we also have an implicit knowledge of each appearing real item, each appearing plurality of real items, and each field of real items within which something real appears as salient as being sectors of the world.33 When Husserl says that the “world [...] [is] pregiven as holding good horizonally” (“Welt [...] vorgegeben [ist] als horizonthaft geltende”—Ms. A VII 12/81a, emphasis added), he is using neutral terminology to characterize this universal descriptive state of affairs. The use of the locution “holding good horizonally” offers the possibility of doing descriptive justice both to the sectoriality

33 This implicit knowledge of “the world” can take very different forms and varies not only from culture to culture, but within a person’s lifespan, as well as within the history of smaller and larger human communities. The world comes to awareness [bewusst] or is known [gewusst] differently for humans with a mythical image of the world and humans whose worldview is shaped by modern science. The different knowledge of (and belief about) the world co-determines in each case what the world currently holds good as and how it is co-accepted in experience and action.
already mentioned and to the fact that “any experience of something belonging to the world [is] at the same time [implicitly] an experience (although an unthematic one) of the world as a totality” (“jede Erfahrung von Weltlichem, obschon unthematisch, [implizit] zugleich totale Welterfahrung [ist]”—Ms. A VII 12/79b), thus avoiding the vague and awkward talk of “co-intending” or “co-consciousness,” as well as the ambiguous sense in which the noun “co-intending” (Mitmeinung) can refer either to the noetic side (Mitmeinen as the act of co-intending) or to the noematic side (Mitgemeinte as its co-intended correlate).

Because the “noetic” or subjective “correlate” of ongoing and enduring ontic acceptance [Seinsgeltung] is not a current episodic intending or having-in-consciousness but a habitual having-in-acceptance, and because knowledge and belief are both fundamental epistemic modes of having-in-acceptance, the subjective “correlate” of the sense-formation holding good for me as “existing world” is a knowing or believing. As habitual horizon-intentionalities, knowledge and belief are the “passive” (non-actional), non-episodic subjective performances thanks to which we have a world at all, and indeed, have it as the “existing total unity of realities existing in themselves” (Hua XXXIX, p. 83) that is necessarily co-accepted with ontic certainty in the experience of real items.34 But as the habitually known or believed-in universal unity of sense and acceptance, the world of realities—a world that we are not explicitly aware of in experiencing individual mundane realities—is still not something that we are somehow “co-aware” of, not something “co-intended” in act-like fashion as is the case with, say, the co-perceived background co-appearing with a seen thing. The language of “knowledge” and “belief” is suitable for the phenomenon of habitually having-in-acceptance, and allows us to call the phenomenon we are actually dealing with (i.e., the epistemic phenomenon of habitual intentionality) by its true name without tempting us to overextend the vocabulary of “intending” or to reach for such ambiguous expressions as “co-intending” or “meaning more.” With the help of the terms “knowledge” and “belief,” then, we can give unequivocal expression to the intentional performances that make the world present to us at every moment of our waking life as the totality of realities that are habitually held in constant ontic acceptance—and that constantly make us, ourselves habitually present to ourselves as beings existing in the world.

34 The being of the world is certain because “as the totality of individual entities standing in co-acceptance starting from any [particular] individual entity, the total horizon cannot be modalized. The type of ontic certainty [Seinsgewissheit] of the world that is founded in the modalizable certainty pertaining to individual [entities] is the apodictic basis for all modalizations, etc.” (Hua XXXIX, p. 128).
at every moment of our waking life. These intentional performances consist precisely in the “appresenting” performances of knowledge and belief, which as habitualities are necessarily non-conscious, but which as sense-determining intentional performances lend all spatiotemporal realities—and thereby us, ourselves—the sense of being mundane, of being something in the world. In a manuscript from the 1930s, Husserl expresses this state of affairs as follows:

Whatever I may be thematically occupied with, it is known to me as something existing in the world. With anything and everything, I have ontic certainty of the world. I have this a priori with every single experience, with every single perceptual field, with every single theme, with everything, as a horizon of continual, permanent certainty running through shifting themes. (Hua XXXIX, p. 73)

The permanence of a world holding good as existing for an I is the “correlate” of the permanence of the habitualities that this I has developed or acquired, since the I at the center of the countless performances of intentional life is a concrete subject for whom the world “constantly” exists—and is such a subject only as a “substrate of habitualities” rather than as “an empty pole of identity” (Hua I, §32, pp.

