On the Social Morphogenesis of Citizenship: 
A Relational Approach

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The paper deals with the issue of the mutations in citizenship as they emerge from the crisis of the nation-state and the speeding up of the globalization processes. Within modernity, nation-states have put peculiar socio-cultural identities and larger solidarities in deep conflict, so that no real common citizenship could be achieved. With the advent of globalization and multiculturalism, we witness the fading away of statist citizenship due to a multiplicity of factors. By resorting to the morphogenetic approach, the author tries to explain why and how a transmodern (societal) citizenship is emerging, which changes the old forms of citizenship. The new forms of citizenship stem from civil society rather than from the nation-state. New interdependences and links between ‘local’ identities and ‘broader’ solidarities are building up a post-lib/lab citizenship, based upon unprecedented relational practices in dealing with social issues. The morphogenetic processes generate different modalities of configuring citizenship in different contexts. From a sociological viewpoint, a new societal semantics is emerging, according to which citizenship becomes a complex of rights and duties not only of individuals but also of social groups capable of reconciling self-management practices and collective goals. The name of this new game is societal citizenship, one that promotes civil and social autonomies through which citizenship can be pursued as a relational good.

The issue: citizenship after modernity

Citizenship is in flux, challenged by shifting boundaries of the nation-states and innovative forms of political action. Apparently, we witness both a contraction and an expansion of what it means to be a citizen. My purpose is to explain why and how this seeming contradiction is emerging and put forward the argument that a transmodern (societal) citizenship is currently springing from a nascent global civil society rather than from the nation-state. New forms of interdependences and links between ‘local’ identities and ‘broader’ solidarities are building up a post-lib/lab citizenship\(^1\), which stems from adap-

\(^1\) As it will be clarified in the whole paper, by lib/lab I mean the compromise between liberal and labour (socialist) ideologies, or between capitalist market and political democracy. The lib/
tive forms of learning new relational practices in dealing with social issues where citizenship rights and obligations are involved. From a sociological point of view, may be that a new societal semantics is emerging, according to which citizenship becomes a complex of rights and duties not only of individuals but also of social groups, arranging civic life into a number of social autonomies capable of reconciling collective goals and self-management practices, solidarity and identity issues. This is the new challenge for citizenship in an *after-* (or *trans*) modern world. I claim that the name of this new game is «societal citizenship» or citizenship of social autonomies. In a way, I would like to argue that, on the door of what I call after-modern society, there is written something which closely resembles what Augustine of Hippo hoped for long time ago: «Therefore let each one question himself as to what he loves: and he shall find of which city he is a citizen».

There is no doubt that the modern concept of (national) citizenship, as it relates to the modern idea of nation-state, is experiencing a period of great instability and change. The reasons do not so much lie in democracy itself, as a form of government (the political institutions of representation not being usually involved), as in the socio-political national institutions of citizenship, i.e. all institutions responsible for granting what are commonly referred to ‘as rights of citizenship’.

The underlying reasons are indeed very complex and stem from within as well as outside the national political system. A discussion of all these factors, their interrelations and their outcomes falls outside the scope of this paper. I shall only point out that one should never forget that democracy and citizenship, albeit they are different concepts and institutions – are indeed very closely interrelated, as they originate from the same cultural fabric. If the democracy/citizenship relation is to survive, the prevailing culture is required to have democratic (progressive) rather than undemocratic (regressive) characteristics (Alexander 1998), as far as both the representative institutions and the citizens’ rights are concerned.

The crisis of the democracy/citizenship relation at the national level essentially results from some changes that have been introduced into the (overall) cultural environment of politics by the process of globalisation. As Ong (2006) reminds us, today mutations in citizenship are crystallized in an ever-shifting lab configuration of citizenship is based upon the idea that human emancipation is an optimum combination (hybridization) of liberal freedom and socialist equality.

\[2\text{ In my language, *after*}-\text{modern is different from *post*}-\text{modern in so far as ‘after’ means a deep/sweeping discontinuity with modernity, while ‘post’ is usually understood as a radicalization of modernity or late modernity (Donati 2011).}\]

\[3\text{ ‘*Interroget ergo se quisque quid amet, et inveniet unde sit civis*’ (*Enarrationes in psalmos* 64, 2).}\]
landscape shaped by the flows of markets, technologies, and populations. We are moving beyond the citizenship-versus-statelessness model. First, the elements of citizenship (rights, entitlements, etc.) are becoming disarticulated from each other, and becoming re-articulated with universalizing criteria of neoliberalism and human rights. Our societies lose the normative orientation to a common good, but, on the other side, new relational goods in ‘global associational spheres’ become possible. Such ‘global assemblages’ define zones of political entitlements and claims. Second, the space of the ‘assemblage’, rather than the national terrain, becomes the site for political mobilizations by diverse groups in motion. In the EU zone, unregulated markets and migrant flows challenge liberal citizenship. In Asian zones, foreigners who display self-enterprising savoir faire gain rights and benefits of citizenship. In camps of the disenfranchised or displaced, sheer survival becomes the ground for political claims. Thus, particular constellations shape specific problems and resolutions to questions of contemporary living, further disarticulating and deterritorializing aspects of citizenship. In short, «instead of all citizens enjoying a unified bundle of citizenship rights, we have a shifting political landscape in which heterogeneous populations claim diverse rights and benefits associated with citizenship, as well as universalizing criteria of neoliberal norms or human rights» (Ong 2006: 499-500).

These processes seem to generate a huge change, quite often a fragmentation, of what we are used to call ‘modern citizenship’ – with reference to the classical work by Thomas H. Marshall (1950). Have we reached the end of the modern conception of citizenship? In this paper I would like to support the thesis that this is precisely the case.

Many wonder if an expanding development of the modern state citizenship is still possible. If so, how? If not, why? And, most importantly, what alternatives are there?

In the USA, whenever a new President is elected, the whole concept of citizenship is renewed together with the Union Government. Renewal takes place under the banner of consistent change, and therefore the American nation manages to strengthen its identity, both in terms of democracy and citizenship. The American ethos of citizenship seems to be strong and firm – as testified by the reaction to the Watergate affair (Alexander 1989). But is is evident an increasing difficulty in meeting the requests of citizenship rights by immigrants and cultural and ethnic minorities.

