Democratic Citizenship and Its Changes as Empirical Phenomenon

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The article aims to contribute to the empirical approach towards the study of democratic citizenship, while avoiding both reductionist and all-embracing uses of the concept. It deals with three issues: the identification of the phenomenon, the observation of the dynamics of change, and the assessment of the ongoing evolutions of citizenship.

The return and escape of citizenship

Since the beginning of the 1990s, theoretical and empirical research on citizenship has increased dramatically. The sheer number of books, articles, papers, journals, courses, seminars, and conferences published and organized around this subject makes it virtually impossible to provide a general overview. Likewise, we have seen citizenship emerge in the realm of public debate as an issue of the utmost importance for the future of democracy, both at the local and at the global level. Political leaders, policy makers, activists, experts and opinion makers have advanced and exchanged reflections and proposals. At the same time, governments and civil society organizations have enacted initiatives meant to place citizenship at the center of public attention. Active citizenship, which is to be promoted or sustained, has become a multi-purpose buzzword, the solution to any societal need.

The democratic quality of citizenship is at the center of this unforeseen return. It is the two-way link between the establishment, enrichment, and development of democratic regimes, and the emergence of the citizen; the citizen, within this framework, is both the generator of and generated by the democratic process.

In sum, it can be asserted that while democratic citizenship used to be regarded, prior to 1989, as a dependent variable of political systems and democratic regimes, we can consider the Fall of the Berlin Wall as a symbolic turning point, after which democratic citizenship has been thought to possess intrinsic value from both the heuristic and etiological standpoints.
However, this ‘return of citizenship in the social sciences and in the public sphere has lent visibility to several problems.-

First, a paradox. On one hand, since the 1990s, democratic citizenship has been recognized as a fundamental pillar of healthy societies and working democracies. On the other hand, this new consideration has coincided with a crisis of citizenship: specifically, what is questioned is its ability to sustain cohesive societies and enrich democracies. Thus, the very moment of recognition of the value of citizenship coincides with the emergence of its crisis.

This return-and-escape paradox is linked to two serious problems. One such problem is that a shared definition of the concept is still seemingly unavailable, despite 25 years of scientific production (Faulks 2000: 2). There is general agreement that democratic citizenship cannot be conceived solely in terms of legal status. However, even if it were defined in legal terms (see for example Bellamy 2008, Isin 2008), it must then be regarded as a process of inclusion requiring several societal relations and meanings (Migdal 2004b: 14-20). There is nothing to say about such an important statement, which very much transcends liberal orthodoxy, other than the fact that it is conducive to an unlimited use of the concept of citizenship, weakening, if not dissolving, its very significance (Joppke 2008: 37, Lister 2008: 57, for an example of this catch-all approach see the remarkable reading edited by Sean Lazar 2013a). Obviously, if everything is citizenship, nothing really is.

It must be stressed that the lack of a shared definition of the concept must not be confused with the ambivalence and intrinsic tension which characterize modern citizenship. For citizenship, as is well known, is both inherently inclusive and exclusive, aimed at integration and enabling conflicts, made of rules and values, public and private, individual and collective, etc. (Turner 1994b, Delanty 2000: 3-4, Ong 2003: 79, Faulks 2000: 29-30). However, this is not the point. What we are witnessing is rather a set of problems that appear to be unprecedented (Isin and Turner 2002b, Castles and Davidson 2000: 10-15).

Another issue is that, at the same time that theoretical proposals flourished (such as, just to mention a few, the formulations of sustainable, ecological, scientific, insurgent, biological, therapeutic, agrarian, pharmaceutical, flexible, liminal, transborder, intimate, sexual citizenship), there grew a serious deficit in empirical studies. As Ruth Lister has pointed out, this field presents an imbalance between theoretical and empirical work, to the point that the theoretical debate risks being conducted in an empirical void (2008: 57, see also Baglioni 2009: 233). This problem is the starting point of what follows, which aims to favor the observation of democratic citizenship and its ongoing changes as empirical phenomena.

To this end, the article is structured into three sections. The first one is devoted to the identification of the phenomenon of democratic citizenship.
The second section is about the observation of the turmoil democratic citizenship has been undergoing in the last decades. The third and final section focuses on an assessment of the present, unexpected developments of democratic citizenship.

