abstract

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1. To describe the relationship between values, facts and norms.
2. To consider if norms are a constituent part of the essence of values.
3. To define the boundaries of the axiology.

To reach these goals I will present an historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the relationship between values, norms and fact. Starting from Brentano and his school I will focus on those disciples that directly or indirectly borrowed and improved Brentano’s idea of analogy.

keywords

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To reach these goals I will present an historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the relationship between values, norms and fact. Starting from Brentano and his school I will focus on those disciples that directly or indirectly borrowed and improved Brentano’s idea of analogy. The main tenet of this paper addresses the analysis of the two-tiered analogy that Brentano assumed to be within the field of values. In his *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics* (1952), Brentano emphasizes the role that the analogy played between the true and the good in order to describe the axiological essence of the good.\(^1\) The analogy he describes is built on a two-tiered level:

1. The analogy between axiology and ontology
2. The analogy between values and the true

The first level of the analogy between the value’s essence and the being of the object, and the second level between the value and the true. In this paper I aim to prove the following: the essence of values is rooted in the practical intentionality of the subject and the ought cannot create a norm with regard to how we should practically intend objects. Rather, the norm can describe how a thing should be in order to be represented in a truthful way. From this perspective, normativity seems to belong to the logical realm rather than to the practical one, bridging and blurring the two tiers of the analogy via the means of the representation and the description.

Therefore, in my paper I will prove on the one hand that normativity is a layer that comes ‘after’ the value, thus describing what I will call the *second layer of the analogy*. On the other hand values, being completely independent

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of normativity, can be described as a practical intention that relates to what we feel to be right, though not always in a predicative and conscious way.

From Aristotle until modern times axiology has not been considered as an autonomous discipline, but as belonging to ethics and morality, because it had the task to shape the customs and the way people think. With Brentano’s psychology something began to change, although “in the twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul Lapie” (*Logique de la Volonte*, 1902) and E. von Hartmann (*Grundriss der Axiology*, 1908).” With Brentano axiology became an autonomous discipline and we can look to Brentano as the legitimate father of modern axiology. In fact, in his *Psychology from Empirical Viewpoint* (1874) he developed the basis of an axiology that was not, on one hand, related to facts and was, on the other hand, rooted in sentiments. Brentano was one of the first to remark upon the difference between the object and the value (Sache and Wertobject) and the analogy between values and logical truths.

As it concerns the first point, his theory of intentionality lead him to notice that the object, as we intend it, is not the same as the object that exists in reality. Our pointing to (*tendere in*) an object places us in the condition to perceive the object in two different ways: (i) as something that in-exists in our mind and (ii) as something that exists external to or independent of our perception. The same can be said with values. There are values that exist outside of us in their wholeness with objects and there are values that (*in*-)exist in our mind as pure values in themselves. These two groups of objects can differ from each other because the latter, that is the axiological units, are lacking an ontological property. They are axiological essences that are rooted in sentiments and need to be described.

“*[Every conscious act] includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore every [conscious] act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard.”*  

“In discovering this love within ourselves we recognize the object not only as being loved and lovable, but also as being worthy of love.”

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4 Ibid., p. 132.
From both these quotes it is possible to follow Brentano’s statements concerning the relationship between the ontological existence of the object as something that is posed outside of us, and the mental object that exists in our mind as a mental phenomenon.

Values, as mental phenomena, exist in our mind and can be given to the subject via the device of representation. In fact Brentano divides acts into three categories: presentations, judgements and the sentiments of hate and love. Objects are given to consciousness according to these three modes. They do not have to be taken as three distinct classes though. Being the most important category presentation, for example, grounds any other act. We present things each time we are (intentionally) directed towards an object, be it that we are imagining, seeing, remembering, or expecting it. The two other categories, judgments and the phenomena or the sentiments of love and hate, are based on presentations. With a judgment we accept or deny the existence of the presented object. Thus a judgment is a presentation, plus a qualitative mode of acceptance or denial. The third category, which Brentano names “phenomena of love and hate,” comprises emotions, feelings, desires and acts of will. With these acts we have positive or negative feelings towards an object, though such acts need the first category of presentations in order to exist in the mind of the subject.

With his work on axiology Brentano aimed to achieve something similar to what Aristotle strove to achieve with logic, i.e. an analytic of pure values. In fact, according to Brentano, truths and values have similar properties that enable the second layer of analogy. That is, the layer between value and the true or judgments and sentiments. Indeed, belonging to the second category of mental phenomena, truths are founded on cognitive reason and are stated by judgements, whereas values are grounded in the sentiment of love and hate and are expressed by practical acts of interest. “The predicate moral (...) is similar to the predicate true.”