In the European countries the difficulties are even greater, since national identity and citizenship have been so far weaker and more unstable than in the USA, as a result of peculiar and complex historical reasons. In European nations, the state plays a more crucial role vis-à-vis civil society, so that,
whenever a state crisis develops, the whole idea of citizenship is questioned. European citizenship appears to be stuck in a more serious deadlock than the American, due to an internal deep lack of solidarity among the member states and to external pressures (Haller 2010-2012).

The issue on the table is the following: will the present crisis of citizenship lead to its revival or its regression or to what else? Whatever the outcome, one thing is for certain, even though not everybody seems to realize it: the times of modern continuity are over, at least in the sense that any linear progress in the sociological complex of modern citizenship is at stake. We are witnessing the emergence of the post-modern citizenship. How should this be interpreted?

There are different opinions. Some believe that, in spite of the current fluctuations, the basic institutions of modern citizenship can be preserved and even developed, provided that one can stick at a concept of citizenship based on a strong, or inclusive, core of emancipation rights. Others feel that citizenship should be deprived of any juridical connotation, to become a question of freedom to ‘disagree’ within a political system. Others highlight the difficulties, but also the need to include cultural (even traditional ascriptive) differences into the citizenship institutions. Others finally suggest that the values embedded into the concept of citizenship should be given a new, more general meaning, as a common good or as a right of universal sharing.

Whatever the speculations and proposals to successfully overcome the current crisis, they all seem to me to bring the culture of citizenship beyond the statist code to what I call a societal code of citizenship, i.e. citizenship as an expression of civil society rather than of the state, or political-administrative system, which nevertheless will still be there as one of the dimensions in the «complex of citizenship» (Donati 2000). In what follows, I will try to explain what this statement can mean.

**Beyond the lib/lab citizenship**

Typical modern citizenship, with its liberal and socialist character, has been no doubt a remarkable breakthrough, exerting an enormous impact on social life. It allowed to free human energies, that were previously restrained by ascriptive ties, and thus to build an open society, which could at the same time maintain and, indeed, increase freedom and equality (Turner 1986: 134-136). Although this breakthrough may also be defined as a vehicle of social differentiation (as systemic functionalists argue), it is beyond question that it came into being as a result of an intentional, voluntary historical action, promoted and carried through by cultural and social movements driven by the idea of human emancipation.
In the most modernized countries, after the second world war, we have wit-
nessed an unprecedented blossom of social (welfare) rights and especially civil
freedoms. The concerns about social equality have in most cases tempered
the asymmetrical effects of liberal freedoms and ensured that large crowds
of ordinary people could have access to social goods. Partly or totally follow-
ing Marshall’s well-known assumptions, many authors have emphasized that
the modern Western citizenship developed the social rights of equality in the
framework of civil and political freedoms. Whatever the kind and the extent of
the interactions between these various rights (or dimensions of the concept of
citizenship), the main question that, after Marshall, remains deeply controver-
sial is whether our contemporary society should only expect a progressive de-
velopment – in number and contents – of the typical ‘modern’ rights (assuming
that modernity is an ‘incomplete project’ that need be completed) or whether
in today’s society the conventional rights of citizenship should be questioned, as
they show considerable inconsistencies or even dramatic changes. What I will
underline in the following sections is that these inconsistencies and changes re-
late to the human environment that falls outside the scopes of law and politics.

The history of the last few decades have provided two main answers to the
above question: the marxist and the lib/lab movements. The former has failed
after a period of relative effervescence. The latter, on the contrary, has been
very successful. To what extent and how well it can embody and even guide
the future historical course to the after-modern era remains an open question.
Let us briefly comment upon these two conception of citizenship.

(a) Generally speaking, the Marxist concept has been, and still is, based
on the idea that modern (i.e. bourgeois) citizenship is predominantly meant
as a solution to the social problems caused by capitalism. It is a superstructure
pursuing the goal – partly intentionally, partly mechanically (as a result of an
evolutionistic logic) – of freeing mankind from repression and exploitation of
any kind, but with a ‘false conscience’. For all marxist theories, as far as capi-
talism is the dominant form of economy, citizenship cannot be but a means to
a temporary emancipation, which is doomed to stay incomplete till the advent
of communism, i.e. until the economic system as a whole is socialized. Rights
are conceived as social achievements to be obtained by force – either physi-
cal force, as was the case with the early communist countries, or the force of
opinion and political votes in the most democratic systems. Their function
is to identify collective needs to be satisfied. For the marxist orthodoxy, the
question of rights is ideologically bourgeois in character. In principle, in the
communist social arrangement rights – both as agreements and as contingent
historical-social constraints – should no longer be necessary.

Revisionist systems, on the contray, recognise citizenship as being a some-
what independent entity, as the expression of an absolutely necessary self-con-
tained reality that cannot be reduced to a mere gimmick to conceal inequalities between social classes.

In this particular configuration, the neo-marxist thought changes considerably, in that it admits that social inequality may appear in a large variety of forms and stems from many sources (especially cultural) that are comparatively independent of the purely economic foundations of society. Ambiguities, however, are not thereby removed. Instead of having the various spheres of life treated differently, eventually politics (and in particular system politics against market) always prevails.

No one of course would deny that some historical movements inspired by the marxist doctrine played a major role in acquiring the rights of citizenship for the lower classes and the underprivileged social groups (women, poor, immigrants, etc.).

(b) The lib/lab movement, on the contrary, conceives of citizenship as a collection of individual rights which are designed to produce a pluralistic society. A lecture by Ralf Dahrendorf (1994) well clarifies the lib/lab idea of citizenship from the viewpoint of its sociological nature.

