Elements of a theory of social time.  
A Schützian approach  

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The paper discusses in the first place the Bergson’s pragmatic concept of time and successively the Husserl’s concept of time and the lifeworld to define their influences for Alfred Schutz whose considerations on time started from Henry Bergson’s philosophy of duration. The Austrian sociologist uses Husserl’s considerations on the inner-time consciousness as a complement of Bergson’s theory. It’s a well-known fact that time is a fundamental topic for Schutz especially in his Fragments toward a Phenomenology of Music (1944). Schutz’s phenomenological research on music takes into account the Bergsonian connection of mind and body, of (inner) time and space and their theoretical characterization. The paper examines finally Ilja Srubar’s differentiation between constituted and produced time. Coming a conclusion the paper distinguishes analytically a multiplicity of forms of time and the types of mechanism for their formation trying to describe the kind of interrelations are to found between these different forms as necessary elements in order to conceive a sociological theory of time.

One of the genuine achievements of the Schützian Theory of the Social is the introduction of a concept of time into sociological theory both as central and fundamental. In starting from Max Weber’s concept of subjective meaning Schütz relies on Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl’s philosophical considerations for his «philosophical founded theory of method» (Schütz 1967: xxxi) for the social sciences. Nevertheless, his theory of time is rather neglected in the reception of his work, with the exception of Ilja Srubar (1974, for a condensed version see Srubar 2007), whose differentiation between constituted and produced time is discussed later in this article. Neither Elias (1984) nor Nowotny (1989) mention Schütz at all. Nassehi (2008) at least mentions Schütz’ theory of time, but states that Schütz «remains a captive of phenomenological thinking» (110, my translation). Two more recent articles discuss certain aspects of time in Schütz’s works: Muzzetto (2006) asks for the function of time in the constitution of experiences, but in the end diagnoses a structural difficulty in Schütz, because in «the relationship between the subject and the social world» there are used «two different modes of discourse» (25). Another way of investigation leads Renn (2006b) to a similar result. In starting from the
concept of constitution in Husserl and Schütz he detects two different modes of it in Schütz: appresentation and synchronization, which would lead to two different theories of communication. But in Schütz’ detailed analysis of the time horizons in communication he finds potential for an amendment both of pragmatically and phenomenologically based theory of communication. So, all in all theories of social neglect the Schützian approach, even if its potential is recognized. In order to work out some elements of a theory of social time, I will ask for the temporal dimensions as developed by Alfred Schütz, in order to pave the way onward to a sociological theory of time. Therefore, Bergson’s and Husserl’s conceptualizations of time are shortly reconstructed. Then, the time concept that Schütz developed in his *Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932/1967) is outlined, before some clarifications and later considerations in his *Fragments Towards a Phenomenology of Music* (1944/1996) are discussed. After a brief sketch of Srubar’s distinction between constituted and produced time a short prospect will summarize draw the conclusions for a theory of social time under the condition of social differentiation of high degree.

**Bergson’s pragmatic concept of time**

Schütz began his theoretical work in the 1920s relying on Henri Bergson’s pragmatic philosophy of the durée. Bergson conceptualized the durée as a continuous flow of experiences constituting a «succession of indistinct elements» (Muzzetto 2006: 7), as a permanent coming-to-be and passing away of experiences. This stream is the inner kernel of consciousness, not accessible by reflection (or only in «rare moments», see Bergson 1913: 231), but it can be symbolized, spatialized, conceptualized, transformed into an discontinuous and quantifiable time. It is the base of a lot of levels of consciousness, that differ in the degree of attention towards life. So, we have two forms of time in Bergson: the inner time of the durée, an unmeasurable continuity, and the reflected, symbolized and measurable time outside of it. The link and mediation between both forms is the body. It is conceived as the active center of the subject in the spatio-temporal world. Through the body experiences are transmitted into the durée and occurrences as stimuli from the durée are turned into action in the spatial world. Perception and action (or working) are located in the body, it is only a kind of transitional place also in a temporal sense. It is located in the spatio-temporal sphere of the outer world and reaches into inner time through sensations and in taking on impulses from the durée. Thus, Bergson finds a way out of a dualistic conception. Bergson’s concept of memory adds two more important aspects to his theoretical stance of time. On the one hand recollections are triggered by pragmatic usefulness
for the present situation, a kind of pragmatic relevance (Bergson 1911: 188-89) that modifies also the recollected according to the present context. On the other hand, it orders and stores away experiences. But to reflect upon experiences they must have expired. Reflection is only possible in retrospection. Memorization means also the making of a kind of temporal succession in the inner time produced by memory. So, memory is a central concept in Bergson’s theory.

