abstract

This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence.

keywords

guilt, shame, self-regulation, autonomy, heteronomy, social cognition
The paper that follows tries to interweave two themes: a ‘micro’ theme, which concerns shame and guilt, and a ‘macro’ theme, which concerns self-regulation generally. I argue first of all that a common contrast between shame and guilt is frequently overdrawn, and that in fact neither emotion is more ‘internal’ or more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not \textit{per se} a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is \textit{per se} more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness than the other. I then turn to the ‘macro’ theme. Relying on phenomena that have been brought into the philosophical spotlight by advocates of the view that the mind is ‘extended’, I argue that a commonly held picture of the self-regulatory mechanisms of young children – namely that they are importantly other-dependent – is, plausibly, also true of the self-regulatory mechanisms of adulthood, though spelling this out in detail would need further research. If that is so, then – assuming only that the moral consciousness of typical adults can be well-functioning – there is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of the functioning of our self-regulatory mechanisms, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our self-regulatory mechanisms when they function well – the paper’s ‘macro’ thesis – then there is all the more reason to accept the paper’s ‘micro’ thesis, that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion to draw from both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ theses is that the mark of heteronomy, and therefore the difference between the well- and the ill-functioning moral consciousness, is to be found not in the mere fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence.

1. Rather like those strangely inaccessible renaissance paintings with titles like ‘the contest between love and time’, philosophical literature on guilt and shame has sometimes taken the form of a contest between the two emotions, asking which is the sign of a more developed or mature moral consciousness. Oddly, though opinions differ as to which of the two emotions is the mark of greater maturity, there is substantial agreement as to the standard by which maturity should be judged. The standard is \textit{internality}, or \textit{other-independence} or (inversely) \textit{sociality}, the idea being that the more internal or other-independent, or the less social, an emotion, the less \textit{heteronomous} it is. And so because – it is assumed – \textit{autonomy} is the hallmark of moral maturity, the more internal or other-independent, or the less social, of the two emotions must be the more mature; or, more complicatedly, to the extent that the dominant or typical emotion in a moral consciousness is the less social or the more internal or other-
independent of the two, to that extent the moral consciousness is the more mature. I shall
argue that this ‘contest’ not only has no winner but also is misconceived. I will stay with
the terms of the ‘contest’, however, except in so far as for ‘mature’ I shall substitute ‘well-
functioning’. If ‘mature’ means ‘characteristic of adults’, the title bestows no honour because
an adult moral consciousness can work otherwise than it should; if on the other hand ‘mature’
implies ‘functions as it should’, then we may as well say that instead.
The ‘contest’ I have in mind is nicely exemplified by AWH Adkins and Richard Wollheim,
for though they hold contrasting positions on it, each position is structured by the same
underlying assumptions. Williams summarizes Adkins’s view of shame and guilt when he
attacks it in *Shame and Necessity*:

In the scheme of Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad side of all the lines. This is
well brought out in its ... association with the notion of losing or saving face. “Face”
stands for appearance against reality and the outer versus the inner, so its values
are superficial; I lose face or save it only in the eyes of others, so the values are
heteronomous (Williams 1993: 77-78).

By contrast guilt, on the old-fashioned view, is closely associated with moral obligation, and
with responsibility for one’s own intentional actions. Thus, on this version of the contest,
shame loses: it is less internal, and so more heteronomous, and so less mature than guilt
(Adkins 1960). In *The Thread of Life*, Wollheim (1984) goes along with the privileged position
occupied, on the old-fashioned view, by autonomy, and with the connection between
autonomy and internality: a consciousness regulated by notions that are ‘internal’, or truly
one’s own, is morally more mature than a heteronomous consciousness, one regulated by
the notions of others. However, shame (he argues) ‘must be conceived to be just as much an
interiorised sentiment as guilt is’ (Wollheim 1984: 220). Indeed precisely because of guilt’s
association with moral obligation and the constraints it imposes on action, it is guilt not shame
that is relatively heteronomous: the moral consciousness which is regulated by notions that
are truly one’s own is one whose dominant moral emotion is shame. In Wollheim’s view, it is
shame that is ‘the prime moral sentiment of evolved morality’ (Wollheim 1984: 220).
The differences between shame and guilt which supposedly underwrite a normative
distinction between them – internal versus social, other-independent versus other-dependent
and so on – are, however, insubstantial.
Wollheim’s claim that guilt is less internal than shame is based on his distinction between two
‘grades of internalization’:

There are figures that are merely internalized, and there are figures that are
internalized and with which the person identifies (Wollheim 1984: 218).