Dahrendorf’s lib/lab conception can be summarized as follows. Citizenship is an extension of rights by the political (national or supra-national) institutions to the benefit of social classes that cannot afford to enjoy the goods produced in a free market, through the creation of new opportunities for them to have access to these goods. Even though the so-called underclass accounted for just 5% of the whole population, the rest could not live at peace if it knew that some members of the community do not enjoy the fundamental rights for their survival. Who can ensure this right of citizenship? According to Dahrendorf, the provider of this right, and of its progress, must be ‘someone’ who will take the place of the bourgeois upper class of the early modern times. New enlightened economic and political élites, in replacement of the old liberal middle-class, should, on the one hand, increase the supply of market goods and, on the other, to expand the rights of access to them to include larger and larger segments of the population and, eventually, the whole of it. How this should occur is not made clear. What is certain is that his idea of citizenship does not dispel the doubts that this is the ruling class’ tactic for keeping the reins of government in its hands. Dahrendorf’s conception falls within the elitist current of thought: on the one hand, an economic élite ensures that economic goods are available and, on the other, a political élite which, operating from within institutions through the political parties that rule the country based on democratic principles, ensures that increasingly large groups of people may have unconditional access to these goods.

In actual practices, according to Dahrendorf’s lib/lab approach, citizenship is the result of a political system that gradually strengthens the balance of provisions from the market and entitlements by the State. In his view, in
the ‘50s and ‘60s this combination worked well (based on Keynes’ model) and then in the ‘70s got stuck. In his opinion, the ‘80s witnessed a rise on the supply side (provisions of the supply side economy) and a decline in many entitlements (a great deal of universalistic entitlements were banned, not only those associated with a welfare system). Supposedly, the same trend went on during the ‘90s and early 2000s.

What is praiseworthy about this scheme is that citizenship is seen as a way to redistribute equality. However, it is also marred by many blatant limitations, especially of a sociological nature.

(a) In the lib/lab approach, society consists of intertwined economic and political interests, the rest is negligible in terms of citizenship and belongs to the private sphere. The European Union is criticized for giving provisions only, and no entitlements, thereby remaining purely economic in character and not developing the rights of citizenship. Of course, this is even more actual for the USA. This is all very well, but this approach, far from evaluating the social and cultural aspects, as it should, completely overlooks them. Cultural differences, in particular those shaping regional and national identities, are viewed by Dahrendorf only as hindering citizenship. Cultural features, including religious and ethnic ones, have no citizenship.

(b) In this approach no alternative exists to a citizenship that results from the combination of liberalism and socialism. According to Dahrendorf, the political power has only one duty to discharge, i.e. to ensure, at the same time, freedom and equality in having access to the citizenship entitlements against the background of one prerequisite and promise: freedom vs. system. Social solidarity does not come into play either as the basis for the democratic consensus that should promote the expansion and maintenance of entitlements or as a claim to citizenship in solidarity-oriented social forms.

(c) In the lib/lab approach, citizenship, by its unconditional definition, causes citizens to be ‘recipients’. One implication is that citizenship then is enjoined as a gracious grant, even though entitlements are given as rights and not as discretionary bonuses. This implies that nothing is said about the relationship of reciprocity, and therefore of duties on the part of the recipients. It is apparent that, as a rule, citizenship entails duties (such as taxes), but in Dahrendorf’s approach duties are unrelated to rights and may also be lacking (for instance in certain groups of outcasts who are supposed to have nothing to give society). In this approach, the very fact that citizenship is regarded as a mere status-giving entity implies that socially weak people are considered unable to have any socially relevant relations with others.

When confronted with this approach, one should ask oneself whether, based on these assumptions, a concept of citizenship that fits also complex
globalized societies can be developed. To my mind, there are deep cracks in the three above-mentioned assumptions. They can be pointed out as follows.

(a) What falls outside the dual concept of State and market is not unimportant with regard to citizenship, is not simply something ‘private’, but actually comprises elements that are vital to the very essence of citizenship. Who ever said that achieving a comprehensive citizenship means to level down all cultural differences (i.e. differences of identity) existing outside the market and the political spheres? It is a common slogan – as Dahrendorf claims – that citizenship will never be complete until it becomes worldwide in scope. This statement can hardly be disproved in theory, although in practice the necessary inferences are hardly ever drawn from it. The question, however, is of a different nature: one should rather wonder whether moving from the citizenship of a town/municipality to the citizenship of a nation-state and to that of supra-national communities (such as the European Union) up to a world citizenship may be possible only as long as primary identities are removed. Conversely, if one is to trust empirical research, one must concede that the present crisis of citizenship is precisely brought about by its inability to meet with the requirements of a multicultural society, i.e. from social-cultural identities that stem from outside the state/market areas. Multiculturalism is a challenge to the typical lib/lab citizenship. It requires what I call a «relational reason» if we want to recognize the cultural differences and give them a place in the complex of citizenship (Donati 2009).

(b) Citizenship as a question of balancing out freedom (requirements against the system) and equality (as an expedient value for the purpose of expanding the number of freedoms) is unconcerned with the problems of social adjustment that this very approach gives rise to, especially in late modern societies. There is no need to go to such an extreme as to be haunted by the problem of social order – as someone overcritically claims – to appreciate that, owing to its very mode of operation, the combination of freedom and equality, as is advocated by the lib/lab conception, causes huge social problems. These arise from the restriction of (limited or enlarged) reciprocity resulting from an improper usage of trade and political codes in social settings other than commercial or political. While acknowledging that planning (like any other system based on preceptorial programmes) provides no adequate regulatory solution; it is apparent that the lib/lab combination says virtually nothing about the problems of the global regulation of today’s social systems.

(c) Citizenship, conceived and implemented as an unconditional standard entitlement, carries the problem of the lack of reciprocity in expectations and behaviours that govern the relations between individuals and the state as well as between individual citizens. This concept of citizenship may easily deterio-
rate into welfare statism and, ultimately, entirely rest on the resources available to the upper classes to face the ups and downs of business cycles.