Brentano is interested in the description of Aristotelian oregis or the medieval problem of voluntas sine affectus. According to Brentano, values are connected to emotions, in particular the sentiments of love and hate. A value is what is desired or not desired within an act and there can be a primary and secondary value depending on whether or not we desire something in itself or for the use we can do of it. As such, emotional acts

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5 Foundation, p. 286.
can be distinguished as either correct and incorrect. This means that if I love something that I desire, I am apparently feeling something that is correct. According to Brentano both judgements and interests obey to the Cartesian criterion of evidence. We have no doubt about judging something that is transparently evident and therefore absolutely true. We can behave in the same way when we love something and when the object of our love is clearly evident. Therefore it is certain that that sentiment of love that we are feeling is good or correct. Consequently, for Brentano, correctness has the same essence as a mathematical operation. The primary good/bad is that which is correct to love or to hate as an end in itself. Different from the judgement, interest is that by which we recognize the correctness of what we feel holds an objective scale and proportion. This means that the polarity between good and bad accepts gradations that are not tolerated in the polarity between the true and the false.

Hence, the first analogy posed by Brentano shows the parallelism between the object and the value held by the object. The second analogy recognizes the parallelism between the true and value, though the value works on this sense of evidence and scale that cannot be appreciated in judgments.

The motives of this analogy can be found also in the work of other scholars that are directly and indirectly influenced by the school of Brentano. Among such scholars we can mention the names of Ehrenfels and Meinong, who only developed the former sense of the analogy and Husserl who improved both layers.

On the one hand, both Ehrenfels and Meinong maintain Brentano’s first layer of analogy between ontology and axiology. For them, value resides in a sentiment. According to Ehrenfels, in his System der Wertlehre (1897), value is grounded in a desire. “We desire things not because we comprehend some ineffable quality ‘value’ in them but we ascribe value to them because we desire them.”

Among the authors operating in an indirect way within the atmosphere of Brentano’s school who were followers of his disciples we can cite Ehrenfels (Meinong’s follower), Kraus (Marty’s follower), Scheler and Hartmann, Ingarden and Kotarbiński. Authors such as Calderoni, Perri, Prall and Stevenson clearly worked within the framework of the Brentanian school, though they cannot be considered as institutional members.

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For Meinong, in his ZurGrundlegung der AllgemeinenWertlehre (1923),
value is grounded in feeling. He is aware of the referential meaning of our emotions and includes judgments as a necessary presupposition of every value experience.

On the other hand, Moore and Husserl work on both of Brentano’s layers of analogy, transforming it into an outright parallelism. Moore, for example arrived at the same results as Brentano, reading Brentano’s work only after his Principia Ethica (1903). In Moore’s axiology there are two areas of intrinsic value: “personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments include all the greatest, and by far the greatest, goods we can imagine.”

As in Brentano’s famous lecture on ethics, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1903) reviewed by Moore in 1903, there is for Moore a parallel between ethics and logic. “What truth is for logic, the good is for ethics.”

In the paper entitled ‘the nature of judgment’ (1899), Moore understands the nature of judgement to be the central issue because, for him, truth is independent of the judging and thinking mind. Truth relates to the object of judgement, not to the judgement as act.

“Because there is no distinction between states of affairs or objects in a certain state, on the one hand, and propositions, on the other hand, there is nothing to which the proposition could correspond to make it true”.

For Moore truth, as well as good, is a primitive, unanalysable notion.

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9 While Ehrenfels and Meinong agree on the intrinsic value with respect to desire or emotions, both consider that this essence can be predicated on objectively ascertained capacities of an object. Ehrenfels, like Dewey, makes a distinction between valuing as mere praising, and valuation as appraisal. He considers the latter to be a value judgment. The Ehrenfels-Meinong controversy as to the primacy of desire or feeling in our intrinsic value experience affected the work of R. B. Perry and D. W. Prall. For both, values are rooted in our connotative and affective responses, that cannot be taken as isolated psychological datum as they originate from an ongoing transaction between ourselves and the different levels of environments. Perry’s approach is behavioristic, Prall’s introspective.