That is, though Wollheim concedes – *pace* some critics of shame – that the basic audiences for
both guilt and shame are internal, they are nonetheless different: whereas the audience for
shame is one with which the subject is identified, the audience for guilt is *merely* internal. But
what do these two grades of internalization amount to?
Consider a case which is aptly described as an experience of ‘merely’ internal guilt. Albertine

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1 In this and the following paragraphs, I adapt some material from my “Guilt, Shame and the “Psychology of Love””,
133-147.
always does housework on Sunday mornings. This is not because she likes housework – what she would really like to do on Sunday mornings is to lie in bed reading the newspaper. But Albertine was brought up in a strictly observant religious household. So although in adulthood she has not been a believer and never goes to church, she has found on Sunday mornings that if she tries staying in bed with the newspaper, guilt kills any pleasure she might otherwise have taken in it. Housework on the other hand – because it is burdensome – makes the guilt go away. Now there is a clear sense in which Albertine’s guilt is ‘merely internal’. It is internal in that it’s not connected, for example, to whether anyone else is aware of what she does on Sunday mornings. But it is merely internal in that there is nothing in Albertine’s current beliefs or values that rationalizes Sunday morning guilt even though, however much she rehearses the reasons why there’s nothing wrong with Sunday morning relaxation, the habit of feeling doesn’t shift. It is internal only topographically: it shapes Albertine’s deliberation in the way an obstacle does, but the obstacle in this case happens to be inside her mind rather than, say, in her bloodstream (like a drug which induces nausea when she drinks alcohol).  

But though Albertine’s guilt-avoidance strategy supplies a clear model for what ‘merely internal’ might mean in relation to guilt, it can’t be what Wollheim means by this phrase. It’s true that the beliefs and values which would rationalize Albertine’s guilt are no longer ones with which she is identified, and that for this reason Albertine’s strategy is heteronomous: her behaviour is a response to values that are not hers but someone else’s (her parents’, perhaps). But Albertine’s story only makes sense if a certain history is in place, that is, this kind of failure to identify is only conceivable as a step down from some prior and now withdrawn identification. This does not fit the profile Wollheim describes for ‘merely internal’ guilt. 

Wollheim, that is, envisages the ‘merely internal’ grade of internalization as developmentally prior to identification, whereas Albertine’s case represents the afterlife of decayed identifications. 

Let us turn, then, to Wollheim’s own account of the forerunners of identification, the internal figures who – the phrase is Freud’s - ‘confront’ the ego:

The development of, or development beyond, the superego [and a moral consciousness regulated by guilt] is best understood in this way: that the internal figure, or the group of internal figures, whose phantasised activities regulate the thoughts, feelings, and conduct of the person start off life as merely internalized figures - they ‘confront’ the ego - but, gradually ... come to be figures with whom the person is able to identify (Wollheim 1984: 220).

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The internal figure sketched here differs from my picture of Albertine’s ‘merely topographical’ internalization, but it too fails to match Wollheim’s theoretical description of a lower grade of internalization, though for different reasons. A ‘confronting’ superego certainly goes with heteronomy: one can be motivated by terror without sharing the terrorizer’s values. But

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it is unclear how fear turns into guilt just because the source of fear comes to be inside the subject’s mind rather than outside it; that is, the confronting superego seems so primitive that it leaves untold the story of how guilt makes its first appearance in consciousness. To see this, consider the citizens of a state which relies on terror as a means of social control. To begin with they try to predict what will attract punishment, and avoid doing it. In this phase they are motivated by fear, but the source of fear - the apparatus of state terror - is external. But their consciousness gradually undergoes a change: desires, plans, initiatives which previously they formed but refrained from carrying out now no longer even occur to them. This change represents the internalization of terrorizing external figures: the citizens’ behaviour is still regulated by fear, but the regulation no longer requires actual threats by secret policemen and the rest. What matters here is that there’s a word for what results when a terrorizing other is moved inside the mind, and it’s not guilt-proneness but merely timidity; that is, the citizens’ self-censorship makes perfect sense without the supposition that the plans they no longer make are objects of guilt. Internalizing the terrorizing figures makes a difference, namely the difference between a disposition to avoid punishment that is geared to actual threats and a generalized disposition to avoid it that indeed is no longer thought of as punishment-avoiding but simply as the way to behave. But that isn’t the right sort of difference to explain how guilt appears on the scene.