After all, lib/lab thinkers do not appear to have a deep understanding of the historical inconsistencies that developed since the ‘80s-‘90s. They did not actually understood why the lib/lab configuration of the welfare state was structurally (and not temporarily) undermined by intrinsic reasons that were, and still are, dependent on the malfunctioning and fallacies of the market/state compromise. Moreover, the lib/lab thinkers have failed to grasp the meaning of regional claims to redraw the national citizenship in many countries, that they labelled – in Dahrendorf’s definition – as ‘tribal’ re-occurrences, rather than as expressions of community cultures that, in a given area, try to re-define the relation between universal and particular values. And what is more, lib/lab thinkers provide no suggestions as to how rights (entitlements) can be further extended and enlarged in the event that, after having carried tax systems to an extreme, tax levying should be reduced (as it has happened in recent years in Scandinavian countries).

More generally, lib/lab thinkers failed to understand that the concept of modern citizenship as production of wealth through the market and subsequent redistribution via entitlements, by means of universalistic centralized mechanics, is over. Regarding the development of citizenship as a sheer extension of the public welfare state amounts to moulding society according to a panoptic form of systemic control, which, far from solving a multitude of social problems, actually gives rise to a host of unintentional perverse effects.

In addition: where is the «enlightened élite», advocated by Dahrendorf, that should promote the social progress of the fringe groups (the under-privileged, illegal immigrants, drop-outs, etc.) to be found? Then, how can one be sure that the principle of citizenship as a mere expansion of entitlements may still work, should expectations and claims increase? Or if severe economic structural or temporary junctures exist? And what about the new migrants? As for them, is it only a question of granting or denying a universalistic and unconditional citizenship or can other intermediate solutions exist, that are particularly suited to handle provisional situations or instances of transit through a country? Unfortunately, Dahlendorf cannot answer all these questions.

Failing a sufficiently complex picture, the lib/lab visione is unable to give useful suggestion on how to meet the major challenges citizenship is currently confronted with. They do not seem to realize that the new social evils are not linked to an unequal access to the market supplies due to political constraints, but rather in the unresolved issue of a good socio-cultural integration and in an increasing malfunctioning of the correlations between system and social integration (Archer 1996) within the new globalization processes.
Redefining citizenship as the social relation linking the subjects of a political community

So far, citizenship has been defined as a collection of rights and duties of individual and collective subjects towards the political community which they belong to, whereas the political community has been basically identified with the nation-state. However, the political community can no longer be identified only with the national political system. The aggregate of rights and duties changes with the meaning of what is a ‘political community’.

What is the sociological nature of this aggregate? It is an assemblage of political subjects’ mutual expectations, the citizens, on the one hand, and institutions representing and forming the political community, on the other. This assemblage must be shaped according to the values and rules that govern the institutions and procedures related to citizenship. What does this ‘shape’ look like? It is a link between rights and duties that must be given a sociological meaning.

A right of citizenship is usually thought of as the actual opportunity to have one’s expectations fulfilled or to demand services as citizens (i.e. as members of the same political body). Speaking of social rights, welfare services are actually ‘owed’ to citizens (Parker 1975). In this configuration, however, the right of citizenship does not reveal its ‘relational content’: on what account should one be entitled to or demand something? Just on the account of an ascribed status? But, in a complex society, there is not such thing as an ascribed status. In this kind of society, even the citizen’s status must be reconsidered based on relational criteria. The same applies for duties. As a rule, a citizenship-related duty is regarded as the obligation to provide whatever the political community, through its legitimate institutions, may ask of citizens for the good of the whole community. But who are these institutions but the very same citizens who are responsible for running them?

In short, the aggregate of citizenship contains a pattern of mutual obligations among all those who, as citizens, bind (tie) one another through the political institutions. Reconsidering the contents of citizenship is then tantamount to reconsidering this relational pattern of mutual obligations.

The decline of citizenship can be given many different interpretations; basically, however, it has to do with the lack of an adequate balance, in terms of mutual exchange and meaningful functioning between the rights and duties of either party (citizens and institutions), since here too the theorem of double contingency will hold.

In other words, when asking for being entitled to rights, citizens must be aware of the duties that go with it. And public institutions, on their part, must clarify the gains and social costs of this trade-off – as Janowitz (1980) had
warned quite a long time ago. Citizenship can be thought of as a balanced relation between citizens and institutions: a dynamically balances, interactive (mutual), straightforward (frank) relationship that can be controlled within the scope considered. Many have emphasized that these features are becoming more and more elusive and unlikely.

Whether one sets (and envisions) this sort of relationship in an ancient polis, in the medieval city-state, in a city of the 19th century or in today’s cities, the scenario will change completely. And one may wonder how this balance can be accomplished in a complex and globalized society. The answer that I propose is: societal citizenship. Let me explain what this configuration can mean.

In the lib/lab approach the question of the connections between rights and duties is not even raised, as this ideological strand does not think in terms of relations. A simplified approach was taken: private rights, on the one hand, and public duties on the other (according to a revised version of the well-known Mandeville’s paradigm). In summary, concerning the question of the balance between the rights and the duties associated with citizenship, the lib/lab orientation claims that regulations are needed, which must be as consistent and centralized as possible, depending on the highest possible number of individual options.

Everybody would then be entitled to take advantage of whatever is available, on the same footing as everybody else, so that similar needs would be fulfilled similarly, with no social, economic, political or racial groups being discriminated against.

Political decisions and public services must necessarily be centralized, i.e. in line with the philosophy and social practice of redistribution (meaning that resources are collected by a central unit, that re-allocate them to the periphery) according to political criteria.

This approach is tainted by severe limitations, because it is based on a (purely political) a priori definition of citizenship. It takes no notice of the existing differences in social arrangements and of the various circumstances and different relational contexts in and through which citizenship must be actually implemented.

Lawrence Mead’s (1986) criticism can therefore be readily understood. He pointed out two main flaws in this approach. First of all, it takes it for granted that a big or large government must necessarily be better than a small one,

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4 To quote Julia Parker (1975: 145), appealing to the principles of citizenship to demand services or resources amounts to suggesting that individual standards of living must be defended through political decisions ensuring previously agreed levels of health or social services, education, income and so on, with complete disregard of the individual bargaining power.
which, in his opinion, is not the case. The second, and even more important, fault concerns the nature of the government: there are social policies that promote civilization and independence and others which, on the contrary, promote the lack of civilization and dependence. Now, Mead claims, the post-war welfare state plans, especially in North America, failed, not on account of their extent, but of their permissive style: they asked for nothing in return for the aid they granted (and still grant) to the individuals and the social groups concerned.