This exercise is intended to support the establishment of a sound empirical basis for the study of democratic citizenship and its changes. Our purpose is neither to add new pieces of theory, nor to set up a methodological toolbox in terms of normative assumptions, variables and correlations, but rather to define a standpoint enabling the observation of phenomena related to democratic citizenship.

Identifying the phenomenon

The first step is to identify citizenship as a phenomenon. What do we refer to when we deal with democratic citizenship and its components? And what are the places of observation of the phenomenon?

As aforementioned, the still-developing research in the early 1990s did not achieve a univocal conclusion in defining the concept (Turner 1994b). Among other reasons, this was due to the existence of competing visions and approaches to citizenship which for a long time seemed impossible to combine or even to translate to each other. We refer to the liberal, the communitarian, and the civic republican approaches. Though each of these vary and overlap with one another (as shown by Delanty 2000), they have been dealt with mainly as autonomous islands of meaning that depict citizenship in very different ways. We can thus summarize these approaches by looking at their core elements rather than at their many variants.

According to the communitarian view, citizenship consists in an individual’s belonging to a community that shares a set of values, ethical norms, cultural patterns, and habits. Individuals are attached to the community thanks to strong ties of trust and interdependence. In this context, duties are more important than rights (Delanty 2002, Etzioni 1995, Putnam 2000).

According to the liberal approach, citizenship is a set of rights allowing the individual to advance and practice his/her interests and standards of life. Further, they legitimize the individual to call on the State for recognition and protection, even against the State itself. These are usually organized with reference to the Thomas Marshall’s (1950) systematization of civil, political and social rights (Schuck 2002, Delanty 2000: 9-22, Zolo 1994a).

According to the civic republican approach, citizenship is the active participation of the people to public life, where the collective good is more important than individual achievements. Citizens are those people that submit

These three approaches have long been hegemonic in scientific discourse and have for just as long been deemed competitive. However, the idea that they could be considered constructs highlighting different core components of citizenship, instead of mutually exclusive views, has been advanced in recent years (Delanty 2000: 9-11, Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw 2006b: 5-7, Bellamy 2008: 1-16, Coleman and Blumler 2009: 4-7).

Following this suggestion, we can reference Richard Bellamy’s thematization (2008), shifting, however, from his normative perspective to a phenomenological one. We can state that citizenship as an empirical phenomenon can be viewed as structured into three components, namely membership, rights and participation: being and feeling member of a political community; enjoying collective benefits and rights associated to this membership; participating on an equal basis in political, social and economic processes that take place in the community (Bellamy 2008: 12).

We can consider membership as the definition of who is a citizen and who is not. Membership has two sides: (a) a material one, consisting in a status, both legal and social, that identifies who is part of the political community (see also Ong 2013); (b) a cognitive one, made of feelings of identity and belonging (see also Migdal 2004a, Croucher 2004).

In the membership dimension the double function of citizenship as an inclusive and exclusive tool is highlighted. Membership implies the recognition of the State as the center of legitimated power. But it also entails a unique civic culture, regarding, for example, the legitimacy of political rules, a common language enabling the participation to public debate and deliberation, and a sufficient degree of trust and solidarity among the people. All these examples are related to the sharing of a collective identity and of a sense of attachment to the community (Bellamy 2008: 13).

The rights component regards in general individual prerogatives: legitimate claims that individuals can advance on their fellow citizens and the State about standards of life (Bellamy 2008: 14). Social relations must be organized so that these rights are guaranteed on an equal basis. Since they presuppose a common sharing of identity, rights are therefore collective, and can be invoked only by persons that accept certain civic duties, such as recognizing that rights be respected through cooperation and collective agreements.

As for the participation dimension, it must be noted that rights depend on the existence of a political community, which citizens join to achieve the former. This is precisely the meaning of the well-known ‘right to have rights’ formula (Arendt 1968): the power to institutionalize rights on an equal basis through
political participation, even in the form of raising and managing conflicts. In other words, citizens give shape to collective life through participation, so that their own rights will be recognized by the community and so that the State will be engaged to guarantee them.

As a consequence, we can look for and identify democratic citizenship when all three components are present. In other words, this phenomenon takes place when we can detect, simultaneously, the following: membership in a political community in terms of status and belonging; a set of rights that individuals and collective entities can claim and practice with the support of the State and the whole community; and forms and procedures of participation in the definition and implementation of ends, rules, and standards of quality of life on an equal basis.