In summary, Wollheim tries to distinguish two grades of internalization such that guilt is already present at the lower of the two grades while shame appears only at the higher one. But though Albertine’s case includes guilt and is distinct from Wollheim’s higher grade in that identification is absent, it cannot represent Wollheim’s lower grade because it is not developmentally prior to identification. The police state case, on the other hand, shows that a consciousness may be regulated by internalized fear without being regulated by guilt. Moreover when we imagine guilt appearing on the scene, what we seem to be imagining is identification with the agents of terror. So we jump from a lower grade of internalization at which guilt is absent to a higher grade at which it’s present, but where identification is present too. Shame and guilt therefore do not occupy two distinct grades of internalization, so that is not a difference that can underwrite a normative distinction between them.

I want to turn now to two further alleged differences between guilt and shame, each of which plays its part in the ‘contest’ between them, and which in different ways concern their relation to heteronomy. The first concerns the allegedly tight connection – whether deployed in praise of guilt (as on the old-fashioned view Williams criticizes) or against it (as in Wollheim) – between guilt and morality. The second concerns the relations of the two emotions to other people.

One may feel shame equally properly at cheating in an exam, raising a laugh by telling a bad joke to an undiscriminating audience – both of which are intentional, but only the first of which I take it involves any moral fault - falling over on stage, being overweight (unintentional) or having a prominent scar (involuntary). So shame is only loosely connected with the intentional or indeed the voluntary, or with morality. But is the connection any closer for guilt? No: proper objects of guilt include breaking rules of religious observance, bringing an insistent non-member into the ‘members only’ room at a club, failures of prudence such as not visiting the dentist, and breaches of self-imposed rules such as diets or work schedules, none of which are moral wrongs. People also feel guilty about their own good.

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fortune. One’s enjoyment of a comfortable house to live in can be spoiled by the distinctively guilty thought that there are other people who are homeless. But the guilty thought does not seem to need the mediation of any further thought as to a route by which, were one to live less comfortably, homelessness might be mitigated. Indeed, far from having to be ‘I have deprived them’, the guilt-inducing thought can be ‘what have I done to deserve this?’. In other words, the guilt-inducing thought can focus precisely on the absence of any doing of one’s own that warrants the difference between one’s own advantage and others’ disadvantage. So the link between guilt and the intentional or indeed the voluntary – one might unexpectedly inherit a lot of money - is also looser than is often supposed. This is not of course to recommend guilt in such cases, but just to say that one’s own unearned advantage is an intelligible object of guilt; a parallel point could be made, say, about shame at having a scar. So on assumptions that structure the ‘contest’ – the closer the connection to morality or to the intentional, the better-functioning the moral consciousness (Adkins) – once again neither guilt nor shame emerges as a clear winner.

As to other people, let me rehearse briefly the reasons why the fact that shame, though admittedly other-dependent is not - pace the old-fashioned view - always heteronomous. To be sure, shame is often occasioned by the reaction, or the imagined reaction, of others. But this observation doesn’t support the view that shame is per se a heteronomous emotion. To see this, we need only ask why other’s opinions of our actions should matter to us – in particular, why they should matter to us in the special way such that imagining whether others would try to shame (or praise) us for doing such-and-such informs us directly whether or not our doing such-and-such would be shameful (or praiseworthy) – except on the supposition that we and they, at least as far as this action is concerned, have something relevantly in common. This community of values with others is what shameless people precisely lack, which is why attempted shaming by others makes no difference to them – at least not the relevant difference. Of course the ill opinion of others may matter even to the shameless, just as being hit by a stone while in the stocks hurts whether or not one cares why it was thrown. But neither the stone nor others’ ill opinion will hurt in the distinctive way the stone hurts a victim whose values are in tune with the stone-thrower’s, namely as an expression of what both of them agree is the shamefulfulness of whatever it is that explains the victim’s being put in the stocks. Just the same point goes, mutatis mutandis, for the others’ good opinion.