His charge is that a lib/lab policy pursues the goal of creating a society made up of average men, in which – as he contends – «no opposition exists between freedom and equality». Equality simply means freedom to be at the mercy of the charitable assistance provided by public institutions, which is contrary to the real meaning of «equal citizenship». In his opinion equality also involves common duties, in addition to rights.

Mead places particular emphasis on the educational role citizenship plays, and should play, as an assemblage of individual rights, but also of common duties that lib/lab policies tend to do away with. He suggests that the style of citizenship should be altered (i.e. made less permissive) through authoritative social policies setting minimum behaviour requirements to be entitled to rights. In other words, citizens should be asked to commit themselves to a reasonable social integration (or re-integration). This all means that, while by virtue of the principle of citizenship the state pledges to offer the needy all the necessary help, citizens should be urged by the same welfare-oriented legislation, regardless of whether a large or small government is in office, to give the community whatever is in their power to offer, and, in particular, their commitment to look for a job, to be adequately educated to be able to find one and not to trespass the law.

The empirical documentation provided by Mead leads us to conclude that the lib/lab concept of citizenship triggers a self-defeating way of thinking, which fails to offer any citizenship, in that it fails to recognise that rights and duties are forms of social relation, on the part of both citizens and institutions. A sustainable theory of citizenship must be able to produce and preserve a mutual balance between these relations.

Taking a step forward requires that at least three focal issues are dealt with, which instead were largely neglected by the lib/lab thinkers.

(a) Citizenship is undoubtedly the expression of a social contract, which, however, rests on non-contractual premises. In summary, citizenship consists of some elements, that are the products of interests, strategies and plays of power, and of others that represent non-negotiable objects. Lib/lab thinkers do appreciate this by word of mouth, but fail to get to the bottom of the problem, for this would imply a discussion on the rights of human beings and social groups, which fall outside their analysis and evaluation patterns.
(b) Citizenship for them is and will always be a question (assignment) resulting from the mutual exchange and interplay between the state and the market. As a consequence, what, in a society, is alien to the state-market interrelation is underestimated, or altogether disparaged. They regard social and cultural pluralism not as a basis and expression of citizenship, but rather as a mixed blessing, as a sort of constant threat to citizenship, and go so far as to consider, all in all, the third sector and the social private sector as something residual, as pure voluntarism, that in principle detracts from citizenship although it can be useful to solve many social issues (poverty, social emargination, etc.).

(c) The lib/lab idea of citizenship is and remains one of ‘donation’ of rights – agreed, deserved or gained as this may be. This requires that someone, whether a national state or a community of member states, is responsible for doling out (granting) these rights. However, in the late modern society the state is no longer the pillar and/or summit of citizenship. Today rights largely arise from outside the established state organization and the entitlements it grants under the positive law, and are instead associated with human beings and the social groups these form part of. This is now once again the core of the citizenship issue, as it used to be in the early modern times.

A novel approach to citizenship does require that these issues, absolutely post-Marshall, be addressed: citizenship becomes a new modality in which homme et citoyen can relate to each other, thus a new scenario arises. Either citizenship pays attention to human beings’ living conditions or is lost.

The question of citizenship beyond modernity so requires much more than a sheer implementation of the ’89 principles. Modern citizenship can legitimately be viewed as a perfectible concept or an unfulfilled utopia. After-modern citizenship, however, must necessarily be something else: the question of how to deal with the living conditions of human beings as such, in situations of extreme diversity. It thus becomes a question of recognizing and handling dissimilarities and, as such, it undermines the very cultural foundations of democracy and rights. In summary, it is not only a matter of the different ways and means for implementing citizenship according to a historical continuity that is believed to be the only possible one.

In a complex society only through processes of adequate differentiation and spreading of citizenship-associated relations can problems be overcome. It is in this context that the theory of societal citizenship comes into play to provide answers (Donati 2000). This revises Tocqueville’s paradigm of liberal democracy, in that it introduces the concept of a (social) democracy deeply concerned with primary and secondary relations, which envisages and indeed promotes an associative, most competent and self-managed citizenship, in the
framework of a welfare state that ensures a smooth operation of the citizen’s rights and duties through a relational management, which takes care of and coordinates social policies in a reflexive, non-monopolistic and non-residual manner (Donati 2015).

**The social morphogenesis of citizenship**

My main argument is that what we are used to call ‘classic’ modern citizenship has been distinctive of an industrial society. It has survived well beyond the latter. It is in the so-called globalized societies that the complex of citizenship must face radical changes. In this new historical-social context, in order to understand the content, forms and procedures of citizenship, we need a new conceptual framework. I will refer to the «morphostatic/morphogenetic approach» (M/M) launched by Archer (1995) and developed by a team of scholars together with her (Archer 2013, 2014 and 2016).

The general scheme of the M/M paradigm is presented in figure 1. If we observe a certain social relation (as citizenship can be) existing at a given moment, time T1, and in a given empirical context, we can see that it is conditioned by a certain social structure (the term ‘structure’ is meant to include the various cultural, normative, political and economic dimensions of society). The social relation ‘citizenship’ is embedded into the social structure of that particular context. Like all social relations it is agency-dependent. Therefore, we can observe it in the way it is acted by actors (primary and corporate agents) over time, i.e. in the phase between time T2 and time T3. In this phase, the actors actualize the relation of citizenship by making choices and interacting among them, within the given opportunities and constraints. After this phase, at time T4, an elaborated structure emerges, that depends on how the previous networks of relations have been configured. These networks could reproduce the same starting form of citizenship, which means morphostasis, or they can generate a new one, morphogenesis.

If we apply this general scheme to the specific case of the lib/lab citizenship as the starting, conditioning structure (figure 2), since I assume that the lib/lab is the overall configuration of advanced societies, we can observe what follows.