From a normatively-oriented point of view, we can state that the link between the three components rests upon the fact that rights cannot be established without participation of citizens on an equal basis and cannot be implemented without the sharing of common values and habits, which are the base of common duties (Bellamy 2008: 17). However, though dealing with citizenship necessarily implies a normative side, we should regard this definition solely in empirical terms, using it to identify phenomena related to citizenship.

The definition of three observable components of democratic citizenship is a necessary but not a sufficient step. A further one regards the places where citizenship can be observed. Without this step, the risk is indeed to consider citizenship only by looking at Constitutions, or by focusing only on specific aspects such as the emotional sense of attachment to the political community, or even to diminish it to the claim for the recognition of certain rights. By so doing, we would lose sight of the whole and reduce citizenship to a legal status, to a vague sense of sameness with other people, or even to the practice of any form of social and civil engagement, from bowling to voting (Berger 2009).

Where citizenship can be observed is, therefore, a task as crucial as it is to ask what we are observing. Our suggestion is to identify three places where distinctive elements of citizenship can be detected.

The first one is, obviously, constitutional-rank norms. In case of European democracies these regard fundamental, but also civil, political and social rights. They embody the norms defining who is a citizen of a nation-State and the forms of political and civic participation that create and give shape to representative institutions.

The second place is what we could define civic Acquis, taking this French term from the European Union discourse. By civic Acquis, we mean the set of legal- or policy-based provisions establishing the content of citizenship in terms of membership, rights and participation. This set includes laws, public policies, court decisions, administrative acts, recognized collective agree-
ments, and other elements. By definition, the Acquis is not a fixed or static compound. It changes with time, in general more rapidly than constitutional norms (Moro 2013a: 34).

The third place is *citizenship practices*, by which we mean the dynamic relation between citizens and the polity, as well as the political community, on an everyday basis (Wiener 1998, Lazar 2013b: 4, Turner 1994b: 2, Lister 2008: 54, Baglioni 2009: 44 and, with a partially different meaning, Isin and Nielsen 2008). Thanks to the concept of citizenship practices, we can observe citizenship as an output not only of political decisions and institutional acts, but also of citizens’ lives, a product of social meanings and actions (Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw 2006). In other words, what people do with citizenship is of crucial importance to give shape to citizenship itself.

What is the value of observing citizenship in a multiplicity of places? Three points can be mentioned in support. The first, and the most obvious, is that it provides the possibility of observing citizenship as a whole, without losing sight of its constituting dimensions. The second advantage is the chance it offers of analyzing the multiple interrelations which exist between these places: for example, the way civic Acquis and citizenship practices can reinforce or undermine constitutional norms. The third point is that it creates the opportunity to make visible several of the factors and dynamics that give shape to citizenship, otherwise difficult to observe. Let us now give some examples regarding the civic Acquis and citizenship practices, taking for granted the constitutional level.

Regarding membership as status, in the civic Acquis we can detect the influence of official statistical taxonomies in defining the conditions under which individuals are considered part of the political community. At the same time, in citizenship practices, we can observe inclusion and exclusion dynamics unforeseen either in constitutional norms or in public policies. Regarding membership as belonging, we can find, in the civic Acquis, patterns of civic education and narratives which affect the feeling of attachment to the community. In citizenship practices, instead, we can detect the anthropological models upon which belonging is based (the WASP-like phenomena). As for rights, looking at the civic Acquis we can identify sets of operational rights recognized to citizens as individuals or collective entities, for example vis-à-vis public administrations, while in citizenship practices we can observe the existence of rights that are recognized but not codified. As for participation, in civic Acquis we can find forms, bodies, and procedures enabling citizens’ participation in policy making, such as consultations, while in citizens’ practices we can detect the invention of unplanned forms of participation, such as, just to give an example, the caring for public spaces in urban areas.

In sum, the amount of information available by looking at citizenship in a multiplicity of places of observation is considerably greater than viewing it
solely as a constitutional-rank matter. At the same time, this method avoids falling into the catch-all approach.

Observing changes

The contemporary return-and-escape paradox of citizenship has already been mentioned: the very moment of a novel consideration of the relevance of citizenship in contemporary societies has coincided with the acknowledgment of its crisis. The next step of this exercise is about the phenomenon’s changes. What are the contextual factors affecting democratic citizenship? What are the internal levers upon which change is operating?