Although ordinary speech can be very free with the phrase ‘approval seeking’, others’ approval functions motivationally in very different ways depending on how well adjusted to one another are the values of the seeker and the person from whom approval is sought. At one extreme, only a shameless person could enjoy being applauded for a prize-winning work they had plagiarized, and what they would enjoy in that situation would be (say) being the object of attention of a room full of people, being photographed etc., not applause as the expression of others’ recognition of the value they themselves see in what they have done (because they haven’t done anything). Moreover, for the plagiarist, the good of being applauded is a self-standing reason for passing off the plagiarized work as their own – it’s only good as a means to securing the applause. At the contrasting extreme, applause is not a self-standing reason: the agent’s reasons for seeking it are the very same as the audience’s reasons for applauding.
namely their shared belief in the value of the work. Somewhere short of this extreme belong a class of cases which, in a way, make the same point even better. These are cases where there is a community of values between the agent and his or her audience, but where the audience makes the difference to the agent’s motivation to act on them. Thus George Eliot describes Esther - heroine of Felix Holt – as viewing her beloved Felix as ‘another better self’ (Eliot 1972: 591). Far from acting contrary to her own judgment under pressure of the desire for her lover’s approval – which of course is possible too - Esther’s knowledge of Felix’s approval motivates her in the way it does because he speaks, more loudly than she does herself, for what she values.

Now just where we might expect to find a contrast between shame and guilt, there’s in fact an exact analogy. Guilt, like shame, can be absent until it is brought on by the judgment of others – a court verdict, for example. Nonetheless, when the judgment of others does work like this, it is not their judgment alone but that judgment in the context of something the subject shares with those others that makes it work. Absent that shared something and the others’ judgments of wrongness won’t work, or won’t work in the relevant way. Someone who feels alienated from the entire judicial system won’t feel guilt when denounced by a judge, though they may feel exasperation, fear and a range of other things, emotions which stand to guilt in much the way as the pain cause by the flying stone stood to shame in the earlier illustration. Again, the all-seeing eye of the superego (Freud 1985: 317) is sometimes said both to be central to the phenomenology of guilt and to show why guilt is less social an emotion than shame. In fact it seems to show the exact opposite, by emphasizing the centrality to the phenomenology of guilt of being known to have performed some act by another who shares with one the beliefs that suit it to be the object of the emotion. The same phenomenology is at work in reverse when we see people staving off the experience of guilt by concealing what they have done. My first conclusion, then, is that shame is neither less internal or other-independent, or more social, than guilt; nor, alternatively, is it less social, more internal or other-independent: both are importantly dependent on the opinions or judgment of others.

Now this would be a comparatively uninteresting conclusion if all it showed was that the familiar ‘contest’ between guilt and shame has no clear winner. But it shows more than this. The point of the ‘contest’ was not merely to compare guilt and shame along these various dimensions, but to compare them along these dimensions because of a presumed connection between internality or other-independence and the ‘winning’ characteristic – the well-functioning moral consciousness.

The cases I have discussed, however, show that the link between internality or other-independence and the well-functioning moral consciousness doesn’t hold. Guilt can be internal and yet part of a moral consciousness that doesn’t function well, as with Albertine. On the other hand where the opinion or judgment of others matters in the distinctive shame- or guilt-evoking way – that is, where the others share with the subject the values in the light of which some feature of the subject, or of one of his or her actions, is the object of the emotion - both guilt and shame are social not internal, other-dependent not other-independent, and yet the subject’s moral consciousness is working exactly as it should.

5 As with the citizens of the police state again: if the seen did not have something relevantly in common with the all-seeing, then why would being seen be part of the phenomenology of guilt, rather than of the phenomenology of fear?

