Husserl on Lifeworld and Experiential World

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Husserl brings up the lifeworld notion in his discourse on overcoming the crisis of European sciences that results from the objectivism or naturalism of scientific research. He puts forward the concept of experiential world as he works on the foundation for socio-cultural sciences. Both concepts depict how the subject is not enclosed in itself, it is instead the subject in the world. Yet the distinction of lifeworld and experiential world reveals that Husserl thematizes this problem in two distinguished ways, the one has the transcendental phenomenology as background, the other the phenomenological psychology. My paper aims at an explication of these two different ways of how Husserl deals with the relationship between subject and the world and explores the possibility of an lifeworld discourse that looses itself from the transcendental bond.

I. Husserl on Lifeworld

In the modern age the natural science developed in a way that no science can compare with. Its methodology is widely recognized and imitated. The pursuit of knowledge in natural science is based on the belief that its object of inquiry is the nature in objective reality. The objectivity of the nature signifies that it is free from the impact of human being. As long as it has nothing to do with the human experiences, the human perception of nature plays herein no substantial role. It is even taken to be irrelevant in the research for objective knowledge. Subjectivity is entangled with relativity, which for the sake of objectivity just needs to be dispensed with. In general, in the division of scientific researches, the objectivity of nature belongs to the subject matter of natural sciences, whereas the aspect of subjectivity is ascribed to psychology, which deals with the psychic phenomenon based on the physical nature. Since Galileo and Newton, natural science has made tremendous development and set up the model for all scientific researches. Even the old tradition of philosophy cannot but recognize this fact. Yet is the viewpoint that the subjectivity can only be seen to be relative and unworthy of being the subject matter of scientific re-
search also justifiable? To be sure, how objective is the nature at all in view of its being as the object of scientific research? How is the nature to be disclosed, anyway? With all these questions in mind, Husserl asks more questions about the status of subjectivity. He wonders how to legitimate the claim that subjectivity has only to do with the relativity? Is there no invariant structure in the human experiences of nature in spite of all varieties and differences? It is from here that Husserl begins his lifeworld discourse. He asks about the possibility of a science of lifeworld and explores the relationship between human experiences in lifeworld and the objective natural sciences. In the end he brings up his transcendental phenomenology to help clarify all these questions.

Husserl delineates the lifeworld as “universal field of establishable facts”(Hua VI 141/Carr, 138). These facts are related to the individual persons, such that the lifeworld is in the realm of the subjective (Reich der Subjektiven)(Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). Husserl mentions that the facts recognized by the Congos in Africa, the Chinese farmers will not have the same validity for the Europeans (Hua VI 141/ Carr, 139). In such a case asks Husserl, can there be a core that is commonly valid to all people, no matter which culture or tradition they belong to? Both the traditional philosophy and the natural sciences in the modern age can be said to have overlooked this question. It is actually uneasy to thematize the lifeworld in a scientific way as long as it has since long been questioned whether such a science about lifeworld is possible. Even the legitimacy of such a questioning is bracketed. Is the experience in lifeworld not just subjective and therefore relative? Is it not what we need to dispense with in our pursuit of objective knowledge? The lifeworldly experience is shadowed by its untrustworthy subjectivity, which is undesirable in our demand of rigid objectivity. In pursuit of objectivity one should jump over the subjectivity that is inherent in the lifeworldly experience. As a result, the lifeworldly experience is regarded as valueless for scientific research and one seems to have sufficient reason to suspend it. Either traditional philosophy or modern science has dismissed it as a whole. However, the more it is dismissed, the more Husserl sees the urgency to take it up as a problem. How then does he approach this problem? Wherein lies the appropriate way of access to it? Suppose that the lifeworldly experience cannot be merely regarded as relative, through which way we can claim its universality? Are there indeed universal aspects to be worked out? In order to deal with these questions, Husserl suggests to introduce the epoché of objective sciences as its method (Hua VI 138/ Carr, 135). He holds that we need to get free from the impact of natural science, which aims to work on the objectivity of nature. The purpose of practicing epoché is not to do away with scientific thinking. In Husserl’s eyes the science is not restricted to natural, objective science. Working on lifeworld without objective science does not mean that we give up scientific thinking.
at all. In Husserl’s view in order to make clear the meaning of lifeworld, one needs a science that can handle the problematic of lifeworld correspondingly. As mentioned above, lifeworld is the “universal field of establishable facts”.