Perry’s General Theory of Value (1926) describes axiology in a systematic way, focusing on the meaning of value as interest. Interest, for Perry, is a necessary condition for “anything’s possessing or acquiring the quality of value... for anything known to be valuable...”. Interest represents an activity rooted in reality. With his work Perry influenced Dewey’s axiological naturalism as he claimed that value is not merely a quality of an object nor a mere mental quality of a subject, but is a relation between an object and an interest-taking subject. On the other hand, Prall’s A Study in the Theory of Value (1921) considers affective states, such as liking, hating, tasting, as essential constituent of value, albeit the value is more than an objectified feeling, because the affective state is predicated on ascertained qualities of an object. Consequently, Prall makes a clear distinction between a mere subjective imputing of valuational qualities and an objective imputing of values where the latter is determined by “the properties of things as well as by the properties of minds or bodies that see these things so qualified, by physical conditions, in other words.”

11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 Ibid., p. 173.
Goodness is a value independent of any desire or will on our side. Like truth, the notion of goodness is unanalysable. In this sense Moore differs from Brentano, because Brentano gives an objective foundation to ethics in terms of the correctness of our acts of loving and hating.

Nevertheless, thanks to the work of Brentano, values began to be emancipated from objects and their essence began to be considered analogous to objects that we can predicatively represent. The former analogy relates to the latter. In fact, if the ontological object differs from the axiological essence that overlays it, the ontological object can be described in a different way from the axiological one. On one hand, cognitive reason can say to us what the object is and its truthfulness in the world. On the other hand, the sentiment can perceive what we feel to be right or valuable from the same object. Both analogies are related to each other and address the direction of the research.

Husserl began to attend Brentano’s courses “out of mere curiosity” in 1884/85. What made him so curious was the public attention drawn by Brentano’s seminars. Within a couple of years, as, Ehrenfels wrote, Husserl became “a new star” in Brentano’s Circle, taking a number of classes held by Brentano, including two on Practical Philosophy. It is likely that under the influence exerted by Brentano’s moral teachings, Husserl began to reflect on the idea of a two-tiered analogy and parallelism. The first note we have about the analogy dates back to 1884, though on several occasions throughout the years, Husserl worked out this idea and integrated it within his overall thought. As a matter of fact, amongst the volumes of Husserliana we have, those that are entirely focused on ethics are very close to Brentano’s Foundation and Construction of Ethics, though they are developed in a different direction according to the due difference between Brentano’s and Husserl’s philosophy.

3. Ideas and Ideals

13 Ibid., p. 178.
15 Rollinger, Robin D., Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999
Husserl commences his analysis from the latter sense of the analogy, that is the one between logic and ethics, albeit always implying a reference to the analogy between axiology and ontology. Indeed, in his lessons of 1914 Husserl enforces Brentano’s idea of analogy with the term parallelism. For Husserl, as well as for Brentano, axiology is a science that relates to the realm of value, and it probably represents the pure rational core that can make ethics a pure science whose values can be as universal as logical truths\(^{19}\). For instance, positive value would correspond to a true statement and negative to its falseness.\(^{20}\) Similarly to Brentano, he retains the same Cartesian criterion of evidence to acknowledge the rightness of values and the same sense of axiological scale and proportion between values\(^{21}\). The second layer of Brentano’s analogy is transformed by Husserl into an outright parallelism. In fact, Husserl writes: “This apparent parallelism—is not a merely apparent analogy, but rather, reflects a shared essential foundation—[therefore] we are able to assert that formal ethics and axiology are analogous to formal logic.”\(^{22}\) According to Husserl, analogy is something “radikal und durchgehende”\(^{23}\) because both logic and ethics refer to the rationality of consciousness\(^{24}\).

Husserl defines consciousness as “a unit which goes under the name of reason: a reason that knows, values and acts.”\(^{25}\) Every area of reason is committed to a specific function: knowing, willing, valuing. All these rational areas provide logic, ethics, axiology \textit{et al.} with a rational basis. Axiological reason, that is the reason in charge of processing values, is defined as a “consciousness which constitutes values objectivities.”\(^{26}\) Logic and ethics or the true and good are parallel to each other because they are grounded in two different kinds of reason. According to Husserl, to describe these essences we just have to explore the intentional act by which the consciousness experiences its objects.

As Husserl wrote in his \textit{Logical Investigations} (1900–01), every act of consciousness is either an intentional act that is based on a representation or is a representation\(^{27}\).