Some of the most relevant (external) contextual factors which enable observation of the changes in democratic citizenship, and their relation with the latter’s three components, are summarized in the following table:

Table 1 – Contextual factors affecting democratic citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Factors</th>
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| **Membership** | - Migrations and porous borders  
- Loss of State’s powers in favor of international and supranational, regional and local, private and non-State entities  
- Escape from taxation |
| **As Status** | - Multicultural societies  
- Individualization and pluralization of lifestyles  
- Multiplicity of belongings  
- Development of information technologies |
| **Rights** | - Human rights  
- Rights’ and related policies’ implementation gaps  
- New rights demands, based on differences |
| **Participation** | - Decrease in election turnout  
- Distrust in political leaderships  
- Crisis in membership of political parties  
- New forms of participation and representation |

Research on citizenship-related phenomena has widely dealt with these factors. In regards to membership as status, it has been noticed that migrations make one of the founding elements of the State’s sovereignty uncertain: the power to establish institutional and social borders – the power to define who is in and who is out of the political community (Benhabib 2008, Joppke 2008). Globalization, localization, and new emerging private powers have
undermined nation-State construction (Beck 1992, Beck and Grande 2007, Castles and Davidson 2000: 2-9). This newfound difficulty is related, among other factors, with the growing influence of international bodies such as the United Nations or development banks; supranational or transnational institutions like the European Union; regions as Catalonia or Scotland; big cities acting like autonomous actors of the political scene; private companies and financial markets; and organized civil society (Crouch 2004). Furthermore, escape from taxation has simultaneously impoverished the States and undermined their sovereignty (Linklater 1998).

In regards to membership as belonging, the advent of multicultural societies has called into question the foundational anthropological model of belonging, including the heritage of a common language, religion, history, culture, and everyday customs (Bauböck 2006, Kymlicka 1999 and 2012, Zanfrini 2007). The individualization and pluralization of lifestyles in contemporary societies and the development of the Internet as a new environment have produced the same outcome (Castells 1996). This effect is related to the multiplicity of identities and attachments that individuals live and feel (Beck 2001, Delanty 2010). As a result, differentiation between members of a political community appears more present than unification, which would be based on feelings of commonality.

As for the rights component, the development of human rights has entitled people not included in the political communities to a set of rights which States are called to respect and ensure (Soysal 1994, Turner 1994b, Isin and Turner 2008: 12). At the same time, States appear less and less able to implement, through public policies and courts, the rights established for every citizen. It is not only a matter of the hegemony of ideologies such as neo-liberalism (Schmidt and Thathcher 2013), but also of scant resources and ineffective public administrations (Isin and Turner 2008: 10). Moreover, a growing demand for the recognition of new rights is taking place, and these new claims are based more on the recognition of differences rather than on equality (Young 2000, Taylor 2010: 148-171, Delanty 2000 and 2010).

On the participation aspect the well-known phenomena of decreasing electoral turnout and in political parties' membership (Raniolo 2007), as well as the growing distrust of political leaderships (Dogan 2005) call into question the representation mechanism itself. At the same time, new and unexpected forms of participation, variously defined (Barrett Zani 2015, Moro 2015b, Schudson 2002: 294-314, Fung 2006), and non-conventional forms of representation (Warren and Castiglione 2004, Urbinati and Warren 2008, Moro 2013b) are taking place.

Looking at the ‘mechanics’ of democratic citizenship, we can focus on the (internal) factors operating as levers of change – elements that enable citizen-
ship to work. We can identify at least one of these elements for each component of citizenship and their corresponding reshaping effects.

For the membership component, we shall take into consideration the membership and incorporation models, that is, «the institutionalized scripts and understandings of the relationship between individuals, the State, and the polity, as well as the organizational structures and practices that maintain this relationship» (Soysal 1994: 36).

For rights, we shall look at the institutional and legal basis for the recognition of rights. The principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli come to the fore here (Castles and Davidson 2000: 84-102, Zanfrini 2007: 3-18).

As for participation, we can refer to the structure or participation opportunities, that is, the set of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents that simultaneously facilitate and constrain citizens’ participation (Ranieri 2007: 29).