The question arises as regards the facts in lifeworld: do they remain the same after the epoché? Husserl gives a positive answer to this question because for him the aim of epoché is not to dismiss these facts, rather, it aims to facilitate our recognition of these facts. But does it mean that the study of the lifeworld lies in the collection of all kinds of facts spread all over the planet? Obviously not, Husserl holds that despite the differences on the surface there is universal structure to dig out. He deems these universal structures a priories. And it is the task of his phenomenology to depict all these a priories. Now, what are these universal a priories to understand substantially? First of all, Husserl points out that as persons, people are living in the world, he is existent in the lifeworld. As such he has all kinds of lifeworldly experiences. The practical actions in everyday life show that people experience the world and the objects in the world incessantly. Though people never cease their experiences in lifeworld, they seldom notice their own involvement in such kinds of experiences. So long as their attentions focus more on things that are relevant to their basic needs, vocational activities or enjoyments, they fail to thematize the world as a whole. Such awareness remains concealed unless special occasion occurs, for example, when they start philosophizing. Philosophy, as Husserl conceives of it, has paid attention to such a thematization from beginning on. He claims that in the seventh century before Christ the philosophy was born in Greece. This counts as unique event in the whole development of human history. The philosophers thematize the world rather than just living in the world like the ordinary people through theoretical attitude. They are highly motivated in this attitude to know what the world is rather than just being involved with it. In this way, the philosophy made great contributions to the human culture as a whole. It constitutes a breakthrough in the human history. From then on, not only the philosophy was born, so was the science in the narrower sense, that is, the discipline that is separate from philosophy. This special event has evolved to become one of the essential characteristics of European or Western culture (Hua VI 325/Carr, 279).

Even though the philosophy in ancient Greece was interested in the question about what the world is, he sees that the main trend of traditional philosophy, particularly the traditional metaphysics became more and more objectivistic with the culmination in the modern age as the natural sciences emerged\(^1\). The objectivistic tendency leads to the consequence that the question regard-

\(^1\) Husserl calls the natural science as the residuum of the metaphysics (Hua VI 232/ Carr, 229).
ing the relationship between human experience and the world as experienced remains concealed first by the traditional metaphysics and then the natural science in the modern age. In view of this, Husserl regrets quite a lot about the unthematization of the realm of the subjective in scientific research (Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). The subjective experience is commonly relegated to merely relative and becomes valueless in the eyes of natural scientists who claim to pursue the objective truth in nature. For this reason Husserl aims to work out a science of lifeworld and suggests to practice the epoché of objective sciences as first step. On such a basis Husserl develops what he names “ontology of the lifeworld” (Ontologie der Lebenswelt)\(^2\) in order to work out the aprioric, universal structures (Hua VI 145/Carr, 142). To make clear such a universal structure is to depict how the world is experienced by subjects in a flow of experiences.

The life in the lifeworld is a “life within a universal unthematic horizon” (Hua VI 148/Carr, 145). That means, in the lifeworld, the subjective manifold (das mannigfaltige Subjektive) has been in function, though in a concealed manner (Hua VI 149/Carr, 146). Thus, to make clear how the subject and world are correlated to each other would become the task of the ontology of lifeworld. Such a correlation is aprioric and universal. According to such a conception, the manner in which an object is revealed is also the manner how a subject is revealed. In a word, the world is correlated to the subjective consciousness. Though the world and objects can be displayed in a variety of ways, yet the correlation between the world/objects and the subjective consciousness is universal and aprioric. Husserl acknowledges such an essential fact and takes it to be the task for the ontology of lifeworld.