\(^{19}\) Husa \textit{XXVIII}, First Section
\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 240
\(^{21}\) See: Ibid., §10-12.
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p. 266.
\(^{23}\) Husa \textit{XXVIII}, p. 44.
\(^{24}\) Ibid, p. 4: “"Since a system of fundamental structures of the consciousness of belief (doxic consciousness as I use to say) corresponds to the formal logic (....), similarly things are for the practic in relation to the phenomenological discipline that corresponds to them, that is the theory (....) of will.”
\(^{26}\) Husa \textit{XXVIII}, p. 266.
This means that consciousness refers to its objects by intending them. This is distinct from Brentano’s claim that intentionality is not object-oriented, rather it is subject-oriented as it is up to consciousness to “decide” what it wants to mean. The intentional essence, similarly to what Brentano also claimed, is composed of quality, matter and representative content. Every intentional act can aim at different contents in different ways but intentional acts always need a signitive or intellective act to present or understand what consciousness is aiming at. For example, I can feel the beauty of a sunset only if I can represent the presence of that sunset to myself. I can know a friend if I can represent her presence before me. Consequently, this means that the intentional essence of every act is based on the representation of the object.

“We can talk about a pure understanding (...) when the acts that we define as (...) perceptions, representations, judgments, suppositions, conjectures, doubts can be thought without the interference of affective acts at all. (...) On the other hand affective acts, according to their essence, look to be grounded acts and grounded in intellective acts. Every intellective act is based upon (...) a represented object which is established as an existent one.”

The intentional essence of an axiological act is always made up of representative content, matter and quality where this specific quality is often explained by Husserl with the metaphor of colors. Axiological intentions are, to use his words, “emotionally coloured.”

“A sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject, and also as an objective property (...) The event thus pleasingly painted now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach (...). The sad event seems coloured and clothed with sadness”

The axiological essence is a hue that attaches to the representation of the ontological object to which it refers. In this sense, the two layers of the analogy and parallelism are, for Husserl, related to each other. The analogy

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28 See: Husserl, E. Analyses concerning Active and Passive Synthesis, trans. by A. Steinbock, Dordrecht: Springer, 2001, p. 134: “The noetic (subjective) Yes and No [...] arises from taking a position specifically as judging. As with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic (objective) correlate. Here, of course, this correlate is the noematic valid and invalid arising in the objective sense”

29 Hua XIX, p. 461.

30 Hua XXVIII, p. 252.

31 Hua XIX, p. 111.

32 Hua XIX, pp. 110–111.
between the true and good leads the way to the former layer of the analogy between the axiological essence and the object. The former analogy, in fact, shows that there are two analogous kinds of intentionality, both grounded in the representation of the object (though in two different ways). The ontological object differs from the object that exists in the consciousness because of its signitive representation. The good, as well as the true, exists as a ‘primary object’, i.e. as an ontological object that is in front of me and as a ‘secondary object’ cognitively given to my mind. Without the “all-encompassing” device of predicative reason we cannot explain what we are referring to, nor can we even be aware of our practical intentionality.

Therefore, following the former layer of analogy, Husserl defines value as a state of affairs that differs from the object that holds the value. In fact, the object of value (primary object) that we normally perceive differs from the moral value (secondary object) because the latter is enriched by the affective intentional hue which is parallel to the hue of ‘logic’. “Values are objects (...) that have to be constituted in kinds of acts belonging to a coherent and particular class of acts that we define as acts of knowledge.”

Apparently “evaluative acts are essential to the constitution of values”, but only when the object is already given. “The value is not the being; the value is something connected to the being (...) but in another dimension. The state of value (Werthalte) itself is not just a state of affairs” but it is a directed and teleological being in a new normative sense. The second layer of the parallelism pertains to this second teleological level. This “practical” direction seems to be what makes the difference between a simple judgment and an evaluation, at the lowest level of any evaluation. Value, as a secondary object, is ‘a hue’ which is later added to the act as the direction in itself. “A sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, as a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject, and also as an objective property (...) The event thus pleasingly painted now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach (...). The sad event seems coloured and clothed with sadness”

According to the Logical Investigations (1900-01) and the Lectures on Value Theory (1914), values are essences grounded in practical feelings and addressed toward a direction that is parallel to the logical one.

33 Hua XXVIII, p. 57.
34 Hua XXVIII, p. 277.
35 Hua XXVIII, p. 340.
36 Ibid., p. 110-11.
In this sense ideas and ideals, cognitive notions and axiological essences, are parallel to each other and at the same time blend together within the representation of the ‘state of affairs’ (Sachlage) of their objects. From this perspective, a question is raised that we will deal with in the following section: what is the role of norms in these logical and axiological essences?

What is the role of norms in this pattern? What is the relationship between normativity and values? At a first sight norms seem to have no role within the structure of a value, especially in Husserl’s system, as values spring from a sentiment that cannot be normed. It consists of a Wertnehmung, i.e. a perception of what one is feeling.