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35 Here it can merely be mentioned that by being known in empty horizons as the universe of what is present and co-present, the world is also known as a world with a world-past and a world-future. Husserl emphasizes the role of empty intentions in the constitution of the world as a temporal formation in a manuscript from 1932: “As soon as we are directed toward things we speak of what exists in their surroundings but is not seen. Thus in its infinity, in its indeterminate determinability, the surrounding world is given at any moment as the surrounding world relative to our own lived body, and is given originaliter. As [it is] for the present, so [is it] also similar for <the> past through the accompanying expectations and for <the> past through the empty retentions. What is constituted through all of these forms of empty intentions is thus not only the delimited unitary thing or a ‘genuinely’ perceived part of the surrounding world, but the entire world in an indeterminate spatial present stretching into the past and into an indeterminate future” (Hua XXXIX, p. 143).

36 It may be remarked in passing that this state of affairs—i.e., the fact that the world I experience at every waking moment as “a world holding good for me as existing” is a formation of habitual knowledge, belief, and knownness—determines the methodical sense of the phenomenological epoché: I cannot refrain from knowledge of the world and of entities in the world, I cannot abandon this conviction, because all I can refrain from is the performance of acts; however, convictions such as knowledge and belief are not acts, but something habitual. As Husserl says in numerous places, all I can refrain from is making use of my world-knowledge and world-belief, for “having a conviction and making use of this conviction within a sphere of judgment, letting an ontic ground be given through the conviction, are two different things” (Hua Mat IV, p. 74). It lies within our freedom to make no use of our convictions; we can decide to make no use of them, and as phenomenologists, we can maintain this decision in our descriptive work, thus refraining from all prescientific and scientific judgments that explicitly or implicitly posit the existence of the world or of items in the world. Through this refraining (epoché) we reduce the sphere of possible judgments to the sphere of possible phenomenological judgments, i.e., to the sphere of possible judgments about pure phenomena—phenomena purified of naive positing of entities: “phenomena of being” (“Seinsphänomene”), phenomena in which entities still appear, but only as entities holding good for me (us) as existing.
What holds good for individual objects constituted as existing also holds good for the world constituted as existing as a whole: the “abiding existence and being-thus [is] a correlate of the habitualit[ies] constituted in the Ego-pole [itself] by virtue of [its] position-taking[s]” (Hua I, §33, p. 102). It is by virtue of such position-takings and of countless acquired and “firmly developed” habitualities that “a Nature [...], a cultural world, a [human] world with [its] social forms, and so forth” exists for an I (Hua I, §37, pp. 109f.). Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological principle “that nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness” is accordingly to be supplemented by adding, “or by virtue of the intentional performance of non-conscious habitualities,” since habitualities essentially belong to the performances of the “effective intentionality” thanks to which entities—and finally, the world as a whole—exist for me at all.

As the constitution of an objective world existing through and for a concrete subject endowed with habitualities, world-constitution necessarily has an intersubjective dimension: the objective world, which has the sense, “world for everyone,” rests upon communication and tradition, and thereby upon taking over and “believing” the knowledge of others. Nature in particular (in the sense of what holds good for us as objective nature) is an intersubjective unity of sense and acceptance whose subjective correlate is empirical knowledge that is intersubjectively confirmed and accepted as valid [gültig], i.e., knowledge procured by natural science—more concretely, knowledge that natural scientists convey to us and that we “believe” and take over for our own stock of knowledge. The world holding good for

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37 Hua XVII, §94, p. 241/234. Husserl expresses the same principle in two further places in the same section: “No being nor being-thus for me, whether as actuality or as possibility, but as accepted by me [mir geltend]” (Hua XVII, p. 241/234); “Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something that [...] has received its whole being-sense for me from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality” (Hua XVII, p. 241/234).