In this context another question arises as regards the ontology of lifeworld: How is the ontology of lifeworld related to the transcendental phenomenology? The answer to this question will concern how Husserl conceives of subject. The subject that is correlated to the world is a subject in the world. Despite its status as subject, it can be just objectified. It has double aspects of subject and object, which seems to be paradoxical (Hua VI §53). Suppose that the human being is nothing but an object, then we may explain how the worldly experience proceeds, how the aprioric structures of lifeworld functions without having to think of how the thematization of lifeworld is made possible. It is exactly in consideration of such a problematic that Husserl introduces his transcendental phenomenology following the ontology of lifeworld.

Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology works on the ultimate foundation of philosophy. In this way he intends to provide philosophy with

\(^2\) David Carr translates it as “life-world ontology” (Carr, 142).
a way to overcome the antitheses of all kinds—subjectivism vs. objectivism, empiricism vs. rationalism, absolutism vs. relativism, ontologism vs. transcendentalism, positivism vs. metaphysics etc. (Hua IX, 300/McCormick eds., 34). In Husserl’s conception phenomenology in its complete form is no other than universal philosophy, which is a rigorous science that results from radical self-reflection. Only transcendental phenomenology is legitimate to fulfill this requirement. And it is in this sense that Husserl regards the “ultimate and highest” problems as phenomenological problems. So explains he:

In its universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its particular function within a possible life of mankind at the transcendental level (Hua IX, 299/McCormick eds., 33).

With this in mind, Husserl holds that the ontology of lifeworld has to be transformed into transcendental phenomenology if one wants to work out a science about lifeworld in the full sense. And Husserl makes it very clear that the motivation behind his thematization of lifeworld is for the sake of introducing transcendental phenomenology. However, it is exactly here that we need to ask the following questions:

1. Has Husserl only make use of lifeworld for another purpose instead of taking seriously the theme of lifeworld? As a result, one might wonder how his treatment of lifeworld is corresponding to the thematization of lifeworld in the full sense?
2. Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?
3. If it is reasonable to distinguish two sorts of the ontology of lifeworld and argue for the independence of the ontology of lifeworld successfully, then what impact does it have on Husserl’s discourse on Europe, which he displays over and over again in his late philosophy, particularly in his Vienna Lecture in 1935?

In what follows, I would like to focus on the second question by invoking the “Lecture Summer Semester 1925: Phenomenological Psychology”\(^3\).
2. Phenomenological Psychology

Husserl’s phenomenological psychology touches on the natural world-concept (natürliche Weltbegriff) (Hua IX, 93/Scanlon, 70), the universal science of the world (universale Weltwissenschaft) (Hua IX, 92/Scanlon, 69) and the correlation of our experiences and the world. In phenomenological psychology Husserl lays foundation to the factual sciences with help of the concept of experiential world.

Husserl uses the term psychological phenomenology or phenomenological psychology alternatively, I myself prefer the former term than the latter, because the empirical psychologists have taken it for granted that the phenomenological psychology is a qualitative methodology for the empirical study in psychology as a specific science, yet Husserl makes it very clear, that phenomenological psychology is more embracing than psychology, that is, it is related to all socio-cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), even all sorts of sciences. Husserl points out that as long as all the socio-cultural sciences are related to the mental (das Geistige), they all can be seen to belong to psychology (Hua IX, 221/Scanlon, 169). In this sense, psychology is treated as the universal science of the mental (universale Wissenschaft vom Geistigen) (Hua IX, 91/Scanlon, 68).