6 This is perhaps the point at which to notice that the standard for a well-functioning moral consciousness is not itself a moral standard. The shameless plagiarist’s moral consciousness is functioning badly with respect to (say) the value of literary achievement. But if in her view failure to be glamorous is so shameful that it makes plagiarism worthwhile, and if there are also audience members who applaud her glamour rather than her (apparent) achievement, then with respect to that value, her moral consciousness is functioning well. But that is not to say she is
What is more, these cases show that the distinction between other-dependence (sociality) and other-independence (internality) aligns poorly with the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy: Albertine’s self-regulatory mechanisms are internal yet she is surely heteronomous, because her disposition to feel guilt is not responsive to her own values. On the other hand though pride and shame in the case of George Eliot’s Esther (or guilt, in the case of the criminal not alienated from the judicial system) are thoroughly social, because the values they respond to are those of their respective audiences, there is nothing heteronomous about these agents, because the values in question are not just those of others, but also their own. That there should be a connection between autonomy and a well-functioning moral consciousness, or heteronomy and an ill-functioning one, is highly familiar. That there should be compatibility between autonomy and sociality or other-dependence is less so. To try to understand why that is, and to suggest why things should be otherwise, I now turn to my ‘macro’ theme of self-regulation generally and – slowly - to the ‘extended mind’.

3. First I want to present a narrative about self-regulation which crops up in places as ostensibly different as Kant and the psychoanalysis of children. It goes like this. The infant or child does not regulate itself – its behaviour, emotions and so on – but rather is regulated by a relation to another, or others. This regulation begins (very roughly) in mutually attuned interaction between infants and their first caregivers. But as maturation progresses, the role formerly played in the regulation of behaviour (etc.) by others gradually gets replaced by an internal mechanism in the operation of which others play no part. This kind of view has its locus classicus perhaps in Kant, where reliance on another (‘a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet’)7 is the norm in childhood but written off as a moral failing in anyone who has passed beyond that stage8. But D.W. Winnicott too describes the mother’s role in relation to the infant as that of an ‘auxiliary ego’, needed in order to perform essential ego-functions while the child’s own ego is not yet fully formed9. The implication is that once the child’s ego is fully formed, it does whatever it needs to do all on its own – no auxiliaries needed. But of course in Winnicott implicitly, and in Kant explicitly, the transition from regulation by others to self-regulation is the transition to autonomy. This narrative is thus a spectacular example of how the connection between autonomy and other-independence, which structures the ‘contest’ between shame and guilt, is made: the less the dependence on others, the greater the autonomy.

Now for the second piece of new material. In some interesting recent work, Joel Krueger has presented evidence to support the idea that the mind is extended (Krueger 2011, Varga and Krueger 2013). Krueger, like me, is interested in the phenomenon of self-regulation, so he is struck by the fact that children seemingly regulate themselves using various things beyond themselves, including music (as when music helps them to calm down and get to sleep), cuddly toys and, most impressively of all, other people. According to Krueger, if the right thing to think about Clark and Chalmers’s famous diary (Clark and Chalmers 1998) is that the mind encompasses that (because memory is a mental function and memory depends on the diary), then, because the same can be said of self-regulation, mind also extends to teddy bears,
lullabies and other people. Now here I am not interested in the extended mind idea per se, but only in the phenomena Krueger adduces in support of it: whether they do support the idea, and if so on what interpretation of it, is a subject for another day. But I take it that these phenomena do show that self-regulation in children is a business that crucially involves the child’s environment, including other people.

Two questions raised by Krueger’s work that cannot be set on one side, however, are these: first, to what extent is the involvement of others in self-regulatory mechanisms always (in a sense I shall explain) instrumental? And secondly, to what extent do Krueger’s claims about the distributed character of self-regulation carry over from children to adults?

With regard to instrumentality, Krueger describes music as ‘a tool … to enact micro-practices of emotion-regulation’, a ‘crucial tool for cultivating and regulating our emotional and social life’ (my italics) (Krueger 2011: 2-3). Now it’s not only music that can be a ‘tool’ of self-regulation: other human beings can be tools too, as when I control my intake of whisky by persuading a friend to hide the key to the drinks cabinet. But for the purposes of arguing that things or persons beyond the body are part of one’s self-regulatory mechanisms, this kind of case is not very helpful. For the regulatory role of music when it’s a tool, or of the other person, is mediated by a fully formed intention (to get to sleep, say, or to drink less) and the external thing comes in simply as a means to that. When I intend to cut down on whisky for the same of my health, however, I am already a self-regulator, but do not ‘use’ the reason of health (or the thought of my future health, or whatever) as a means to cutting down. So it looks as if, if external things as well as thoughts, reasons etc. are really to belong to the mechanisms of self-regulation, as opposed to being things which these mechanisms can make use of now and again, they must feature in self-regulation in a more than merely instrumental way. But this, indeed, is just what we find in the case of music and infants. When caregivers play music to infants to get them to sleep or to calm down, there is instrumentality on the caregivers’ side, but not on the infant’s: in listening to the music the infant is simply regulating itself, not listening in order to regulate itself. This brings me to my second question: does anything like this interesting case of the non-instrumental involvement of an external thing in self-regulation occur in adulthood too?