To further elucidate this point, we provide the example of the reshaping effects of migrations on democratic citizenship. These are summarized in the table below:

Table 2 – Migrations and citizenship: critical points, levers of change, reshaping effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Critical points</th>
<th>Levers</th>
<th>Reshaping effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>- Rejection of history, language, religion and material culture as basis of membership</td>
<td>Membership and incorporation models</td>
<td>- Identity based on diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as Belonging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Community of fate vs. community of origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>- Plurality of migrants’ statuses, The internal Other</td>
<td>Membership and incorporation models</td>
<td>- Recognition of differentiated forms of citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as Status</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>- Criticism of rights as equality of condition, Multiplication of claims for new rights</td>
<td>Legal basis of rights: ius domicilii vs. ius solius sanguinis; national rights vs. human rights</td>
<td>- Group rights, Affirmative actions, Migrants’ access (partial) to welfare systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>- Public participation beyond voting, Refusal of individual representation</td>
<td>Structure of participation opportunities</td>
<td>- Group representation, Quotas, Ethnic politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
norms recognizing differentiated statuses for minorities, or even the teaching of migrants’ languages in schools of the host countries suggest that membership models themselves do change. As contrary evidence, we can mention the attempt of some European Union countries to introduce procedures of civic integration aimed at forcing migrants to accept the heritage of national community as an unquestionable given (Van Oers, Ersbøll and Kostakopoulou 2010, Joppke 2008). This attempt is both futile, since no one can feel attached to the community before actually becoming part of it, and proof that models of membership and incorporation are a place where citizenship is questioned (Kostakopoulou 2010).

Regarding rights, tensions concerning the effectiveness of the traditional principles on which rights are recognized – the *ius sanguinis*/*ius soli* couple – emerge and are in fact integrated if not substituted by the *ius domicilii*, which places residence as the basis for rights (Delanty 2000: 120-12, Castles and Davidson 2000: 93). Moreover, human rights (such as the right to asylum) tend to extend to migrants entitlements once reserved to national citizens.

As for participation, the successful claim for forms of group representation, as well as quota policies and, more generally, the emergence of various forms of ethnic politics show us that it is the structure of the opportunities for participation that is going to change (Castles and Davidson 2000: 129-155).

Assessing evolutions

The final step of the exercise conducted in this article is about the present evolutions involving democratic citizenship. The question to be addressed in this case is the following: how can we consider the citizenship-related phenomena that have come to the fore?

In the environment of citizenship studies there is a wide recognition of the proliferation of claims regarding citizenship, with reference to a multiplicity of conditions, variously concerning culture, religion, social statuses, habits and lifestyles, living and working conditions, sites of everyday life, etc. What is definitely less clear about these «hyphenated citizenships» (Joppke 2008: 37, see also Nyers 2008: 2, Bellamy 2008: 1), is their nature, meaning, and implications for scientific research and policy making, as well as their relation with what we take for granted about citizenship. The matter is all but easy to address; nevertheless it cannot be denied.

What are these new citizenship claims? A list of them does not exist, as could have been expected, given the aforementioned difficulties. On the other hand, this is not the place to attempt a complete picture of them, even if hypo-
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Theoretical. What is sufficient here is to identify some of them, in order to check if it is possible, in the context of this exercise, to shed more light on them.

Nine of these citizenship claims can be mentioned. Some of them – urban, European and cosmopolitan (or global) citizenships – are focused on places. Others – multicultural (or cultural) and gender citizenships – stress identity issues. Others – consumer and corporate citizenships – emerge in the economy, a realm traditionally foreign to citizenship discourse (see Marx 1978). Others – digital and active citizenships – refer mainly to participation.

Urban citizenship consists in the membership of individuals to a community defined by the space of cities. Within this context there take place specific rights and duties (for example on environment, mobility or safety), forms of participation to the planning, maintenance and regulation of the common space, as well as specific definitions of status and role of individuals and social groups. Claims for urban citizenship are definitely linked to residence as the founding element of membership, so including migrants in the community (Sassen 1998, Holston and Appadurai 1999, Isin 2000, Bauböck 2003, Benhabib 2008, Ong 2008, Smith and Guarnizo 2009).

The principle of residence is one of the distinctive features of another phenomenon: European citizenship. This citizenship, though fully recognized in legal terms (Maastricht Treaty of 1993), does not come from the authority of a national State, but rather refers to an institutional machinery covering a mobile territory (the one of a «cosmopolitan empire», according to Beck and Grande, 2007). It encompasses a plural identity of its members (with an increasing number of official languages), a set of rights that would not make sense in the framework of a national State, and forms of citizens’ participation in policy making on a daily basis (Delanty and Rumford 2005, Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw 2006a, Bellamy and Warleigh 2003, Wiener 1998, Moro 2009: 54-73).