Husserl on the one hand determines the psychological phenomenology or phenomenological psychology as pre-stage or propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology, yet on the other hand he also underlines that the former is parallel to the latter. Because the transcendental phenomenology is extremely alien to the people of common sense, Husserl regards the phenomenological psychology as helpful device to ascend to transcendental phenomenology. With help of phenomenological psychology one might get familiar with phenomenology step by step and then becomes well-prepared to go upwards to transcendental phenomenology (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 31-32). The final step requires a “mere reversal of its doctrinal content” (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 32), which concerns the change in attitude. To which Husserl explains:

While the psychologist, operating within what for him is naturally accepted world, reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but still within the world), the transcendental phenomenologist, through his absolutely all-embracing epoché, reduces this psychologically pure element to transcendental pure subjectivity (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).

Concretely speaking, it concerns the apperception of the world (Weltapperzeption) and its transformation. The psychologists, be they empirical psychologists or phenomenological psychologists, never stop their reliance on such apperceptions, so are the pure psychic subjectivities (Hua IX, 340-341/Sheehan...
The apperception of the world includes not only the apperception of objects, but also that of themselves, through which the personal ego (Mensch-Ich) is constituted. This kind of ego is that which is objectified in the world. All this requires a Copernican turn in order to get to the transcendental level (Hua IX, 341/Sheehan eds. 248). The transcendental pure subjectivity posits within itself the validity of such apperception. The process of such a transforming process delineates Husserl as follows:

They are transmuted into my transcendental mental process if through a radical epoché I posit as mere phenomena of the world, including my own human existence, and now follow up the intentional life-process wherein the entire apperception of the world, and in particular the apperception of my mind, my psychologically real perception-process, and so forth, are formed (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).

The contents of these processes are preserved. That is, all that is included in the mental process of pure psychic subjectivity are preserved in the transcendental pure subjectivity; and all these contents become “transcendentally inner experience”. As a result, this new kind of transcendental field of being is parallel to the purely psychic one.

Husserl contends that there are not two separate egos (i.e. the personal ego and the transcendental ego), but the same ego functioning in different attitudes. In view of contents they are parallel to each other, only in regard to attitude, the one is mundane and the other transcendental. Because of this parallel “the field of transcendental self-experience...can, through mere alteration of attitude, be changed into psychological self-experience” (Hua IX, 294/McCormick eds., 31).

What this signifies is that, conversely, whatever is the result of research in the transcendental field, there is the possibility to apply such a result to the mundane level. And whenever one is well acquainted with the practice of phenomenological psychological reduction and consequently knows the psychic subjectivity well enough, one is ready for the transcendental reduction and get to know the transcendental pure subjectivity.

Here we notice that Husserl distinguishes two different kinds of reduction: the phenomenological psychological and the transcendental. This distinction is first introduced in First Philosophy (1923/24), yet not made completely clear until in the articles concerning the phenomenological psychology such as Encyclopedia Britannica Article in 1927, Amsterdam Lectures in 1929 and finally Part Three of Crisis in 1936.

Generally speaking, Husserl localizes phenomenological psychology between the empirical psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Yet as
mentioned above, he also renders it as the central science to all socio-cultural sciences. In addition, it is also universal science for all empirical studies on human phenomenon because of its aprioristic characters (Hua IX, 127, 128/Scanlon, 96, 97). It is very close to transcendental phenomenology, but it remains positive science because it is confined to the natural attitude. In view of all these characteristics of this discipline, one may see its role as bridge between the transcendental phenomenology and empirical researches, but it also involves the seeming contradictions as well. It is eidetic as well as positive science, it practices epoché to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity, but it also retains the presupposition of the world. If we follow Husserl to see how he talks about the duplicity of human being – he is at the same time the person living in the world and the transcendental ego for the validity of the world (Hua IX, 294/McCormick ed., 31; see also Hua VI, §53), then the psychological phenomenology can be seen to best reflect such duplicity in regard to the status of the world. Husserl on the one hand dispenses with the presupposition of the world through reduction and on the other hand insists that the world has never been completely dispensed with due to its connection to natural attitude, which is opposed to transcendental attitude evidently.