Alfred Schütz uses Bergson’s ideas as a foundation in all his writings in the 1920s and also his conception of time (see Schütz 1982). But his early writings of this time are not least fragmentary, because he wrestles with the problem of the inaccessibility of the durée. He solved it, when he (re-)discovered Husserl’s phenomenology with the epoche as a methodological instrument to analyze the stream of consciousness. But, as we will see, his concept of time rests still on Bergson’s considerations for a great part.

Husserl’s concept of time and the lifeworld

Edmund Husserl’s investigations both into time and the life-world are most influential for Alfred Schütz. Therefore, a very short sketch of his theory of time is necessary. I want to distinguish three forms or maybe strands of time in Husserl’s work.¹ Husserl states in his Ideas I that «time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty» (Husserl 1982: § 81, 193). Temporality designates for him not only something «belonging to every single mental process, but also a necessary form combining mental processes with mental processes» (194). Thus, a stream of mental processes is constituted and within the stream a temporal order. Each actually present «now» is punctual and is accompanied by a «just now» (retention) and a «before» (reproduction). And it is also accompanied by a «soon» (protention) and an «after» (anticipation). So the temporal order of the stream of consciousness constitutes in its constant references to the past and the future phenomenological time. With his method of phenomenological reduction Husserl clarifies this inner consciousness of time, the «phenomenological time» as the «unitary form of all mental processes» (Husserl 1982: § 81, p. 192). That is the core of Husserl’s phenomenology of time: the detailed description of the constitution of subjective time in inner time-consciousness.

¹ I do not discuss the often problematic connections between the concepts and the development of them in the context of the development of his work. See Ricoeur (2012), Römer (2010), de Warren (2009), Mensch (2010).
But, he distinguishes another form of time: the objective or cosmic time. This, from the point of view of a single consciousness, is a transcendent (not: transcendental) form of time. It resides in the outer world and is measurable by the position of the sun, clocks or other physical means. And it has to be suspended for all investigations into the subjective form of time.2

And maybe there is also a third strand of time to be found in Husserl: the time of the life-world. The term ‘life-world’ as developed by Husserl has two functions. It is conceptualized as a foundation for all knowledge, especially the scientific knowledge, as the «general ‘ground’ of human world-life» and the «foundation for science» (Husserl 1970: 155). And it is conceptualized as the social environment we live in:

the concrete life-world must first be taken into consideration; and it must be considered in terms of the truly concrete universality whereby it embraces, both directly and in the manner of horizons, all the built-up levels of validity acquired by men for the world of their common life […] the world of straightforward intersubjective experiences (Husserl 1970: 133).

As such it is a social world, given in its specific cultural and historical way: «The world is the sole universe as what is pregiven as obvious» (Husserl 1970: 180). And in its givenness and validity inherent is a intersubjectively constituted time based on and constituting the transcendental intersubjectivity. Like all his attempts to establish intersubjectivity on phenomenological ground this one can also be seen as just a statement in the last resort.

To sum up, there are three strands or forms of time to be found in Husserl’s work: the intensely and very lucidly analyzed subjective time, the intersubjectively constituted time of the life-world and the objective time of nature (or of Newton’s physics?, see Römer 2010: 47 ff.). In attempting to found all these forms on the first one, Husserl tried to lay the foundations for the «unity of one time» (Husserl 1970: 169), but he never succeeded. Maybe that would be impossible, as Paul Ricoeur stated in his aporias of time. What remains, then, are three separated forms which have to be mediated and analyzed in their relation to one another.

Alfred Schütz used Husserl’s considerations on the inner time-consciousness as a complement of Bergson’s theory. Husserl’s method of the epoche, the way of observing the consciousness from within the consciousness offered him a way to access the stream of consciousness in a controlled way and to ask for the constitution of subjective meaning in its temporal dimensions.

2 On the other hand Husserl tried to base the objective time in the inner time-consciousness. For a critique see Ricoeur (2012) and Römer (2010: 47 ff.).
Schütz’s considerations on time in the Phenomenology of the Social World

a) Time and subjective meaning

Alfred Schütz used time always as a central concept in his philosophical foundation of Weber’s interpretative sociology. His first attempt started from Henri Bergson’s philosophy of duration:

Our I-experience is banished into time and space; it is tied to consociates through language and emotions; it is accustomed to thinking, that is, to spatialize streaming changes of quality and to form them into concepts. […] This is so because our world of thinking, our concepts, our science demonstrate their time-space character at every move (Schütz 1982: 32).