Under this perspective, a value does not need a norm in order to be a value. Intuitively we could say that a friendship does not need norms in order to be so or to be worth of values. For example, we did not need the norms of three generations of Human Rights in order to recognize the value of those principles. Rather, these three generations of norms are the outcome of what people felt throughout the ages and what generations fought for in order to find new norms able to define a new rising identity. Norms seem to describe the signitive representation of what we feel as a value, rather than the value in itself.

On this point we can cite a passage of the Logical Investigations in which Husserl describes the role of norms in relation to values. “A warrior must be brave.”37 The sense of this norm is related to desire or to a value as a kind of request. A warrior, in order to be a warrior, has to satisfy an x, i.e. being brave. Being brave can be described according to some specific predicates. Courage is a cognitive idea that is required not for the value in itself, but out of the representation needed to describe a warrior.

Consequently, normativity does not belong to the essence of the value, but to the essence of the representation and the description we hold about a specific status quo. You must obey me if you want to be as good as I imagined you to be. The value, in its inner structure, is a teleological essence grounded in a feeling which points to an end whose meaning can be shared only after being represented.

A crucifix cannot be an object worthy of respect unless we do not project onto it a shared feeling of respect which implies a code of norms intersubjectively shared.

37 Hua XIX, p. 57.
There is a beautiful article from Hartman -- who was influenced by Moore and indirectly by Brentano’s school --\(^{38}\), in which he distinguishes facts from values and, accordingly, norms from values. “Fact, thus, we said, was the primary property of value. We usually see only the factual nature of fact and not its valuational normativity.”\(^{39}\) Yet a fact, to be a fact, needs norms that define it and yet the same thing cannot be said for values. Values need ontological facts in order to be expressed but they do not need normativity in order to be values.

To give another example taken from Hartman: “We have a magic wand in our hand, but it is just another stick. Formal axiology arrives at a Copernican inversion of fact and value: rather than value being a kind of fact, fact is a kind of value; rather than value being the norm of fact, fact is the norm of value; rather than fact being real and value unreal, value is real and fact is unreal. Value is the reality of which fact is the measure. Fact is to value as a measuring rod is to a mountain. It measures the mountain, but that is all.”\(^{40}\) The phenomenological analysis highlights an inversion of the relationship between values and norms. Fact is something that remains unreal until the value can describe how norms can feature it. A magic wand remains a stick until our feelings can be processed and can express predicatively what defines this stick as a magic wand. A fact remains unreal if we do not have normative and axiological words to make it real. Axiologists who employed the Aristotelian procedure “repeated ad nauseam the Kantian distinction, which is a distinction of secondary value properties and obstructs to this day the true understanding of value.”\(^{41}\)

From this it follows that it is misleading to base value on oughtness or normativity. Values are the primary properties for facts and descriptions are the primary property for values. Hence, the oughtness is a feeling that can be described and lead to those norms that define a fact.

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\(^{38}\) Hartman read Moore’s *Principia* (1903) and in his work was directly influenced by Moore and his school. It is not the case that he refers to the Husserl of *Crisis* as one who was “closest to the solution here presented. Hartman cited Husserl’s well-known volume of the *Crisis*, noticing how this division of norms and values made possible the development of science. These authors move within the same atmosphere as Brentano’s school.


\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 206.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 205-6.
The confusion between norms and values and facts and descriptions can be attributed to the two-tiered parallelism. Before Brentano, many axiologists did not distinguish values and objects or values and meanings. This two-tiered analogy or parallelism, if seen under Husserl’s lens, allows us to observe the essence of values independently of the normativity that it entails. The value is not the same as the object, though we need the object in order to express the value, and the value is not the true, though we need the representation of something that appears true in order to perceive it as a value. Consequently axiology is not a moral discipline that says to us what we have to do, but it should be a kind of mathematical discipline that describes the measure of what we feel.

As Husserl in the Crisis and, independently from him, other authors such as Hartman or Bernstein note, if facts are bearers of normativity and if normativity is connected to values, we undertake the risk to consider facts the only reliable judge of what is good and wrong. Rather, we need to separate values from normativity, otherwise the (essential or empirical) facts will become the judge of what is valuable without leaving room for the search for a lifeworld more respondent to our own identity. In fact, to use Husserl’s words, the teleological hue of values makes axiology a science with no moral boundaries but rather a ‘liquid’ discipline deeply more fit to the ‘liquidity’ of our practical life. This allows us to describe our epistemological, aesthetical and logical identity according to an intersubjective changing view of the life-world.

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