In Husserl’s conception, psychology should not be only restricted to the empirical psychology. Psychology can be also understood as that which aims at the study of the essential part of psychic phenomenon—the intentionality. In this sense, phenomenological psychology is an aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, and purely descriptive field of investigation. The objects of such a psychology are the consciousness-life (Bewußtseinsleben) of the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects in the world (Hua XXVII, 213-214; Hua IX, 335; Hua XV, 142).

In order for the investigations to be made possible, the phenomenological psychologists need to practice reduction such that they may become “the non-participating onlooker” (der unbeteiligte Zuschauer) (Hua IX, 313/Sheehan eds., 222) and become aware of the consciousness-life of the research objects. They need to give up all that they hold on in the natural attitude and do their best to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity and describe the essence of it (Hua IX, 312/Sheehan eds., 222). They also need to dispense with the world and what remains is all kind of being conscious of, for example, perception of, remembering of, judging of etc. (Hua IX, 282/McCormick, 24). With all these practices they become different from the objects they investigate. The purity of the psychic phenomenon, secured by “psychological-phenomenological reduction”, means mainly liberation from the psycho-physical aspects of psychic phenomenon (Hua IX, 308/Sheehan eds., 218). The reduction demands that whatever irrelevant to the essential part of the psychic needs to be bracketed. The investigators concentrate solely on the correlation between the psychic activities and their intentional objects.
As indicated above, the objects that the psychological phenomenology aims to study are the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects in the world. The subjects of these sorts are deeply involved in the world, so deeply that without the correlative part of the world, the psychic phenomenon of the subject(s) can be hardly explained. In this sense, the investigation has to presuppose the world. And this results in contradiction regarding the status of the world, i.e. on the one hand the world is bracketed through the practice of reduction, it is on the other hand retained for the sake of research so long as the objects they investigate are deeply involved in the world. In transcendental phenomenology such a contradiction is overcome because the world as a whole has turned into phenomena. Consequently the reduction practiced by the psychologists is so to speak incomplete compared to philosophers and consequently the purity attained therein has also only relative purity (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172).

3. Phenomenological Psychology and the Experiential World

Nevertheless one should never denounce the value of phenomenological psychology in view of such contradiction. As long as this discipline works on the liberation from the “transcendent factors,” that is, the psycho-physical aspects of the psychic phenomenon, it gets hold of the basis to work out the essence of psychic phenomenon. And this leads to the study of the “unitary experiential world” (einheitliche Erfahrungs- welt), which is “all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences” (Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178).

All the socio-cultural sciences need to deal with what proceed in the mental (das Geistige) of the people, what they think and how they think. But as long as the human beings are living in the world, the worldly aspect just requires to be taken into consideration. Traditionally, the relation between material nature and the mental has concerned the philosophers and scientists since Descartes in the early 17th century. Though Husserl poses similar question, yet he declines to see either “nature” or “mind” as indubitable notions from which we can start dealing with this question. As a matter of fact, these two concepts result from our theoretical thinking instead of our original experience. As long as the concepts of “nature” and “mind” are results of theoretical interests, they should not be taken for granted in such a context.

The world revealed through pre-theoretical experiences is never the world-in-itself, i.e. the pure material nature, it is instead related to the subject. Husserl delineates such a world as surrounding world (Umwelt). This is a pre-scientific, pre-theoretic world of experience that involves the subjective aspect. Even though every subjective experience has its particular, concrete content,
it nevertheless contains the stable sense (*fester Sinn*), that is, the invariant (*das Invariante*) in the world (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172). The phenomenological psychology of Husserl aims at exactly the clarification of such invariants in the world. So long as it is related to the subjective moments, it is not devoid of the mental or mind. Besides, one has to add that the subject is closely connected to the world. It is “subject in the world”. How, then, is such a subject to understand?

The subject is a being with the mental, with mind, yet it is not purely mental, it is also a being with bodily existence. The subject is involved in space, closely related to the physical phenomenon and material nature. How then is such a connection to be explained? Husserl takes up this old question with a new orientation.