However, Bergson’s concept of duration or of inner time allows as developed above no controlled analytical access to the stream of experiences, because every form of description, of conceptualization, or representation involves alienation, exteriorization, and disassociation. When Schütz discovered Husserl’s Phenomenology of inner time consciousness in 1928 or shortly afterwards, he had an instrument to access the processes of mind and of constitution of time. But he didn’t abandon Bergson, instead he combines him with Husserl to solve his problem of a clarification of Weber’s concepts especially the concept of meaning: «The problem of meaning is a time problem» (Schütz 1967: 12). In his investigation he starts with «Bergson’s distinction between living within the stream of experience and living within the world of space and time» (Schütz 1967: 45). That opens up a double perspective, on the one hand we have enduring processes, like for example the flowing motion of an arrow, and on the other frozen, spatialized acts, the space traversed by the arrow divided into single points.

Indeed, when I immerse myself in my stream of consciousness, in my duration, I do not find clearly differentiated experiences at all. […] I cannot distinguish between the Now and the Earlier, between the later Now and the Now that has just been […]. For I experience my duration as a unidirectional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now, I have grown older. But I cannot become aware of this while still immersed in the stream. As long as my whole consciousness remains temporally uni-directional and irreversible, I am unaware either of my own own growing older or of any difference between present and past. The very awareness of the stream of duration presupposes a turning-back against the stream, a special kind of attitude toward the stream, a ‘reflection,’ as we will call it (Schütz 1967: 47).
Schütz combines this distinction with Husserl’s concepts of retention and reproduction, because especially retention allows the constitution of an order of different Nows in the duration, in the ongoing flow of experiences. Reproduction on the other hand ensures the identity of an object, as only with recollection a comparison and a judgement about likeness is possible. Because meaning constitution presupposes discrete experiences, it is not possible to ascribe meaning, while living in the stream of experiences. That is possible only in reflection, in a retrospective glance, an act of attention to the past experiences (a movement taken again from Bergson). Then, a single experience can be selected as a discrete one and just in selecting it it is bestowed with meaning. It is also interpreted with schemes of experiences at hand. So, the memory functions, retention and reproduction and also protention and anticipation, arrange and order the unstructured stream of consciousness, so that subjective time is constituted. This way, Schütz could describe the production of order between the elements of the durée, which in Bergson’s conception remains unclear.

We have here developed in combining Bergson and Husserl the form of time in Schütz’s theory: the subjective time of the consciousness, which is the base for all processes of subjective meaning constitution and action.

b) Intersubjective time and simultaneity

While subjective meaning can only be bestowed to one’s own past experiences, the situation changes with the establishment of intersubjectivity. This is done in leaving the transcendental analysis of the stream of thoughts and changing to the natural attitude of everyday life. Social situations imply the encounter of two or more individuals:

By merely ‘looking’ I can grasp even those of your lived experiences which you have not yet noticed and which are for you still prephenomenal and undifferentiated. […] You and I are in a specific sense ‘simultaneous’, […] we ‘coexist’ (Schütz 1967: 102).

Schütz states here, that two streams of consciousness are synchronized by and in interaction, in the practical operations involved in perceiving one another, communicating, or acting together. The two or more streams of consciousness involved have their own rhythm, their own feeling of time, their own subjective time constituted as described above. But meeting at a certain point of time leads to synchronization of these separated times. The mediators are, with Bergson, the bodily expressions of the participants of the situation. The mutual perceiving and interpreting the other happens in the present of the encounter, and, as the formal structure of both streams of consciousness involved is the same, they are synchronized in their mutual reference to the
other. So, production of synchronicity is a practical achievement. And it holds true only for the specific social situation. That means, the newly constituted intersubjective time is not a temporal dimension for itself, but just two or more interconnected or interwoven subjective times. This way of «growing older together», of coexisting in simultaneity in spatial immediacy is the basic social situation. The temporal dimension of such a situation is structured by the involved subjective times phased on to the other. This is the second form of time, Schütz describes. It implies quite a lot of presuppositions, that are necessary, if the intersubjective time should be connected to both the subjective times: awareness of the other, perceptibility of the other, and bodily mediation of perceptions and actions. These presuppositions are necessary, if the egological constituted time should be fundamental for intersubjective time, which then is only a short-termed deduction of subjective times.