We can also add the claim for a cosmopolitan (or global) citizenship, which is a citizenship status for all members of the human species as such. This claim finds its basis in the system of norms, institutions and procedures regarding human rights established by the United Nations. It includes the quest for, and practice of, a reform of the United Nations itself by opening its deliberative procedures to international NGOs and other bodies, for example through the Economic and Social Committee (Archibugi, Held and Kohler 1998, Delanty 2000, Faulks 2000: 132-161, Aleinikoff and Klusmayer 2001, Dower and Williams 2002, Archibugi 2009).

Multicultural (or cultural) citizenship consists in the request for recognition of ethnic, cultural, and religious differences as an integral part of a political community’s identity and in its protection by public institutions through affirmative action. This implies both the establishment of “group rights” re-
Another noteworthy claim is that of **gender citizenship**. It can be defined as the recognition of a specific citizenship status linked to the female gender, that is, to women as such. Gender, as traditionally defined, is irreducibly inconsistent with the anthropological model upon which the citizenship paradigm is based. The rights claimed, in this case, regard private, as well as public, life. Affirmative actions to enforce these rights (for example regarding the access to politics or jobs, or even the protection against sexual threats) are designed and implemented (Young 2000, Siim 2000, Lister 2003).

Citizenship linked to consumption, or **consumer citizenship**, consists in the claim for recognition of a status of rights, powers, and responsibilities specifically linked to the consumption of goods and services. Goods and services related to citizenship are asked to be recognized as universal (that is, non luxury) and accessible by the members of the community, thus requiring the definition of specific prerogatives and guarantees regarding the way they are delivered (Cronin 2000, Tangen and Thoresen 2005, Trentmann 2007).

In the economic sphere there also exist claims for a **corporate citizenship**. It consists in the establishment and practice of a public status for private companies, which implies duties of accountability towards their stakeholders, in addition to their shareholders, about the environmental, economic, social and cultural impact of companies’ operations. It implies also the contribution of private companies to the development of communities through the investment of material and non-material resources (Googins, Mirvis and Rochlin 2007, Crane, Matten and Moon 2008, Pies and Koslowski 2011, Zadek 2007).

**Digital citizenship** is about the establishment and operation of virtual communities, where new rights (such as full access to Internet ADSL), as well as old rights with new meanings (regarding for example privacy and the right to oblivion) are asked to be recognized. Virtual communities are also the place where collective acts of participation are promoted and implemented. This is especially true for social networks, where civil actions (regarding for instance monitoring of public spaces, struggle against corruption and fiscal evasion, promotion of petitions, lobbying, civic hacking, sharing problems as diseases, civic journalism) take place (Castells 1996, Anderson and Cornfield 2003, Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 2008, Coleman and Blumler 2009, De Blasio 2014, Sorice 2014).

On the participation side, there is also **active citizenship**: the self-organization and mobilization of citizens operating in public policy with the aim of protect-
ing rights, caring for common goods, and empowering marginalized or oppressed individuals and social groups through advocacy and/or service activities. This phenomenon takes place on an everyday basis through a plurality of organizational forms (networks, social movements, associations, community services, voluntary organizations, etc.) which are distinct from both political parties and labor organizations. They exercise the power of taking initiative and collective rights of political action in policy making (Moro 2013a, Anfossi and Oommen 1997, Castells 1996, Bee and Villano 2015, Snow et al. 2013, De Sousa Santos 2003, Brady 1999, Schudson 2002).

There is no doubt that these claims are very diverse. However, in the context of this article, they must be considered for what they have in common rather than for how they differ from one other. We do not need to subject them to normative assessment, checking whether these claims can be considered as ‘real’ citizenships or not; but rather we must look for a thematization of their place in the analysis of democratic citizenship as an empirical phenomenon. To this end, we can propose three points.