Krueger’s answer is yes. ‘Though synchrony in distributed emotion regulation is usually considered as a developmental phenomenon’, he says, ‘there is growing evidence that dyadic adult relationships have similar functions, providing a context for distributed emotion regulation throughout life’ (Varga and Krueger 2013: 286). Nonetheless his positive answer is qualified: distributed emotion regulation ‘also characterize[s] some adult relationships like intimate romantic relationships and the one between therapist and client’ (ibid.). The qualification reflects a broader tentativeness in the literature. ‘Throughout the life cycle, through the emotion-based interaction with a sensitive … other, people are able to manage that which is felt to be too much to do alone’, writes Diane Fosha (Fosha 2001: 229). But in the very next sentence, she says that ‘eventually, [people] become able to do for themselves what was initially accomplished through the relationship’ (ibid.). The fact that self-regulatory mechanisms are distributed in a relationship with a therapist suggests that when this happens in adulthood, it remedies a deficit, thus reaffirming not only the questionable idea that the course of successful psychotherapy recapitulates normal psychological maturation, but also

of course the Kantian-psychoanalytic narrative rehearsed earlier according to which the well-functioning self-regulatory mechanisms of adulthood are a solitary affair. Now clearly, in order to argue that other people are part not only of children’s self-regulation systems, but part of adults’ self-regulation systems too – quite standardly, and not just in the deficit context of psychotherapy, or even only in intimate relationships – evidence is needed, and I certainly can’t provide much of that here, so to that extent the ‘macro’ thesis of this paper is dependent on future research. Let me offer, however, some reasons for thinking that the phenomenon Krueger identifies as true of immature self-regulation generally is also a widely generalized phenomenon in adulthood.

It seems to me that the phenomenon of involving others non-instrumentally in self-regulation is pervasive in adult life, and it does not do justice to this phenomenon to look for it only in special relationships. At the risk of stating the obvious, telling an intimate one’s troubles regulates one’s trouble, both in the sense that it may help one to express it (and so to deal with it as one would not be able to if the troubles were unexpressed) and in the sense that, often, it makes one less troubled. But this truism is but a step away from another one that does not fit the ‘intimate or therapist’ model, for one can achieve the same effect my telling a non-intimate friend, a colleague, an acquaintance, a sympathetic stranger one gets into conversation with on a train – the relationships in question really do not have to be very special at all. Also don’t forget that regulation can be up as well as down: my pleasure in a memory can be intensified by sharing it.

In fact there seem to be so many examples of the involvement of non-special others in adult self-regulation that it is hard to know where to begin. Group activities, where the others in question may be total strangers and united only by the fact that they too are taking part, have an important self-regulatory function. Shouting for their team at a football match, for example, makes people ‘feel better’; group singing – compare Krueger on music for infants – whether it be part of a collective process of mourning or of mutual encouragement (as in marching songs) is a powerful emotion regulator. Another extremely ordinary example is that many people are less able to carry on ordinary activities effectively when alone. But the remedy for being alone need not be intimacy, but simply the presence of others going about their business. Echoing Krueger and Varga’s notion of ‘proximity’, a lecturer may speak more confidently if there are a few people in the audience she recognizes, even if she doesn’t know their names, so the presence of known non-intimates regulates stress (O’Donovan and Hughes 2008). A similar psychology underlies the fact that non-intimates go along to lectures, court hearings or other ‘difficult’ encounters in order to ‘offer their support’; people feel supported in difficult endeavours by wearing the same things as complete strangers – military uniform, for example, or badges and armbands on a protest march. Here I have touched only on phenomena involving the regulation of emotion, but sharing one’s state of mind with other people enables us to do many things we couldn’t do alone, and thereby regulates our thoughts and our behaviour. None of these phenomena involve ‘special’ others; as they are such a

14 ‘Our basic feeling of interpersonal connectedness’, which ‘allows individuals to morph into a cohesive dyadic system able to carry out distributed emotion regulation’ (Krueger and Varga 2013: 272).
familiar part of adult life, there seems no reason to say they only remedy deficits either. (The desire to share one’s experiences with others is not a deficit).