At time T1, citizenship is configured according to a lib/lab structure. When the individual and collective actors have to actualize it (phase T2-T3), they have various options. They can accept or reject the definition of the situation, they can redefine their own demands for rights, they can elaborate new ways of pursuing what they think are their rights and combine them in different modes. Our age has been called «the age of rights», meaning that new
generations of rights are created again and again (Bobbio 1990). In my previous works, I have defined the complex of citizenship as a set of four types: civil rights (individual freedoms referred to the institutions of the public sphere as a market), political rights (referred to the electoral rights of political democracy), social rights (related to welfare and wellbeing), and human rights (referred to human relations) (Donati 2000). These rights of citizenship (and the related obligations) have a different dynamics in the different spheres of society. If we understand them in analytical terms, they can be defined and practiced in multiple ways not only in the political system, but also in the other spheres of society, i.e. in the economy, the educational system, families, voluntary associations, etc. Empirically, then, in each sphere of society, citizenship can be configured as a complex of rights and duties – usually written, at a very abstract level, on a Charter – that specifies the fundamental values, the situated goals, the means and instruments to pursue them, and the rules or norms for the organization and functioning of the procedures of implementation. The point is that all these components of citizenship de facto change over time, by interacting with each other.

In some cases, what changes first are fundamental values, because of a new interplay at the border between the previous values and the latent function of the cultural system (Donati 2011). Ever new human rights emerge, which ask for inclusion into the complex of citizenship. For instance, take the legal rights to change one’s own gender identity, with or without changing one’s body connotations, which is now recognized in European countries. As a consequence, all the other dimensions of the citizenship complex come to be
redefined. In this example, what changes is the complex of rights concerning the couple and family relationships. In other cases, what changes first is the availability of new technologies, which create a new citizenship right, what is now called digital citizenship: i.e. the equal access to internet as a fundamental right for all citizens.

To put it bluntly, there are three main paths through which the morphostatic/morphogenetic processes can proceed (central part of figure 2):

(a) the actors are confined to reproduce the existing complex of citizenship as it is fixed in the lib/lab conditioning structure (bound morphogenesis); this does not mean that there is no change at all, but, instead, that changes occur within the lib/lab structure (by changing the balance between freedom and equality, i.e. between market provisions and state entitlements);

(b) the actors disengage from the constraintes and limitations of the conditioning structure, look for other opportunities, and create networks of interactions – including forms of partnership – in which they elaborate a new complex of citizenship that does not have any pre-ordered arrangement, by being accidental, odd, or even chaotic (morphogenesis unbound);

(c) the actors create networks of relations that operate through some short of relational steering: in this case, I talk of «relational morphogenesis» in so far as the generation of new forms of citizenship is pursued by giving priority to the relational rights of citizenship; by «relational rights» I mean the rights inherent in the human relations, not in the individuals as such; it is in this case that the new rights of citizenship elaborated by and for collective subjects emerge; these rights are concerned with the production of common goods as relational goods (Donati and Archer 2015: 198-228).

Along these three paths, the lib/lab citizenship can be confirmed or undergo constant changes. It will be too long to examine all these possibilities. What I want to emphasize is that, in the phase T2-T3, fewer and fewer actors manage to combine freedom and equality as the lib/lab conditioning structure would like to. Therefore, alternative forms of elaboration and regulation of citizenship rights spring up. And this happens at all territorial levels of society, from neighborhoods to the cities, to the regions and state, right up to the supranational organizations and transnational networks. One speaks, for example, of civic citizenship in the social streets, corporate citizenship, hybrid forms of public-private governments, multinational forms of citizenship through transfers between governments, and other forms of regulations of rights and duties pertaining to what we are used to call citizenship (Teubner 1993).

The structure that emerges at time T4 is the product of these different paths of stability or change. The relation of citizenship can become configured in different modes:
(a) in the case of morphostasis, the interactions of phase T2-T3 regenerate the initial social structure of the lib/lab citizenship, which does not mean that there are no changes at all, change can occur within the double bind of the lib/lab structure;

(b) the interactions of phase T2-T3 produce social structures with anomic citizenship (fragmented citizenship without generalized standards), e.g. in situations of anarcho-capitalism;

(c) the interactions of phase T2-T3 produce social structures endowed with a relational citizenship, i.e. social norms centered on the nexus between freedom and responsibility and aimed at promoting the sociability of social networks by sustaining the qualities and specific causal properties of their specific relations.

As Hulgård (2015) has rightly observed, what is at stake is a new perspective on the relations between civil society and the state. The new citizenship must rely upon relational goods, co-production and societarian networks, within a societal configuration in which the state can and must play a role of support to a vibrant civil society. In a way, the model presented here for the study of how citizenship is changing in advanced societies refers to those social innovations which have been labelled «associational democracy» (Hirst 1994), «welfare community» (Rodger 2000), and in similar other ways. They can be conceptualized by referring to a general theory of a «relational society» (Donati 2011).

In respect to Zincone’s theory (1992), I wish to underline the need to go beyond the conventional dichotomy between forms of citizenship that are universalistic or particularistic. In her analyses, universal forms of citizenship are statist by definition, while particularistic forms of citizenship are called ‘societal’ in so far as they are described as an essential tool to withhold or grant peculiar and private privileges. It is for this reason that, above and beyond the historical investigation, her approach remains lib/lab in character. She suggests that democracy can continuously improve if and insofar as it manages to expand in number and magnitude the existing rights of a statist citizenship and accord them to increasingly wider groups of social drop-outs. But, from the viewpoint of relational sociology, there are many other possibilities, other chances and ways out of the morphogenetic processes.

When confronted with the limits and aporias of the normative lib/lab philosophy, it becomes imperative to understand which empirical types of citi-

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3 «In its extreme form the societal system is one in which the most powerful social groups (ethnic and religious majorities, the pick of the manual workers, businessmen etc.) control and take advantage of the state to preserve and add to their privileges» (Zincone 1992: 82).
Citizenship can emerge in the different contexts. Figure 3 depicts four possible types, depending on how, in the intermediary phase T2-T3 of the morphogenetic process, the primary and corporate actors will interact and configure the complex of citizenship.