Basically, Husserl holds the view that the mental is more essential than the body in the definition of human being. However, to the extent that the mental cannot exist on its own, the mind is not irrelevant to the space. The mind is involved with space through the body, with such involvement the mind can be said to localize in space, though mediately. Husserl regards this as the way how the mind is originally given in space. When we determine that the mental cannot exist without the physical subsistence, the latter can be said to constitute the presupposition for the former. As a result, when the body is annihilated, so is the mental or mind. This is how Husserl thinks of death as a real event in the world (Hua IX, 109/Scanlon, 82). Accordingly Husserl does not support the idea that the soul may survive the decay of the body. He insists on the necessary precondition of the bodily existence for the mental. However, he is not in accordance with the naturalistic view that the mental or mind can be treated as no more than the by-product of the physical body, either. It is unacceptable to him to study the mental or mind with the devices borrowed from natural sciences. For him this sort of approach makes up the biggest obstacle to understand the mental or mind. He explains:

In a completely one-sided fashion, one attempted always to continue proceeding exclusively in the mode of natural science and to reduce all research concerning reality to inductive research. Inductive science and empirical science fact stood and still now stand for many as equivalent expressions. Connected with that is the unclear transfer, one which is as a rule even false in principle, of the idea of a science of nature to the science of mental essences and of the psyche itself (Hua IX, 142/Scanlon, 108).

In the eyes of the natural scientists the mental or mind is nothing but the phenomenon that is based on the physical occurrences. The mental is thus interpreted as objectified phenomenon in the natural world. The human be-
Husserl reinterprets the traditional philosophical question of mind/body by inquiring: how the mind comes to be involved in the spatial world? The answer to this question lies in animation (*Beseelung*), which can be made clear against the background of what Husserl calls the personalistic attitude.

As the subject in the world the human being deals with the things in the surrounding world with a attitude that Husserl calls the personalistic attitude. This attitude signifies the interest in the meaning and value of the things. And in this attitude, «my body is … given for me in the surrounding world as the center of the rest of the surrounding world, as a spatial thing of the surrounding world with somatic properties, in which I hold sway, and even as that by which I exercise an influence upon the rest of the surrounding world, etc.» (Hua IX, 228/Scanlon, 175). This attitude is definitely different from the naturalistic attitude, which has exclusively interest in the pure nature that is deprived of value and meaning. For Husserl the surrounding world is related to the personalistic attitude and the pure nature results from the privation of personalistic attitude.

Originally, the world is never independent of our experiences, the items we encounter are never just natural material, but always involving some senses beyond pure nature, not to mention the persons we encounter. As personal I (*Mensch-Ich*) I am living in the world with all these things and other persons. And it is the socio-cultural science that deals with the personal subject living in his surrounding, cultural world (Hua XXVII, 211). In such a situation, the things around him are significant (*bedeutsam*) (Hua IX, 111; Scanlon, 84). Husserl even notifies that between the personal subject and his objects there is intertwining relationship (Hua IX, 226; Scanlon, 173). In brief, cultural objects are produced for the sake of some uses or purposes that constitute their meaning and value.

The knowledge about the pure nature is not at all equal to the understanding of the world. The things in the surrounding world are things full of meaning and value, they are cultural objects. Although the cultural objects have the components of natural material, they are not merely natural objects. Husserl holds that «(t)he purpose and sense of the work which accrued to the object in its original production is something permanently appropriated to that material object» (Hua IX, 115/Scanlon, 87). The value and meaning are adherent

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4 As long as the pure ego is the origin of constitution, the body can even be said to be constituted by the pure ego (208).
to the cultural objects as their inseparable parts. Taking up arrow as example, Husserl explicated:

physically the arrow is sensually seen and is at the same time, as we say, understood in its final sense as an arrow. It shows itself to be that in possible and actual experience whenever it is shown and demonstrated as having been produced for the sake of this sense and as corresponding to it (Hua IX, 115/Scanlon, 87).