38 As early as 1917 Husserl already mentions the role that “believing in” knowledge taken over from others plays in the intersubjective constitution of the world; writing in “Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (a paper never published during his lifetime), he says: “[...] to a great extent (although not always), I do not content myself with merely empathizing with [other persons]; rather, I ‘take over’ their experiences, their judgments, their theories—i.e., I do not merely ascribe these to others as opinions and convictions these others hold, but simultaneously award them the value of being accepted by me. Along with my experience via empathy—my experience that the other is experiencing thus and such—I carry out a ‘co-experience,’ participating in their positing even where I am not simultaneously experiencing the same objectivities that I have ascribed to them as actual experiential givens. It is the same when I believe in and take up any descriptive statements that others make about something I myself have not seen. Thus to a great extent it is through this kind of co-positing that I adopt and am informed by many of the position-takings I have experienced via empathy, especially with regard to others’ judgments and conclusions about the world, with regard to their world-knowledge of any type” (Hua XXV, p. 180).
each individual is accordingly not merely a sense-formation whose subjective correlate is each individual’s own knowledge, but is also, and above all, a sense-formation that is the correlate of belief in the sense of accepting the truth of something communicated by others. The world intersubjectively valid [gültig] as existing (be it a prescientific lifeworld or a world objectively determined by the natural and cultural sciences) rests above all upon the knowledge of others, a knowledge we take over from others whose truth we trust—especially, in our modern world based on epistemic division of labor, from those who are experts in their field and as such have reliable knowledge about this or that aspect of the world. As laypersons (which we all are with regard to nearly all scientific disciplines, and most of us are with respect to all of them), we trust these experts and their corroborated procedures for attaining secure, dependable, intersubjectively definitive knowledge. In this way our knowledge of the world is broadened through belief. Thus when on the basis of such belief we habitually take a state of affairs as obtaining, this is an essential, or even the most essential, noetic-noematic component in the constitution of the objective world holding good for us as objective. For in such believing—which is not unlike the blind faith of the celebrated/notorious charcoal burner39—we do indeed believe in science (unless we are extremely skeptical of it), and we let science tell us what the world is and what “holds it together at the heart [im Innersten zusammenhält].”40

39 Josef Pieper writes as follows concerning certain insulting language that Luther let loose upon the world (and concerning the thereby unjustly disparaged matter in question): “The ‘implicit faith’ [das ‘unausdrücklich einbeschließende Glauben’] (termed fides implicita by the Scholastics) is something recognized and practiced everywhere else. To be sure, in theology the concept of fides implicita has become controversial”; referring to Martin Luther’s 1533 text Warnungsschrift an die zu Frankfurt am Main, sich vor Zwingli scher Lehre zu hüten, Pieper continues, “there is only a short step from the concept of implicit faith to Luther’s derogatory term, ‘blind faith’ [Köhlerglaube, literally: the charcoal burner’s faith]. Thus when the charcoal burner [köhler] on the bridge to Prague responded to a Doctor of Divinity who asked him what he believed by saying that he believed what the church believes, it seems to me that this much-maligned man’s answer is not at all something ridiculous and despicable, but rather something exceptionally wise, apt, and accurate—and as already mentioned, it is something taken as perfectly natural everywhere else. In my opinion, if I were to be asked about the structure of the universe or of matter, I would respond by referring to modern physics: I may only have a vague knowledge of its results, but (in a way that may be difficult to define precisely) I nevertheless truly participate in these results because I am allying myself with men like Planck, Bohr, de Broglie, and Heisenberg” (Pieper 1962, pp. 101f.).

40 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust I, verse 382f.: “Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält.”
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