The typology is built upon two distinctions: the types of actor’s stances (demands for new rights) and the degree of autonomy of those who are entitled to the rights and duties of citizenship as a social relation linking the members of a political community.

If we conceive of modern citizenship as a progressive sequence of entitlements that embodies the concept and the practical implementation of the transition from authoritarian systems to democracy (or indeed democracies), even though this transition is neither taken for granted nor irreversible, the final outcome of the morphogenetic process, in the long run, can be foreseen in terms of six ideal types.
If we read figure 3, by column, we find three kinds of citizenship which can be labelled ‘governmental models’ since the rights are recognized and regulated by the state or political system, and the ‘societal models’, where, on the opposite, the rights recognized and regulated by corporations, civil associations or civil constitutions. The latter have been described by Teubner (2012).

If we read figure 3, by row, we find the specificities of these forms according to the way in which the kind of actors’ demands for new rights and the degree of autonomy of those entitled to rights can be combined:

(a) particularistic demands for new rights, when associated with a weak autonomy, configure a fragmentate state citizenship, while, when associated with a strong autonomy, configure a corporative societal citizenship;

(b) generalized demands for new rights, when associated with a weak autonomy, configure a centralized state citizenship, while, when associated with a strong autonomy, configure a kind of citizenship stemming from what has been called ‘societal constitutionalism’;

(c) relational or societarian demands for new rights, when associated with a weak autonomy, configure civic forms of citizenship regulated by the political system, while, when associated with a strong autonomy, configure societarian or associational forms of citizenship in a ‘plural’ and ‘relational’ political system promoting social autonomies.

In order to better understand the very many implications inherent in this conceptualization of citizenship, I wish to emphasize one of them which is fundamental to me. This is the fact that the old distinction right/left in

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the political system has lost its significance (Giddens 1994), although not its function as it has been pointed out by Luhmann (1981 and 2002). In terms of substantial or ‘deep’ citizenship (Clarke 1996), the right/left binary code is replaced by the distinction between human and non-human. There are many reasons why a complex, globalized society cannot develop its multiple forms of citizenship being based upon the political right/left distinction as the guiding distinction for the citizenship complex of rights and duties. A fundamental one is that such a distinction is based upon the idea that human relations can be dealt with in terms of positive or negative feedbacks, while only relational feedbacks can be adequate to such a social relation as citizenship (Donati 2013). The binary distinction human/non-human must and can be managed in a relational way which is not available to the right/left distinction. What distinguishes after-modern societies is indeed the fact that they focus on the distinction between the human and non-human character of whatever they refer to as a citizenship right or duty, using the distinction between right and left only as a procedure. Old distinctions are unable to deal with the new scenario.

As a matter of fact, what I call after-modern citizenship is characterized by a growing and unavoidable differentiation and autonomous emancipation of the «different areas of existence» (Crespi 1994) or various «social sub-systems» (Luhamnn 1990). As every «area of living» (family, religion, education, business, science, etc.) or sub-system becomes a separate (self-sustained) province in terms of meanings and interactions, it can come into conflict with others. Which is (and indeed must be) exactly the case, if a differentiation and emancipation of each relational subject, individual or collective, is to be obtained or, at least, endorsed (Donati and Archer 2015).

If the decline in religious and rational values and ideologies (which is actually a synergistic and interactive process with that of social differentiation) is added to the picture, it becomes apparent why and how typical modern citizenship must necessarily suffer a setback: because the gap between people’s everyday lives and political institutions is bound to grow wider. And there is no way to reconcile the two worlds, under the umbrella of citizenship, to a universalistic whole, since, according to Crespi (1994), the focus is being shifted from the conventional requests for greater equality, freedom from exploitation and fairer allocation of resources to the recognition of one’s rights to diversity, in natural and social conditions that allow one to fulfill his or her life’s desires and expectations.

The national social system’s solidarity falls apart and is replaced by local, ethnic and confined forms of solidarity, that are regarded by lib/lab scholars as particularistic and separate identities. This poses the question of how to reconcile these fragmented units into social aggregates which, while shielding
the autonomies that ensure the maintenance of pluralism, can refound basic social solidarity upon universalistic (though not universally agreed) values.

Where can then a solution be found? Crespi believes that particularism can be overcome by giving new and greater consideration to human living conditions as such, while acknowledging the fact that we have a poor understanding of them. On the one hand, individual differences cannot be defined, unless labels are used (male/female, black/white, north/south, ethero/homo-sexual, etc.); on the other, however, we are aware that we all share the condition of living, even though we have little knowledge of what it is all about.

According to Crespi, each of us could form one’s own identity, not just because one fits in with particularistic labels, but due to the fact that one can develop one’s own «inborn power», i.e. the ability to deal with the contradictions resulting from the coexistence of individual and collective needs, of the need for reassurance and stability and for innovations that enable one to keep pace with the changing historical conditions.

The phrase «inborn power» used by Crespi generally refers to individual autonomy without more specifically defining their characteristics than as «an active socially responsible force». The suggested interpretation is appealing. However one wonders who can ensure this social responsibility. Crespi admits that such a political culture not only does not exist today and cannot be envisaged for the future, but it should comprise new forms of (symbolic) mediation, which, however, as with all forms of symbolic mediation, may distort and lead it astray (Crespi 1989).

Crespi rejects the solution whereby (any) normative model should have priority over one’s objective life experiences. He labels it as being characteristic of a «right-wing trend», which considers life’s experiences a dangerous source of indefiniteness, gives absolute priority to the question of order and makes a case for the instrumental reason typical of the technological system. Conversely, belonging to the left wing means, in his view, «to face the complex reality resulting from the transformations in progress without any prejudices» as well as to enquire into the relation between ethnics and politics through its practical ability to handle, in a more balanced way, the relationship between the forms of normative management ensuring social stability and the indeterminacies of the actual, individual and collective experiences.