Though of course more work is needed, the phenomena to which ‘extended mind’ theorists have helped to draw our attention point the way to the view that the interpenetration of self and other is - as the paper’s ‘macro’ thesis has it - a pervasive feature of adult self-regulation, not just an exception to normal adult self-regulation constituted by intimates, or a prop supplied to ill-functioning adult self-regulators by psychotherapists. But now assuming that the capacity for self-regulation is part of autonomy, we have a conclusion that stands in opposition to the idea – that we find in both Kant and in the psychoanalytic tradition – that autonomy precludes dependence on others. Now that autonomy and other-dependence should not be a puzzling combination was, of course, the conclusion of the earlier discussion of guilt and shame. The convergence should be no surprise. Though there is a great deal more to self-regulation than just the disposition to feel these two emotions, shame and guilt are emotions of self-regulation16. By this I do not mean that they are disagreeable experiences the avoidance of which motivates us to be careful self-regulators: though that can happen, it is very much a deviant case17. What I mean is rather this. Of course if we were all perfect self-regulators – if we never acted (or thought or felt) otherwise than as we think we should – we would have far fewer occasions to experience either emotion than each of us typically does. (I do not say no occasions, thanks to the weakness of the link between either emotion and the voluntary – see above.) But for imperfect creatures like ourselves, guilt and shame – at least when they are experienced in relation to the right object, to the right degree, at the right time and so on – are signs that our self-regulatory mechanisms are in good working order. But now if the paper’s ‘macro’ thesis is true, it should be no surprise that in the particular cases of shame and guilt, when both emotions are working as they should, they can – as the paper’s ‘micro’ thesis has it – both be social or other-dependent and characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness.

The paper has only argued, of course, that autonomy and other-dependence can go together, not that they always do. That is why it is still open to us to say, in line with conventional wisdom, that notwithstanding the phenomena Krueger describes, small children are not autonomous self-regulators. Nonetheless if indeed they are not, this cannot be because of the mere presence in their self-regulation systems of other people, but rather (for example) because of the typical asymmetries in knowledge and power of adults and children, a point which suggests that the conventional wisdom is an exaggeration: it is not as if there is no such thing as an adult’s having undue influence over a child - even a very small one - or interfering with its freedom18. Something very similar will go for adults: the interpenetration of self and other in adulthood seems to be neutral between autonomy and heteronomy, so when adults are autonomous, that will not be because their self-regulation systems don’t involve others – not only, for example, because their dispositions to feel guilt and shame are not sensitive to values they share with them - but because they don’t involve others in certain ways: if the others don’t have undue influence, don’t exploit emotional connections which subvert the other adult’s reason, don’t terrify or threaten them, and so on. A proper taxonomy of these

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16 This term is greatly preferable to ‘conscience’, because of the moral associations of the latter together with the fact that the standards in the light of which we regulate ourselves, and such that guilt and shame express in part our failings in so doing, are so much more than moral – as witness the examples earlier in this paper.
17 An example is Albertine’s case above.
kinds of way cries out to be constructed\(^\text{19}\). Such a taxonomy would enable us to leave behind internality or other-independence as measures of the well-functioning moral consciousness, and point us towards a grown-up account of the contrast between autonomy and heteronomy.

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\(^{19}\) Another taxonomy which cries out for construction is a taxonomy of the ways in which others can be involved in my self-regulatory mechanisms. Arguably they are involved somehow when I violently assault a stranger as a way of coping with my own unmanageable feelings of distress or (to take a less extreme example) when I arrive home in a bad mood, shout at my wife for (as I later see) something for which she is not to blame, upset her – and then cheer up. In psychoanalytic terms, I have 'projected' my bad feelings into her thereby ridding myself of them; in any case, she has 'helped' to up-regulate my mood, as has my victim in the assault example. These look psychologically very different from telling her why I am in a bad mood and cheering up that way (or from finding someone to tell about my unmanageable distress). A taxonomy of these seemingly different psychologies of other-dependence is also urgently needed, and in such a way as to make it clear how it maps on to the taxonomy of undue influence etc. just mentioned.
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