The first point is that the aforementioned cases are not theories, but social phenomena with material substance and political significance. They imply the mobilization of people, resources, public attention, political responses, new orientations and habits of the community, private companies’ attitudes, etc. Consider active citizenship. We are now referring to millions of organizations (about 100,000 identified in Italy alone in the recent nonprofit Census), with tens of millions of activists and volunteers recognized by specific norms; whose role in public policy making, both in the definition and implementation phases, is taken for granted in various forms by national governments and international bodies; who are identified by private companies as one of their main stakeholders and by the media as key actors of the public realm; who constantly relate to their public and private interlocutors through dialogue, collaboration, partnership or conflict; who are supported by public and private funds as well as by individual donors; and who are able to deeply impact, for better or worse, contemporary societies as well as the global landscape in a way that political parties are no longer able to. These considerations tell us that we are dealing with a social phenomenon and not with a theory. Naturally, similar indicators can be found for each of the claims enumerated above.

The second point is that these phenomena are strongly linked to citizenship. Two circumstances support this statement. The first is that those involved in these claims define them in the key of citizenship. The same is also true for their external interlocutors: governments, scholars, the media, etc. This means that these phenomena are socially constructed using the key of citizenship, a point which cannot be underestimated. The second is that each of these phenomena has a clear link with at least one of the components of
citizenship identified above: for instance, urban citizenship is connected with the membership component, cosmopolitan/global citizenship with the component of rights, and digital citizenship with the component of participation. Though these claims may not necessarily present an evident link with each of the three components of the phenomenon of citizenship, they nevertheless are definitely not foreign to citizenship itself.

But what kinds of links connect these claims with citizenship? This is the third and final point. It is evident that the elements linking these phenomena with citizenship are complex. Their relation is either one of redefinition of the meaning and scope of the components of democratic citizenship, or one of challenge to their given borders. To wit: urban citizenship is about the principle of residence instead of birth and descent; European citizenship does not derive from a State authority; cosmopolitan or global citizenship erases the distinction between who is in and who is out by including the whole of humanity; multicultural citizenship rests membership on differences rather than on equality; gender citizenship challenges the anthropological model of person that grounds membership, as well as the distinction between public and private matters; consumer citizenship includes economic relations as a field of citizenship; corporate citizenship ascribes public responsibilities to private enterprises; digital citizenship operates outside physical space; and active citizenship gives a political meaning to participation in policy making which goes beyond voting and influencing the formal political system.

In order to aid the consideration of these phenomena and their complex links with citizenship in an empirical framework, we can use – metaphorically – the Kuhnian concept of paradigm (Kuhn 1970). In other words, if we consider democratic citizenship as a paradigm, made of a hard core and a protective belt, able to manage emerging problems as puzzles, thereby preserving the integrity of the paradigm itself, we can view these claims as phenomena that, on the contrary, operate as anomalies, i.e. problems which cannot be reduced to puzzles; these anomalies call the entire paradigm into question while simultaneously maintaining their relations with it. This is not an explanation, but rather a thematization which makes it possible to observe our examined claims as phenomena which are part of changing citizenship. This is what we were aiming for: instead of defective citizenships, we can view these phenomena as anomalies of a paradigm.

Conclusions

The purpose of this article was to contribute towards the design of an approach to the study of democratic citizenship as an empirical phenomenon.
The empirical side of the study of citizenship is indeed the one most lacking, a deficit which affects the progress of both theory and methodology. The situation has the qualities of a vicious circle: if what we are dealing with is not clear, then what we have to observe and study cannot be clear either; vice versa, if we do not observe reality, then it is difficult to establish what we are dealing with.

With this in mind, the article has focused on the components and places of observation of democratic citizenship; the external factors and the internal levers that put it under discussion; and its unforeseen developments that can be considered “anomalies” of a Kuhnian-like “paradigm”.

The limits of this text do not allow jumping to conclusions, which would definitely be hasty. Examples of hasty conclusions would be that we have entered “post-citizenship societies” (Peled 2008), or even that the proliferation of “hyphenated citizenships” is giving rise to a new paradigm.

On the contrary, the article is based on a double caution. On one hand, it warns against both reductionist and catch-all approaches to the study of citizenship, the latter which enlarges this concept to such an extent as to render it pointless as a descriptor. On the other hand, it argues that we cannot study democratic citizenship without confronting its empirical basis, which in turn necessitates the establishment of a specific viewpoint.

From an epistemological standpoint, citizenship remains, even in its present turmoil, a point of reference for the study of political phenomena that cannot be disregarded. Or, in other words, it is a prism able to shed light on the way citizens shape the political (Zolo 1994b: 4, Nyers 2008: 3, Moro 2009: 27, Lazar 2013b: 16). For now, nothing else offers scholars the same, precious opportunity.

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