In short, the post-modern discussion about citizenship is at the crossroads. Either Luhmann’s solution is embraced and the humanistic components of citizenship are neglected, thus giving up any idea of emancipation/liberation and regarding citizenship as a sheer element of functional inclusion, a sub-system for a sub-system, depending on the circumstances. Or it only remains to be hoped that new forms of symbolic mediation of human experience may develop, which can reconcile a due regard for individual differences and the
recognition of common conditions as human beings. The latter argument is certainly more appealing. However, a critical insight into it does not leave much room for hope as the forms of mediation it calls for will always be reductive and rest on no other grounds than their own intrinsic contradiction. How can the promise of a better citizenship be fulfilled using all the necessary means, however expedient? The answer lies on our existential conscience.

Unlike lib/lab thinkers, who are confined within the bounds of modernity, where citizenship is nothing else but reconciling politics with a normative philosophy that tries to ensure more freedom and equality at the same time, postmodern theorists are confronted with an altogether different problem. Since they endorse the idea that citizenship should be decontrolled, it follows that all its contents, including freedom and equality, become not only differentiated, independent and discrete, but also something of a problem. In fact, keeping them together is virtually impossible, even less so in a top-down modality.

Society is supposed to recognise human rights, but there are no foundations or sociological conditions for it to do so. Modern citizenship means equal rights, for individuals and social groups, to diversity and individuality. It is the political system that is responsible for granting these rights. This is how Marshall is re-interpreted, also by the neo-Fabians, who believed that, according to his idea of politics, the state should develop and defend citizenship, as a number of conditions whereby citizens are allowed to do and to be what they like, provided that all other citizens may enjoy the same rights and powers.

Whatever course one may choose to take — either a troubled existentialism or a new blossom of civil associationism — the old normative bases of citizenship are lost. I believe this is also the meaning of the argument, whereby a sort of after-modern civism would be developing (Belohradsky 1989).

Conclusions

Today a new approach, envisaging a citizenship beyond the age of the welfare state, urges us to take a closer look at the question of how identities and solidarities can be combined in a non regressive form. We must observe that the context of political inclusion, as is provided for by public institutions, outlines the visible aspects of citizenship, while leaving out the domain of individuals’ concrete and relational experiences, i.e. the environment of their social identification.

On the other hand, the growing difficulties in establishing citizenship rights upon the premises of rational choice models seem to suggest that individuality is a social fabric that is historically modelled by cultures and values. A more in-depth anthropological examination is needed, which does not hide
human beings’ own relations (about their affective life, gender and generation) within a formal framework of expectations (the conditioning structure of figure 2), but on the contrary raises them to the awareness of self-definition and uses them as the basis for their determination processes. It is the human person who weighs and assesses the concurrent diversities of interests, duties and opportunities in the light of one’s responsibilities and commitments to other people. Such an anthropological outlook invites us to distinguish between the rights which stem from the individual self as the sole criterion of choice and action (with self-defeating outcomes) and rights which write down a common institutional ground, as rules and resources meant to express a self-normative and relational subjectivity.

Some scholars come to refer to a new «democracy of sympathetic citizens», capable of embodying, within themselves and in their institutions, the intricate interplay of relations that make up one’s subjectivity (Rei 1994).

In conclusion, if a new citizenship is possible, this cannot come either before or after the condition of sympathetic citizens, but it can only come along with it. In other terms, it cannot have characteristics and meanings that differ from the means of confidence, exchange and government prevailing in a society and shaping social relations. One should then switch from the concept of a citizens’ state to one of citizens’ society.

What means to be a human being and what means to be a person in a social networks: these are the key issues of the after- (or trans-) modern citizenship. Whereas modern citizenship – until Parsons (1971) – means that everybody can have access to equal roles (although with different outcomes) and post-modern citizenship – until Luhmann (2002) – means that everybody can have access to equal means of communication, it appears that the new post-functional societal citizenship takes place in an interactive and relational framework.

If one thinks this way, one can readily understand how much the resulting concept of the societal model presented here differs from the old liberal, socialist and lib/lab conceptions. Now it no longer amounts to enhancing the private-particular side of life nor to fight for a more collective and public-universalistic configuration of society, but it is rather to be seen as the approach and practice whereby citizenship, in all its various (ethic, social, political and civil) components is allowed to break free from the intermingling of particular and universal, individual and collective, private and public connotations, as opposed to each other in relational terms.

Societal citizenship lays emphasis on the sociability and relational characters of the rights that concern it, since it consists of a number of primary and secondary rights and duties governing the individuals’ mutual relations. It highlights both the relational character of individual rights and duties and the rights and duties pertaining to the civil and civic forms of association. In
addition, it addresses the issue of citizenship not as a normative event, occurring ‘from above’, but rather as an actual experience – which, of course, does include a normative component, this being, however, the result of a bottom-up approach, i.e. originating in the subjects’ wills – of belonging to a number of relations governing individuals, families and broader social groups as the subjects of citizenship in particular times and places.

Although a corporative societal citizenship is a (morally negative) possibility, given the present trends of social morphogenesis in late modernity, what I think we have to look at are those societal forms of citizenship does not ignore or try and conceal the fact that, in those times and places, being citizens means to recognize and handle social inequalities and cultural differences in an organized fashion, based on a management of one’s standing and pursuing the goals of solidarity and universalistic living together between the various members of the political community they want to live in, defined as the relational good of people practicing mutual trust, cooperation and reciprocity. There are many empirical evidences that, sociologically speaking, a new societal semantics is emerging, where citizenship appears as the whole of rights and duties of individuals and social groups, arranging civic life into a number of universalistic autonomies capable of reconciling collective goals and self-management practices solidarity and identity issues. This is the challenge that our more and more complex and globalized society has to meet. The name of the game is societal citizenship, one that promotes the citizenship of civil and social autonomies, including not only regional and local ones, but also emerging societarian networks and transnational communities.

References


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6 I would rather refer to the concept of ‘belonging’ than to that of ‘incorporation’ used by Harrison (1991) to define the bond between citizens. Though the concept of belonging can be construed as something synonymous with inclusion, it should be pointed out that, unlike inclusion, it stresses the fact that citizenship means to be a subject of a political community based on relations of social interdependence (i.e. a person is treated as a citizen in that he/she is a member of a local community, of a family, of a profession, of an association, of a school, of a neighbourhood or of any other milieu, depending on his/her age or gender).