In addition the in pragmatically constituted intersubjective time in the world of working ("Wirkwelt") Schütz mentions an objective time, which seems to be the physical time of the objects «which is quantifiable, divisible, and spatial» (Schutz 1967: 103). This is also the time of history (see Schütz 1967: 212 ff.). Summing up, we can find, at a first glance to Husserl three forms of time in Schütz' *Phenomenology of the social world*: the subjective time of consciousness, the intersubjective time of a specific social situation and the objective time of things and of history. But at a second glance at least the subjective and the intersubjective time differ in a quite great extent from Husserl. In both forms elements of Bergson’s theory are introduced, not at least to pave a more durable way for a sociological theory of time. Therefore, the body and the pragmatic context of working ("Wirken") function as a replacement for the transcendental explanation of Husserl and as a connection to the sociality of the everyday life-world.

**Schütz’s later considerations and clarifications on time**

Time remains an important topic for Schütz all through his work. Especially, in his *Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music* (1944/1996) he dwells more intensively on the subject of time and adds some detailing to his theory of time:

> If you look at your watch, you will find that it takes about three minutes to play one side of a twelve-inch record. This is an important fact for the person in charge of making up a radio program. It is entirely immaterial for the listener. To the listener, it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to the slow movement of a symphony was of equal length to the time he lived through while listening to its finale, although each movement needed the playing of two sides of a twelve-inch record (Schütz 1944/1996: 254).
There are two modes of time shown in this example: the (external) time of the watch, the radio program, the record and the time of the subjective experience of music. Both modes of time are incommensurable and as it seems, ununlinkable. But there is a link between the record and mind of the listener: the music coming out of the loud speakers. Again, the bodily perception of the music functions as mediation to the mind. And there is another link: What is not mentioned is the practice of turning or changing of the record right in the middle of the adagio or the allegro. In this moments the action, the world of working interrupts the pure experience of music and links the subjective time to the temporal dimensions of the outer world. It is a leap between two modes of consciousness and between two spheres of time. Again, the bodily action mediates the two temporal dimensions. In both cases the body bridges the difference between subjective and external time through pragmatic action or perception. Combined with the Schützian theory of multiple realities, we have here a first reference to differentiated forms of time (see Sebald 2011), even if the social status of these different provinces of meaning remains unclear.

«Inner time projected into space becomes the dimension in which our actions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellow men, and which, by a supervening idealization, may be conceived as the cosmic time or the time of the physicists» (Schütz 1944/1996: 254). Eventually that leads to Riemann’s and Einstein’s conception of spatial time, wherein time is the fourth dimension. The theoretical link between these different spheres here is just named «projection». The background of this conception is not so much Husserl, but Bergson. For him, the time of the durée is the unaccessible base of all subjective and social life. Taking this, all forms of time seem to be rooted in the egological subjective time for Schütz.

But when he develops the temporal dimension of music further it becomes clear that the subjective time is not only and entirely constituted in the consciousness itself. It is triggered also by the outer stream of tones, its rhythm, its specific articulation:

We have to consider what we called the articulation of the musical flux into unit and sub-units. Any musician knows this problem very well. It has for him the name of musical phrasing. The art of musical phrasing consists in making each unit and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phrase what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phrase by a very short interruption of the flux of music – so short, sometimes, that even no sign of notation is required in order to mark the short pause between the end of the first and the beginning of the next phrase. It is these small fractions of time, incommensurable in our current notation, which the singer or the wind instrument
player needs for breathing, or the string instrument player needs for changing
the stroke of his bow. The composer of our times order the players by the use
of ties or rubato, or even in special cases by the use of rests, to observe these
thematical units and sub-units (Schütz 1944/1996: 274).

The point here is not so much the thematically structured stream of mu-
sic, but that this structure is transposed in listening into a structure of the
stream of consciousness of the listener: «The listener is invited and incited
by them [the short intermittences] to look from this end-phase back to initial
phase» (Schütz 1944/1996: 274-75). The division into units «incited» (not:
determined) by the phrasing of music is then not only a thematical division,
but also a temporal one, because the points of reflection, for the mechanisms
of retention and protention are thus induced into the subjective mind. «The
attitude of the listener, his decision to follow the flux of music, involved his
preparedness to perform the reflective attitude as soon as the flux of music
itself invites him to do so» (Schütz 1944/1996: 275). Again, the bodily percep-
tion takes on external sequences and synchronizes the mind with them. This
also holds true for the situation of communication or making music together:
in perceiving and phasing in with the other(s), in a specific tuning-in-rela-
tion-ship, the foundation of common, intersubjective time is achieved.