Seen as such, the eidetic description of the personalistic attitude can provide us with an appropriate approach to understand the world. A study of this world calls Husserl also as «the eidetic study of the world of natural experience» (die Eidetik der natürlichen Erfahrungswelt). As long as this science aims at describing the a priori of the experiential world, it is close to the aforementioned phenomenological psychology and universal science of the world (universale Weltwissenschaft).

Phenomenological psychology, the universal science of the world, or «the eidetic study of the world of natural experience», all of them are to be characterized as aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, descriptive and intentional. Beyond that it remains in the natural attitude instead of transcendental attitude. A priori implies that between subject and the world there is a universal structure, which is revealed through constant styles and types. Such aprioric, universal structures are presuppositions of the daily life. Yet these presuppositions are not being aware of. Even the subject that is involved is not being aware of, either. In daily life people have their preoccupations with all kinds of object that concern their living. One needs to step back in order to get in touch with these presuppositions as well as the subject that has been constantly in function. It is what Husserl means by reduction. First is the stage of psychological-phenomenological reduction, and then the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In this context, the first one will suffice.

Through the reduction we become aware of the presupposition of daily life and come in touch with the experiential world, which Husserl explains:

By the title ‘experiential world’ we mean clearly what makes up the unity of concordant total actuality which is continually reestablished in the course of our experiences (Hua IX, 59/Scanlon, 44).

The world is a world that is related to the subject, not just the world-in-itself, as already mentioned before. And such experiential world has a universal structure that is revealed in stable types and styles. The structure is on the one
hand related to the subject, it is on the other related to the world. The subject and the world are just correlated to each other.

Husserl points out further that the experiential world with its eidetic structure is the «all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences» (Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). It contains the world-truth (Weltwahrheit) (Hua IX, 63/Scanlon 47) that constitutes the basis for all the truths in factual sciences, be it natural or socio-cultural. The truth revealed in the world of original experiences signifies that such a world of truth is not a world without contents. Only because of its fruitful contents can it become the foundation of all sciences. Based on the truth of such a world we can be sure of truth in scientific knowledge. The world is a domain of pre-scientific experience, the structures of which will be reflected in other sciences (Hua IX, 64, 46, 232/Scanlon, 33, 47, 178).

Thus, the experiential world is the foundation of all the scientific researches. The experience has it that, as human beings living in the natural attitude, we hold lots of unshakable believes which concern the reality and totality of the world. It is accepted by us as firmly as possible. But that which is revealed in the original experiences is for Husserl much too contaminated by the scientific culture that we may find it extremely hard to return to the world in original experiences and recognize it. For this reason Husserl suggests to overcome such difficulties by phenomenological reduction, here once again the psychological-phenomenological reduction.

**Conclusion**

In the first part of my paper, I delineate the Husserlian notion of lifeworld ending with the question: Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?

In the second and third part of my paper I explore the meaning of phenomenological psychology by indicating the position of this discipline as between transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. In addition, I also indicate the parallel between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Husserl himself handles the relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology quite a lot when he deals with phenomenological psychology. However, in the lecture held in 1925, we hardly find Husserl articulate much about the relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, rather, it concentrates on the relationship between phenomenological psychology and the factual sciences, in particular that of socio-cultural sciences in the context of which the experiential world plays a pivotal role.
As long as phenomenological psychology works on the correlation of our experiences and the world, and as long as it deals with the natural world-concept, the phenomenological psychology corresponds to the universal science of the world. If, as the mind’s self-knowledge (193/Scanlon, 148), the phenomenological psychology focuses on the side of subject, then it is the universal science of the world that focuses on the side of the world. Like two sides of the same coin, these two sciences belong to each other and both of them correspond to « the eidetic study of the world of natural experience» as long as they are eidetic sciences. In such a case, a phenomenology without the subsoil of transcendental phenomenology seems sustainable. Looking back to the question raised above, why not also grant the ontology of lifeworld an independent status?

Bibliographical references


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