There are two more important clarifications to be found in this fragment.
First, Schütz describes the process of time constitution with the example of
listening to a piece of music in a very detailed way:

This attitude of reflection is made possible by that peculiar function of our
mind which is generally called the faculty of memory. The Now which turned
into a past does not entirely disappear; it may be recollected; it is no longer an
actual vivid experience, but it subsists as remembrance of things past. It is this
faculty of memory, which makes the stream of our consciousness an unbroken
and interrelated sequel of our thoughts in inner time (Schütz 1944/1996:
255).

In distinguishing with Husserl the short term memory called retention and
a long term memory, called reproduction, Schütz develops the time-consti-
tuting potential of memory further. A similar differentiation holds true for the
dimension of the future: the short termed form, protention and a long term
form, anticipation. Both the memory of past and of future not only ensure the
unbrokenness and interrelatedness of the stream of consciousness, but in con-
necting the different points of time to a unbroken line of time and therefore to
the ground of each subjective consciousness. In changing between the differ-
ent modes of time (past, present, future), time itself is constituted and memory
becomes the founding operation for it. The second clarification deals with the
role of the body in time constitution. In a only shortly published appendix to
the *Fragments towards a phenomenology of music* Schütz discusses the phenomenon
of rhythm and, again, links it to the body:

> We are not only aware of the sensation which the air we breathe creates in
our oral-nasal tract at any inhalation and exhalation, we feel also distinctly
the movement of our breast as a rhythmical movement of a part of our body,
a movement which we do not only perceive as a recurrent experience in our
inner time, but which can be altogether experienced as an occurrence in outer
space—the optical and the haptic space—in which our body as an extended
thing partakes like any other object (Schütz 2013: 20-21).

That means, Schütz’s phenomenological research on music takes into ac-
count the Bergsonian connection of mind and body, of (inner) time and space
and their theoretical characterization. The important point Schütz makes
here is that rhythm is an occurrence in inner time, but bound to movement and
especially bodily movements and its kinaesthetic perception. It seems to me,
that here is the point to understand the unwillingness, which Schütz expresses
in the *Fragments towards a phenomenology of music*, to recognize rhythm as a basic
and universal element of music, because the close connection to the bodily
sphere lets music step out of pure inner time. Nevertheless, the rhythms of the
body seem to have an impact on the constitution of inner time³.

The problem in Schütz is the attempt to root all time dimensions in the
egologically constituted subjective time. From here he develops unspecified,
but mostly body-based links to other levels of time and assumes an unpro-
blematic transition between the egological consciousness and the intersubjec-
tive life-world. He concludes that a parallelism of the temporal structures
leads to kind of synchronicity, to the constitution of an intersubjectively shared
time. But there are some hints to be found that point to synchronization as
a practical achievement through bodily perceptions and movements. If the
unproblematic transition between the levels is discarded, there are three levels
of time left: the subjective time (maybe distinguished between a time of the
consciousness and a time of the body), the intersubjective time as a pragmatic
achievement and the external, objective or better: socially produced time. Be-
fore coming to a conclusion, the last form shall be discussed with Ilja Srubar’s
notion of «produced time».

³ Husserl came to a similar conclusion in his last manuscripts, when he founds subjective time
on bodily instincts (see Mensch 2010: 247ff.).
Ilja Srubar's differentiation between constituted and produced time

In relying on great parts of the phenomenological tradition Ilja Srubar (1974) accentuates the conception of time with his differentiation of constituted time and produced time. The constituted subjective time is, as in the whole phenomenological tradition, the time of the own durée, the time of the inner stream of experiences. But additionally he tries to show a social dimension in it, an intersubjective validity. In starting from Schütz’ General Thesis of the Alter Ego, which includes the parallelism of the temporal structures of both minds. Both are operating in a present using retentions and reproductions, protentions and anticipations. Discussing persons with an associative disorder (aphasia), he concludes that the disorder is a lack of a shared temporal structure, which produces an inability to speak and act in a meaningful way. Srubar concludes that the temporal structure of the life world has to be intersubjective in order to enable communication and interaction. Thus, he circumvents the phenomenological problem of bridging the gap between the egological conceived I and the social situation.

Meaning and intersubjectivity are built up on and with these shared temporal structures. But the temporal objects constituted in everyday life world transcend this sphere and point to another temporal structure: the produced time. This form of time is defined as a temporal rhythm or a temporality of its own right (Srubar 1974: 102) independent of the life world. Therefore, it appears in the life-world (or «constituted social world» in Srubar’s terms) as anonymous and maybe as a form of estrangement. Furthermore, it is the base for establishing types and roles in the social environment. These ways, the produced time reaches into the life-world. Srubar shows with the examples of unemployed people and prisoners that a breakdown of the produced time prohibits an adequate comprehension of situations.

The produced time is produced socially, but not easy if at all to change with individual intentional action. The produced time is result of the division of labour and is located primarily in the economic production of a society. The material processes of (re)production, the time for the circulation of capital and the relation of the working time necessary for reproduction and the additional working time set specific rhythms and an time of its own right. It cannot be controlled by the participants of the production process. It is a social form of time, social in the sense of social facts as conceptualized by Durkheim. If the Marx-induced preference for the economic sphere is extended to other or all social fields of order, we can take the produced times as a product of the differentiation of society, in so far as all fields of order develop their own temporality, their own time structures. Srubar has complemented the phenomenological forms of constituted temporalities
with the produced social temporalities of societies that are differentiated in a high degree.

Conclusions

To sum up, we have complex collection of time forms both in the subjective and in the social sphere. All of them could be necessary elements for a theory of social time. In a first step I will try to collocate them:

1. Forms of time on the subjective level:
   a) The time of the body: The body is not just an mediator between world and mind. The rhythms of a living body, its needs and drives, constitute own temporal structures. Chronobiology is active in this field, but as these forms of time are also constitutive for action and reflection, they are also relevant for a social theory of time.
   b) The time of the consciousness: The subjective time, as analyzed by Husserl and Schütz, with its form of the specious present, its references to the past and future, is central for the perception and feeling of time.

2. Forms of time on the intersubjective level: In social interactions and situations the subjective temporalities encounter each other and are confronted with produced time forms. The result is a complex conglomerate, which has to be synchronized.

3. Forms of produced time on the social level: In societies differentiated in a high degree, the different and in a certain sense independent and self-contained fields of order develop an own temporality, dependent on the rhythms of the processes, that built them up. This way, provinces of meaning (if they are social), organizations, bureaucracies or social systems have their own temporality, established by the speed of their communication, the circulation of objects in them, and their integration of past and future into present operations.

If we distinguish this multiplicity of forms of time, there remain two problems to solve. Firstly, is there a common mechanism for the formation of these different forms of time? And secondly, what kind of interrelations are to found between these different forms?

For an answer to the first question, I would propose to rely on Husserl’s and Schütz’s form of time constitution. Time is constituted in the permanent change from present to past and future, the permanent oscillating between past, present and future as Luhmann (1996: 38-40) in an explicit reference to Husserl has called it. The operation necessary for that is memory. Not only the individual memory of minds, but especially for the produced temporalities
the specific social memories of organizations, of systems, of collectives (see Sebald 2014). The processes laying the ground for a social unit or a specific field of social order, in their rhythm, in their repetitions and recurrences, in their references to past and future produce an own and autonomous time.

But if there are so much different social times and temporal structures, there would be no interaction, no communication, no social process at all. Therefore, it is important to take a look at the relations and the connections between the forms and levels of time. I would propose to take the differences and the demarcations between the different forms seriously in this way, that we may not assume an easy crossing and linking between them. Instead, we should, like Bergson but without stating an inaccessibility, act on the assumption that a crossing between and a linking of different forms always involves a change of them. Luhmann coined the term «structural coupling» for that link, but doesn’t really fill it. Renn (2006a) offers the metaphor of translation, that seems to be more adequate, because it implies a transformation that is not entirely disconnected from the primary condition. This translation is a pragmatic one, achieved in communications and interactions, that make synchronization of the temporalities involved necessary. As a means for this synchronizations the coordinated universal time has been introduced and is widely used in our globalized world. But that doesn’t mean that all different forms and levels of time vanish, on the contrary, the more societies differentiate the more temporalities emerge.

Both answers are just short sketches of what has to be done yet in order to conceive a sociological theory of time, but that would mean a lot of further work and is for now left to anticipation.

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